Nuclear weapons test effects: debunking popular exaggerations that encourage proliferation

‘Science is the organized skepticism in the reliability of expert opinion.’ - Richard Feynman, in Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics, Houghton-Mifflin, 2006, p. 307. In 1896, Sir James Mackenzie-Davidson asked Wilhelm Röntgen, who discovered X-rays in 1895: ‘What did you think?’ Röntgen replied: ‘I did not think, I investigated.’ The reason? Cathode ray expert J. J. Thomson in 1894 saw glass fluorescence far from a tube, but due to prejudice he avoided investigating that X-ray evidence!

Friday, October 23, 2009

Factual evidence versus the consensus of ignorant opinion and propaganda during the 1957 U.S. Congressional Hearings on the Effects of Nuclear Fallout



On May 27, 28, 29 and June 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1957, the Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session on The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, were held openly under the Chairmanship of Representative Chet Holifield of California, with media attendance. The published hearings are 2,216 pages in length, printed in three separate volumes (part 1 is pages 1-1,008, part 2 contains pages 1,009-2,065, and part 3 contains pages 2,067-2,216). During the debates between experts in these hearings, the "threshold dose" concept for long term effects was falsely killed off, in favour of Edward Lewis's linear non-threshold dose-effects "law" using non-scientific arguments and fears.



Above: this is the graph Professor Edward Lewis used on page 956 of the 1957 fallout hearings to attack the threshold dose evidence: for this purpose it relies on one allegedly solid data point for leukemia induction below 200 rem (numbers below data points are the excess numbers of leukemias over the natural number expected). This smallest dose data point is from the data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki available in 1957: there were 10 cases of leukemia out of 23,000 survivors at 1.5-2 km from ground zero in both cities, and from the unexposed control group only 4 would have been expected to have leukemia. Hence, the average radiation dose to those 23,000 survivors - assumed to be 25 rem using the very crude and inaccurate dosimetry which was available in 1957 - gave an excess cancer rate of 10 - 4 = 6 cases per 23,000 survivors. This is statistically insignificant, as testified by Dr Shields Warren on page 980. Moreover, Lewis ignored data from nuclear bomb survivors who received low doses and had a reduced leukemia risk as a consequence: page 1887 gives a table of leukemia results from Hiroshima available in 1957 which shows that there were 8 leukemia cases in the control group of 50,500 people beyond 2.5 km from ground zero (i.e. a rate of 0.016%), and only 2 cases in the 17,200 survivors who received low doses of radiation at 2-2.5 km (i.e. a rate of 0.012%). Hence, that table (from a U.S. National Academy of Sciences report, Pathologic Effects of Atomic Radiation, submitted as testimony) showed even in 1957 that low doses of radiation appeared to have a beneficial effect in reducing the natural cancer incidence below the rate in the control group. Lewis simply ignored this data which did not fit into his dogmatic linear non-threshold theory. Later data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki has far better, accurate and verified (against nuclear test data from the Pacific and Nevada) dosimetry as well as leukemia and solid cancer (tumor) data spanning over six decades: it confirms that threshold and beneficial effects exist but is suppressed and censored by the Japanses-American funded Radiation Effects Research Foundation to keep Lewis's false linear non-threshold dogma alive for political expediency.

‘Professor Edward Lewis used data from four independent populations exposed to radiation to demonstrate that the incidence of leukemia was linearly related to the accumulated dose of radiation. ... Outspoken scientists, including Linus Pauling, used Lewis’s risk estimate to inform the public about the danger of nuclear fallout by estimating the number of leukemia deaths that would be caused by the test detonations. In May of 1957 Lewis’s analysis of the radiation-induced human leukemia data was published as a lead article in Science magazine [E. B. Lewis, 'Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation', Science, v. 125, pp. 965-972, 17 May 1957]. In June he presented it before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the US Congress.’ – Abstract of thesis by Jennifer Caron, Edward Lewis and Radioactive Fallout: the Impact of Caltech Biologists Over Nuclear Weapons Testing in the 1950s and 60s, Caltech, January 2003.



Lewis's pseudo-scientific linear non-threshold deception in testimony to Congress led to Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling using the data to estimate that strontium-90 in nuclear weapons testing would cause 1,000 leukemia deaths for each fission megaton of air bursts, by giving a very tiny increase in background radiation to the bones of billions of people around the world. However, radium is deposited in the bone and by analogy to strontium-90 the data for 2,383 radium dial painters who ingested radium licking their brushes to a fine point shows that bone cancer induction requires a threshold of 1,000 rads, and there was no excess of leukemias. Nobody has ever received 1,000 rads from strontium-90 ingestion from a nuclear bomb (not even the Rongelapese who drank contaminated rainwater for two days 115 miles downwind from the 15 megaton BRAVO test in 1954). Both leukemia and thyroid cancer have traditionally had diagnosis problems. The rates reported in different communities, or the same communities at different times in history, vary widely due to the rate of diagnosis rather than the true incidence. For example, before the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the reported thyroid tumor rates in the Gomel region of Belarus (mean thyroid dose to kids = 17.7 rads) were under 1 case per 100,000; in the US it was 13,000 (13% of the population) and in Finland 35,600 (35.6%). The Gomel region started to diagnose thyroid problems properly only after Chernobyl and reported a peak of 17.9 cases per 100,000 children (0.0179%) in 1995. This statistic can be used both for and against radiation:

(1) The 1995 peak of 0.0179% of Gomel people with occult thyroid cancers after 17.7 rads to the thyroid from Chernobyl's iodine-131 shows a 25-fold increase over the incidence in 1987. Hence, radiation is terrible, and the iodine-131 from Nevada testing probably caused many cancers!

(2) The 1995 peak of 0.0179% of Gomel people with occult thyroid cancers after 17.7 rads to the thyroid from Chernobyl's iodine-131 shows a 726-fold reduction from the normal rate in the U.S. and a 2,000-fold reduction from the normal rate in Finland. Hence, radiation is great, and the iodine-131 from Nevada testing probably saved many people getting cancer!

This conflict of interpretation is typical of the quackery of "ecological" studies of cancer rates due to radiation: having a proper control group is essential to getting meaningful information because it's the only way to determine statistical significance and to calibrate diagnosis rates properly. Improved diagnosis led to a rise in the reported crude mortality rate for leukemia in the U.S. from 42 per million per year in 1940 to 68 in 1954. Unless you know the diagnosis efficiency, reported cancer rates are useless. A lot of the data that Lewis used is this kind of statistical noise, lacking proper control groups to determine if errors exist.

Dr John F. Loutit of the Medical Research Council, Harwell, England, in 1962 wrote a book called Irradiation of Mice and Men (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London), discrediting the pseudo-science from geneticist Edward Lewis on pages 61, and 78-79:


‘... Mole [R. H. Mole, Brit. J. Radiol., v32, p497, 1959] gave different groups of mice an integrated total of 1,000 r of X-rays over a period of 4 weeks. But the dose-rate - and therefore the radiation-free time between fractions - was varied from 81 r/hour intermittently to 1.3 r/hour continuously. The incidence of leukemia varied from 40 per cent (within 15 months of the start of irradiation) in the first group to 5 per cent in the last compared with 2 per cent incidence in irradiated controls. ...


‘What Lewis did, and which I have not copied, was to include in his table another group - spontaneous incidence of leukemia (Brooklyn, N.Y.) - who are taken to have received only natural background radiation throughout life at the very low dose-rate of 0.1-0.2 rad per year: the best estimate is listed as 2 x 10-6 like the others in the table. But the value of 2 x 10-6 was not calculated from the data as for the other groups; it was merely adopted. By its adoption and multiplication with the average age in years of Brooklyners - 33.7 years and radiation dose per year of 0.1-0.2 rad - a mortality rate of 7 to 13 cases per million per year due to background radiation was deduced, or some 10-20 per cent of the observed rate of 65 cases per million per year. ...


‘All these points are very much against the basic hypothesis of Lewis of a linear relation of dose to leukemic effect irrespective of time. Unhappily it is not possible to claim for Lewis’s work as others have done, “It is now possible to calculate - within narrow limits - how many deaths from leukemia will result in any population from an increase in fall-out or other source of radiation” [Leading article in Science, vol. 125, p. 963, 1957]. This is just wishful journalese.


‘The burning questions to me are not what are the numbers of leukemia to be expected from atom bombs or radiotherapy, but what is to be expected from natural background .... Furthermore, to obtain estimates of these, I believe it is wrong to go to [1950s inaccurate, dose rate effect ignoring, data from] atom bombs, where the radiations are qualitatively different [i.e., including effects from neutrons] and, more important, the dose-rate outstandingly different.’



Professor Edward Lewis's 1957 congressional fallout testimony on page 956 contradicts his testimony on page 959. He starts on page 956 stating that leukemia data is "rather good":

"... the reason that I am stressing leukemia today is that we have rather good data and rather good evidence on leukemia as compared to data on other effects on man from ionizing radiation ..."

Then on page 959 he admits that the leukemia data is not good at low doses:

"In the low-dose region here, there is a dashed line, and there are only six individuals on which to say anything. The point here, however, is that in the absence of any other information it seems to me - this is my personal opinion - that the only prudent course is to assume that a straight-line relationship holds here as well as elsewhere in the higher dose region.

"It may be that there is a threshold - that is, a dose below which leukemia will not develop. However, we can say safely, I think, that if there is a threshold dose it must be below 100 r. The reason for saying that is that in the region below 100 r, you would not expect to have gotten the 6 cases of leukemia as a result of chance more than 1 in 50 times."

Lewis simply ignores the effect of dose rate on cancer induction! The whole reason why the radium dial painters had a massive threshold of 1,000 rads for cancer, as opposed to a cancer threshold on the order of 5 rads at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is the dose rate. The radium dial painters received massive doses of radiation at low dose rates over a period of decades so that DNA repair mechanisms could repair many of the DNA breaks and reduce the cancer risk, while the doses at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were spread over just a matter of seconds at a very high dose rate, which was more liable to overload the DNA repair mechanism by causing breaks faster than they could be repaired, so that loose ends of DNA are "rejoined" to the wrong segment ends (this is unlikely at low dose rates because there is plenty of time for repair after each break before the next break occurs).

What happened in thise 1957 hearings was that geneticists like Lewis and also Nobel laureate Hermann Muller dogmatically believed from their fruit fly genetic data (totally inappropriate to humans) that radiation effects were a linear, non-threshold response to dose. Fruit flies and even mice are inappropriate because they are all short-lived and have evolved without the highly efficient DNA repair enzyme mechanisms used by long-lived human beings. (DNA is naturally being damaged all the time. This is a benefit to relatively short-lived bacteria, flies and mice because it allows them to evolve faster to changing environmental conditions, but it is a danger to humans because without efficient DNA repair, everyone would get cancer and die before the reproductive age of 20-40. Therefore, humans and other long-lived animals have evolved complex DNA repair systems which are effective at preventing both natural and radiation induced cancer up to a certain threshold dose rate; the data prove that only severe exposure overloads the DNA repair mechanisms and can cause cancer.)

Against these dogmatic crusading geneticists, the radiation cancer researchers testified cautiously in favour of a threshold dose for cancer induction using observational data. E.g., on pages 1147-1194 it is testified that there is a threshold dose of thousands of rads to the bones from radium required before any radium dial painter (who regularly licked the brush to get a fine point while working) received bone cancer many years later. On page 1558 it is shown that lung cancers to uranium mine workers who inhaled radon gas required lung doses of about 1,000-10,000 rads over a mean latent period of 17 years, while on page 1887 the data from Hiroshima showed that the small radiation doses at 2-2.5 km from the bombs caused a reduction in the leukemia incidence (0.012%) to slightly below the natural incidence (0.016%) that occurred in the control group beyond 2.5 km, although the numbers of cases were so few at that time that this particular evidence was not statistically significant (unlike the data available today, and indeed since about 1979). There was also weaker evidence from Dr Willard F. Libby on page 1517 that the leukemia incidence in the high-altitude city of Denver which is exposed to nearly double the cosmic radiation of San Francisco has only 62% of that in San Francisco (which is at sea level). On page 980, testimony is given that the background radiation dose over 30 years at sea level is 3.1 rads, but it is 5.5 rads in Denver due to the altitude and thus the increased cosmic radiation.

This kind of evidence for low level radiation benefits is "ecological" because it's not a properly controlled study: you have to apply hundreds of slightly uncertain correction factors to allow for the differences between the population of Denver to that of San Francisco - differences in smoking, drinking, age, diet, exercise and so on - so that the uncertainties in the hundreds of correction factors accumulate to generally make the overall result statistically insignificant. (The underlying reason why threshold evidence is ignored is simply that the critics of the linear non-threshold theory so far tend to promote very weak or quack evidence such as ecological studies which are just as much junk science as Ernest Sternglass's crackpottery, where he claims that the decrease in infant mortality due to medical improvements was somehow a natural exponential law which should have continued forever, and that the fact that it levelled off is thus to be considered proof of harm due to radiation from nuclear testing! Until all such propaganda and quackery, both pro- and anti-radiation, is removed from the scene, the facts will remain submerged by endless, unfruitful controversy.)

The case for a threshold was testified by the President for the American Association for Cancer Research, Dr Jacob Furth (who in 1928 was the first to discover that radiation can induce cancer in mice), and the United States representative to the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, pioneering radiation pathologist Dr Shields Warren (1898-1980) of the New England Deaconess Hospital in Boston. Dr Furth's statement on pages 978-9 gives the threshold dose-effects response the following scientific support:

"The complex mammalian host is capable of compensating for subtle damage. It has been shown that partial body irradiation is not conducive to leukemia development; the unexposed parts powerfully protect the exposed part. Thus, if direct hits cause mutation, humoral substances either counteract or reverse their actions. ... The early radiologists who got such cancers had severe radiation burns with chronic ulcers in which the tumors arose. ... It deserves emphasis that cancer did not arise on the hands of tens of thousands of people receiving huge quantities in small doses [allowing recovery between exposures] over long periods [an analogy here is ultraviolet radiation ionization to the skin from natural sun bathing; if you spread out your exposure and get a little each day, there is evidence that the risk of skin cancer is lower than if you get the same dose all in one brief exposure to a similar spectrum of radiation but received at an extremely high intensity on a sun bed which burns your skin badly, or while outdoors for many hours without any protection]. ... The very idea that leukemia and cancers result from a direct hit mutation was never solidly proven ... Newer evidence unquestionably indicates that some indirect factor [discovered decades later to be human DNA repair enzymes like protein P53, which are stimulated to can repair radiation induced DNA breaks in humans at low doses but of course become overloaded if the dose rate is too high and causes DNA strands to break repeatedly before they can be repaired correctly] plays a determining role in the development of leukemias or tumors."

Dr Shields Warren added on page 980: "I would like to point out that the results at the lower end of the scale that has been used by Dr Lewis [to try to defend the linear non-threshold theory] are not considered as actually statistically significant."

He added on page 981: "With acute or chronic radiation there is what is called a threshold effect in body cells. In other words, because many cells can continue to function even though irradiated and many cells in the body can be repaired even though damaged, we find that at low levels of radiation there is no observable effect."

More crucially, Dr Warren invoked the radium dial painters threshold dose data for the strontium-90 fallout leukemia propaganda on page 987:

"It is striking that in those persons who have had radium deposited in their bones there has been no evidence of leukemia, even though [after receiving massive doses of several thousands of rads] they have developed bone sarcoma [tumours]."

On page 1006, Dr Warren testified:

"I have favored the concept of a threshold for most carcinogenic agents for a number of reasons. First, that in our experiments with carcinogenic hydrocarbons, which are known to be derived from such substances as coal tar, we find that a threshold exists for them. We find that, with many of the medicines that are commonly used for one or another effect on cells, there is a threshold effect to those medicines. ... I like to think of this reparative force, these agents and others which Dr Furth mentioned, as being things which counteract the effect of very low level radiation."

Dr H. L. Friedell, Director of the Atomic Energy Medical Research Project in the School of Medicine at Western Reserve University, testified on page 1001, showing how statistical correlations of death rates in radiologists to the unexposed population can give totally false results unless there is an effort to understand the mechanism for radiation damage in detail:

"I think it is important to show that the activity of radiology itself does not attract into it people who are likely to have a higher death rate, especially at the higher ages, because very early in radiology an individual who had one sort of illness or another was often given the advice to enter radiology, because it appeared to be a sedentary occupation. ... It is difficult trying to make this decision from the statistics alone.

"An example of how this might occur is something that was presented by George Bernard Shaw ... Statistics were presented to him to show that as immunization increased, various communicable diseases decreased in England. He hired somebody to count up the telegraph poles erected in various years ... and it turned out that telegraph poles were being increased in number. He said, 'Therefore, this is clear evidence that the way to eliminate communicable diseases is to build a lot more telegraph poles'.

"All I would like to say here is that the important point is that if you really want to understand it, you have to look at the mechanism of the occurrence. I think this is where the emphasis should lie."

Dr Austin M. Brues, MD (born 1906, Director of the Biological and Medical Research Division of Argonne National Laboratory) added the following comments on page 1001 in support of the threshold:

"If you have two experiments with the same kind of mice treated in the same way, you will expect the second one to come out the same way the first one did. You take a prediction of that sort as simply representing honesty on the part of the investigator. That is why the experiment was repeated in which the irradiated mice lived a little longer because it was difficult to believe, and needed to be confirmed. I think perhaps a lot of our experiments that come out the 'right' way should be repeated too." [Emphasis added.]

On page 1007, Dr Ernest Pollard of Yale University's biophysics department agreed with Dr Friedell's remarks on the need to substantiate mere statistical studies with investigations on the biological mechanism for the radiation damage repair at low doses, but argued that in the meantime, to be "conservative", the linear non-threshold theory should be "assumed":

"... the conservative thing to do in obtaining that knowledge is to assume linearity and therefore no threshold."

The problem here is that once you dogmatically "assume" something in science, you can't later shift it when scientific data arises that challenges the dogma, because it becomes an ingrained foundation of the textbooks, the teaching courses, the "beliefs" of students studying radiology and health physics, researchers, and so on. E.g., dogmatically assuming that the earth is the centre of the universe seemed sensible at one time based on the available evidence, but it was later used to fend off evidence that the earth rotates daily and actually orbits the sun annually. The reason why the new evidence was censored was because the old dogmatic assumption had become an ingrained foundation of science. It is hard to shift foundations because foundations are assumed to be solid building blocks so that mainstream widely-believed theories are built upon them (e.g., Ptolemy's epicycle method of predicting planetary positions in the earth-centred universe model), and facts are endlessly arranged around them. Once a student had invested years learning Ptolemy's epicycle prediction method based on the foundation of the sun orbiting the earth, the student developed loyality to that model and an irrational belief in the foundations to that model, as well as a subject loyality. Criticism of dogmatic foundations was falsely dismissed by educated epicycle students as being "ignorant" or "anti-science".

On page 1143, Dr James F. Crow, professor of genetics and zoology at Wisconsin University, testified:

"I believe most geneticists are convinced that at least some of the somatic [cell division such as related to cancer; not inherited genetic] effects of radiation are of a linear non-threshold sort. I don't think anybody would be so dogmatic as to state that all such effects are or even what the fraction is."

Geneticist and Nobel laureate Dr Muller then stated on page 1143:

"My opinion is ... that the most important effects ... are in all probability linear without a threshold."

On page 1144, Senator Anderson commented favourably on the groupthink advocacy of the linear, non-threshold theory by all the geneticists who had testified:

"I am just wondering if geneticists had a union, guild or gang, or something that teaches you to hang together? This is ... certainly the most agreed group I have seen. I commend you of the fact that you have been able to hang together as long as you have through a rather long day."

Dr Crow then stated in response on page 1144 that their scientific dogma is firm, but not their quantitative facts that supposedly confirm the dogma:

"I think the conclusion that any effect of radiation is harmful is about as firm a scientific conclusion ever is. Of course, the quantitative figures are much less firm."

In other words, Dr Crow was advocating a religious type belief system, a pseudo-scientific dogma justified by majority opinion and the mere consensus of geneticists about cancer induction by radiation. As Feynman repeatedly spelled out, this dogmatic consensus of ignorant opinion is the opposite of science:

‘Science is the organized skepticism in the reliability of expert opinion.’ - Richard Feynman in Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics, Houghton-Mifflin, 2006, p. 307.

Dr Friedell testified on pages 902-3:

"In effect, what I am saying is large doses produce tumors and leukemia, and by 'large doses', I am talking about thousands of roentgens, many hundreds of roentgens. If you set yourself up with a model in which you show that these doses will produce tumors and leukemia, and then extrapolate down to low levels ... how good are these extrapolations - is this conjecture? Is this soundly conceived?

"I wish I could offer an authoritative statement right now to end all of this discussion, but unfortunately I cannot. However, I would like to say this: That I am concerned about the fact that there are no [statistically significant, June 1957] data at the very low levels. It is just nonexistent. Much below a hundred roentgens, or 25 roentgens in the case of mutations, we have no data. ... One of the reasons we are using large doses [in animal experiments] is that you have to have some kind of statistical security in looking at the information. To discover an effect which would occur once in 10,000 times, you would require an inordinate number of biological specimens ... for this reason we do not have really secure data."

On pages 904-6, Dr Friedell argued that cells must have some kind of DNA repair mechanism simply because most of the DNA damage due to radiation does not cause cancer; there is an immense amount of natural non-cancer causing cellular ionization caused by natural background radiation, which is so much more intense than global nuclear testing fallout from the hundreds megatons of thermonuclear tests during the 1950s:

"If you are interested in numbers, each one of us are receiving or having about 3,000 to 5,000 ionizing events per cubic centimeter per second ... We are living in a sea of radiation ... This, of course, is concerned with the whole concept of whether the effects will be occurring at low levels in the same rate that they are occurring at high levels, and whether there is such a thing as a threshold. In other words, is there some level below which nothing will happen?

"Again, this is very difficult to establish. The evidence, as I see it, is inconclusive in this direction, and if I had to choose, if I had to make a decision now, if I were compelled to make a decision, I would hesitate to accept this [Edward Lewis] concept that a threshold does not exist. ...

"I would say, from the point of view of production of tumors, and leukemias, I would hesitate to accept the concept that a threshold does not exist. From a point of view of genetics ... I would like to point out the data on mutations and genetic effects do not exist below 25 roentgens. ...

"I think probably the most important thing is to look at the basic aspects of what occurs in biological systems, so that we can understand the mechanism, so that we can see whether once we understand this mechanism it fits in with the data which we already have. And here I feel is where the greatest possibility for really learning something about it exists. I would like to see this emphasized over and above the efforts to perhaps use 10 million mice [whose DNA repair mechanisms differ significantly to humans, due to their short lifespan and hence lack of the evolutionary human need to survive to a reproductive age of decades without cancer] at very low levels. I would think that basic studies of biochemical [DNA repair] effects, the possible way in which these things occur, would contribute more than doing such statistical studies [on mice]. ... I do not feel we have yet really looked at this in an unbiased and nonemotional manner."

Dr Friedell's written testimony on pages 908-10 states:

"At the lower dose levels there is rapid recovery. At the higher dose levels recovery is markedly impaired ... Protraction and fractionation of the radiation delivered markedly reduces the total somatic biological effect. ... Generally, radiation delivered over a long period of time gives some of the tissues an opportunity to recover (a process which is poorly understood) and, therefore, increases survival. ... With respect to the genetic effects, which have been extensively studied by biologists, there are sufficient uncertainties even in these data that it is not possible to accept them as entirely unassailable. These include the fact that data at low levels do not exist, that data are confined at present to Drosophila [fruit flies] and a few small mammals such as mice, that the mutation rate due to ultraviolet radiation appears to be nonlinear, and there is reason to believe that some of the energy transfer with ionizing radiation is in part of the same character as that with ultraviolet radiation."

Against this was extensive political-type, non-scientific testimony from Dr Ralph E. Lapp (1917-2004), who had written a series of articles in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists about civil defense against fallout after the 1954 BRAVO test fallout, and in 1957 he had been to Japan to interview the fallout contaminated crew of the Lucky Dragon for a book he was researching. (We have discussed the Lucky Dragon incident and the communist propaganda concerning the death of one of the crew due to an unnecessary and infected blood transfusion on the earlier blog post linked here.) In fact, Lapp cut short his trip to Japan to testify at the Congressional Hearings on fallout.



We have discussed Lapp's influence on radiation hysteria briefly in a previous post. In 2002, he wrote a damning letter published in the Washington Post (Thursday, November 21, 2002; Page A40), in which he complained about too much fear of radiation:

'Radiation Risk Realities. The Nov. 11 front-page story on "dirty bomb" risks, "Hunting a Deadly Soviet Legacy," needed to put the threat in perspective. The release of radioactive cesium into the atmosphere from the Chernobyl plant in 1986 was 1,000 times as great as the release in the "dirty bomb" scenario. In assessing radiation risk, it is essential to understand the basic facts about data accumulated during half a century of medical studies. Among a half-million Hiroshima survivors, for example, fewer than 1 percent of the observed cancer deaths were the result of the A-bomb radiation. How many Americans know that?'

But in his 1957 testimony to Congress, which spans pages 1241-84 of the published Hearings, he doom-mongered to the extent of trying to turn the Hearings into a witch hunt naming as "reckless" the honest Atomic Energy Commission health physicists Drs Merril Eisenbud (the author of Environmental Radioactivity and An Environmental Odyssey), Willard Libby (who won the Nobel Prize for discovering how to use naturally radioactive carbon-14 to date things) and Richard Doan, who had all stated the fact in public that the radiation dose from low-dose rate strontium-90 test fallout was tens of thousands to millions of times lower than the threshold minimum dose observed for cancer induction in the radium dial painters. On page 1279, Lapp quoted all their statements which he falsely deemed "reckless":

Reckless or nonsubstantiated statements do a disservice to the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] and to the Nation.

Example: Dr Eisenbud is quoted in an article titled "Man Who Measures A-Fallout Belittles Danger" (Sunday News, New York, March 20, 1955) as follows: "The total fallout to date from all tests would have to be multiplied by a million to produce visible, deleterious effects except in areas close to the explosion, itself."

Example: Dr Libby in a speech dated June 3, 1955, stated: "However, as far as immediate or somatic damage to the health is concerned, the fallout dosage rate as of January 1 of this year in the United States could be increased 15,000 times without hazard."

Example: Dr Richard Dean while in Tokyo on May 13, 1957 stated that the bomb tests would not have "the slightest possible effect" on humans.

I do not label Dr Libby's statement as reckless but interpose it to illustrate the spectrum of opinion being given to the public.


In fact, Dr Eisenbud's statement that a million times more fallout would be required to exceed the observed threshold dose for cancer was merely summarizing calculations in an appendix to Glasstone's 1950 Effects of Atomic Weapons, and the situation had actually improved since 1950 with regard to the discovery that strontium is discriminated against by plants and animals, reducing human uptake substantially (for the situation before this strontium discrimination by the food chain was known, see Worldwide Effects of Atomic Weapons: Project Sunshine, RAND Corp. report R-251-AEC, August 6, 1953). Dr Lapp was well aware of this, but chose to gain publicity by joining the alarmist low-level radiation bandwaggon. Then in his 2002 letter to the Washington Post complains about lying radiation hysteria! It was too late to change prejudices he helped sow back in 1957.

Dr Lapp also wrote an article attacking relatively clean nuclear weapons, 'The "Humanitarian" H-Bomb', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1956, V. XII, No. 7, pp. 261-264. There, his main complaint is that lithium deuteride costs more than depleted uranium, although he at least explains fission product fractionation in fallout very clearly. As we explained in the previous post, the clean thermonuclear weapon became a stockpiled reality in the form of the neutron bomb, which averts fallout due to low fission yield and a burst altitude to avoid dirt being sucked into the fireball. This eliminates collateral fallout damage, while retaining a credible, fearful deterrence.

"It is not contended that there is no risk however minute. But all life, and every minute of our day and night, is measured in terms of risk - 40,000 highway deaths each year in this country, accidents in the home, etc. We make our choice: How much risk are we willing to take as payment for our pleasures (swimming at the seashore, for example), our comfort or our material progress? Here our choice seems much clearer. Are we willing to take this very small and rigidly controlled risk, or would we prefer to run the risk of annihilation which might result if we surrendered the weapons which are so essential to our freedom and our actual survival."

- Dr Willard F. Libby, page 1519 of the 1957 congressional hearings on fallout.

Testimony and opinion came from 50 expert scientific witnesses who personally conducted fallout research at Nevada and Pacific nuclear weapons tests, including the Scientific Director of nuclear testing Dr Alvin C. Graves (1912-1966), the Technical Director of the U.S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Dr Frank H. Shelton, as well as university academic scientists studying genetic risks of radiation and cancer risks, including Nobel Laureates Hermann J. Muller, Willard F. Libby and Edward B. Lewis. The Foreword (by Carl T. Durham, Chair of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Chet Holifield, Chair of the Special Subcommittee on Radiation) to volume one of the printed hearings acknowledges "the excellent support we received from the staff and from the committee's consultant, Dr Paul Tompkins [born 1914, PhD received in biochemistry, California, 1941; Manhattan Project from 1943-9, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory from 1949], technical director of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory at the University of California, whose advice was most helpful in connection with technical questions which arose during the course of the hearings."




We've previously given some extracts from these 1957 fallout hearings on blog posts here and here. One of the reasons for my earlier interest is that Tompkins submitted for the record a number of U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory reports on fallout prediction and decontamination by Schuert, Triffet, Carl F. Miller, and others, which have never been published elsewhere:






Above: notice that Schuert's fallout predictions for 1956 Bikini Atoll Operation Redwing tests Tewa (5.01 Mt total yield, 87% fission), Zuni (3.53 Mt total yield, 15% fission), Flathead (365 kt total yield, 73% fission) and Navajo (4.5 Mt total yield, 5% fission) published on pages 304-307 have the map scales all reduced by a factor of 2, halving the apparent linear dimensions and thus reducing the apparent fallout areas by a factor of 4, compared to the accurate fallout patterns distance scales in the declassified 1961 Redwing fallout compendium report WT-1317 pages 140-143.

As explained on this blog before, the official compendium of all American nuclear test fallout patterns, DASA-1251, first declassified partially in 1979, is very seriously in error due to such errors in the scales of fallout patterns, which is particularly severe for the 110 kt Castle-Koon surface burst, but also for many important megaton yield range nuclear test fallout patterns. The reason for the persistence of such careless errors propagating for decades through the fallout prediction literature and confusing the efforts to model and predict fallout, has been partly the general secrecy of fallout from the very beginning, and partly a lack of effort to widely publish the declassified facts in a high-quality format which is clearly printed (most declassified reports are copies of copies with bits blanked out and cut out, which are in turn copies of originals, and the print quality is very poor and a strain to read, let alone examine closely for errors).

Edward A. Schuert's A Fallout Forecasting Technique with Results Obtained at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory Technical Report USNRDL-TR-139, May 1957 is now only publically available in a practically useless, very poor quality (presumably a scan of a copy of a copy of a microfiche film) PDF file here. So we've created a very high quality (22.7 MB) PDF version with clear diagrams of the essential nuclear test fallout predictions, using the version of Schuert's fallout prediction report USNRDL-TR-139 published in the 1957 U.S. Congressional Hearings (omitting all obsolete diagrams on cloud heights, etc., and keeping to information which remains useful today, so that the file size does not require an excessive download time). Schuert's simple, quick fallout area and "hotline" prediction technique is vital for simple emergency fallout predictions and was used by the British Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch for civil defense fallout manuals during the Cold War (predicted dose rates were added to the forecast "hotline" by simply using computer calculated graphs of dose rate versus downwind distance for various wind speeds and weapon yields, published in chapter 5 of Philip J. Dolan's Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, DNA-EM-1).

Dr Alvin C. Graves (4 November 1909-1966), Scientific Director of Operations Ivy and Castle

The most dramatic testimony in the 1957 hearings came on pages 53-104 from Dr Alvin C. Graves of Los Alamos. Graves is featured talking extensively about nuclear weapons with actor Reed Hadley in the 1952 film of the first ten megaton hydrogen bomb test, Operation IVY, shot MIKE. On May 21, 1946, Graves was irradiated with 360 rem (although he was told his dose was just 200 rem to prevent undue worry, and he still believed that at the 1957 hearings!) when his friend, Dr Louis Slotin, was demonstrating to him a criticality experiment with a 6.2 kg plutonium nuclear bomb core, in which he placed the bottom half of the core in a beryllium tamper and kept the upper half just slightly separated by a screwdriver blade to avoid criticality. The following photograph shows the situation just before the screwdriver slipped and the assembly went critical, releasing a burst of radiation and heating up until thermal expansion quenched the reaction and reverted the assembly to a sub-critical condition:



Slotin, being closest received a 2100 rem average trunk lethal dose in the accident (which was a near repetition of the August 21, 1945 criticality accident involving a plutonium core in a tungsten carbide reflector which killed Harry K. Daghlian 28 days after a dose of 510 rem), with much larger localized exposures to his hands, which swelled up since they had been in contact with the assembly soon after fission (Slotin had a much higher local dose to his hands than any tank crew under a properly air burst neutron bomb explosion could possibly get, contrary to hysterical radiation effects propaganda which Samuel Cohen discredited in his book The Truth About the Neutron Bomb). Slotin died 9 days later. Graves was the next closest and received 360 rem, but was told he had 200 rem to avoid stress while recovering from radiation sickness. Graves describes the experience in detail on pages 103-4 of the 1957 hearings:

Representative Van Zandt: "Mr. Chairman, may I ask this question. Doctor, how many roentgens did your body absorb in the Los Alamos accident?"

Dr Graves: "I had about 200 [it was actually 360]."

Representative Cole: "From outward appearances you look rather healthy."

Dr Graves: "Thank you."

Representative Cole: "At this time some several years later."

Dr Graves: "That was in 1946, so it has been 11 years. But this really is not important. You may have one person take 200 roentgens as I did and be perfectly happy for 10 years. But does it give me a greater probability of having cancer or does it give me a greater probability of this, that or the other, we just do not know. The danger is not that this will happen to you. The danger is that it is more likely to happen to you. Maybe the more likely is not very much more likely, but it is still more likely. [Graves died from a heart condition in 1966, 20 years after his exposure.]"

Representative Van Zandt: "Doctor, how did this dose of radiation affect you?"

Dr Graves: "I was nauseated for the first day. I was in the hospital for 2 weeks. I never did feel very sick but I was quite - I did not have very much ambition, I was tired, I got tired climbing steps and so on, and this lasted for perhaps 6 months. At the end of 6 months I was back to work, and I can't tell any difference now."

Representative Van Zandt: "Did it affect your hair in any way?"

Dr Graves: "I lost the hair on one side of my head. I did not have to shave for a while, which was a byproduct that was useful."

Representative Van Zandt: "How about your eye?"

Dr Graves: "I have a radiation cataract in one eye. The other eye is perfectly all right."

Representative Holifield: "What was the white corpuscle count at the end of 6 months?"

Dr Graves: "At the end of 6 months it was back to normal. You can't tell anything. You can examine me with a microscope or anything else, and you can't tell any difference now. At the time my white blood cell count dropped from about 8,000 or 9,000, which was normal, down to around 2,000. Again I don't have these numbers in front of me, so I don't remember exactly. But at the end of perhaps a week or 10 days the count began to increase again, and got back to normal. As a matter of fact, it got above normal. By 6 months it was back to normal, and stayed there ever since."

Representative Holifield: "Dr Graves, I think I express the feelings of every member of this committee that have known about this for so many years, that we are glad you are in as good health as you are today, and we want to again express our thanks to you for the tremendous contribution you have made to the security of our Nation."

Representative Cole: "Mr Chairman, I just want to concur in what you have said with respect to the attitude of the committee toward Dr Graves' work. But since we have engaged in some rather personal questions of him with respect to consequences of his exposure, I would like to inquire if since that occurred you have increased your family in any way, and if so, whether the progeny is apparently normal and healthy. Mr Chairman, I do not ask it facetiously. Here is a man who has been exposed to a degree of radiation probably greater than any person that we know. He has told us the consequences to him of his own body. Since radiation exposure has been said to involve a question of sterility and so forth, unless he would rather not answer, i would like to give him the opportunity of indicating."

Dr Graves: "I had one daughter before the accident. I have had a daughter and son since the accident. The daughter and son as far as can be told are perfectly normal kids. We love them very much."

Representative Van Zandt: "From a heredity standpoint, do they show any extraordinary amount of energy as a result of your brush with atomic energy?"

Dr Graves: "Speaking as a parent they are very intelligent children."

As time permits, this blog post will be extended to examine in detail the testimony in the 1957 fallout hearings, showing how different scientists presented evidence for and against the "threshold" and "non-threshold" dose-effects response to radiation for cancer induction and genetic effects, and also examining other aspects of the hearings. One important point is that pages 321-3 state that a detailed paper on the nature of fallout was submitted by Charles E. Adams of the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, but was not printed. As a result, there is no discussion in the hearings of the visible nature of fallout as a contaminant itself, and the testimony is limited to just the way that fallout is deposited and the radiation it emits. (If photos of fallout particles and trays showing the visible fallout associated with various dose rates and doses had been published in 1957, a lot of the hysteria about "invisible fallout dangers" and confusion about the distinction between actual fallout particles and particles of nuclear radiation could have avoided.)

Friday, September 11, 2009

Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Department of Defense, Effects Manual EM-1


Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons_Part I -


Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons_Part II -



Above: Sam T. Cohen invented the neutron bomb in 1958 by scaling down to very low yield the design of the REDWING-NAVAJO 5% fission, 95% fusion 'clean' nuclear test at Bikini Atoll in 1956. Cohen personally recruited his school friend, the famous strategist Herman Kahn, to the RAND Corporation. They realized in the 1950s that appearing reasonable or 'sane' will encourage fanatical terrorists. To deal with gun-carrying thugs, the police must descend to their level and likewise carry guns; they will be at a fatal disadvantage otherwise. 'Sanely' ignoring or steering clear of insane thugs will only encourage them; this is the 'sane' policy which pacifist nations tried with Hitler throughout the 30s. But if you want peace in an insane world, you may counter-intuitively need to build up 'insane' stockpiles of armaments or 'insanely' go out looking for trouble with power crazed dictators. Only by behaving in a threateningly violent way towards them can you ever hope to intimidate them into understanding that they must stop what they are doing and focus on improvement. Allowing Hitler the freedom to terrorise and massacre Jewish children and invalids seemed 'sane' to the 'honorable pacifist' 30s politician, but in retrospect we can see it would have been far safer for all concerned and far more humanitarian if the civilized world had gone a little more insane with him as soon as his inhuman activities began in 1933 or so, and displayed some anger and threatened credibly some violence in order to stop such abuses instead of appeasing and encouraging inhumane dictatorships.

On 29 September 1982, Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the U.S. Government, gave the following brilliant address to the Chicago World Affairs Council:

'It was primarily two things that saved us from the danger of nuclear war which we faced in the 1950s. The first was the development in the mid-1950s of an intellectual understanding of deterrence: that what deters nuclear war is not simply more weapons but a protected strategic force that can strike back even if it is attacked first. Such a force removes the temptation to strike first. It is vital to realize that the development of the theory of deterrence was the most important act of arms control in the postwar era; more important than any negotiation or treaty we have engaged in. The second thing that kept nuclear annihilation at a distance was the development of new weapons that were shaped by this theory of deterrence. ... The missile silo ... able to last out a first strike and retaliate; The ballistic missile submarine, which was more invulnerable because it was hidden in the depths of the sea; and the spy satellite, which for the first time gave an accurate accounting of the other side's strategic forces, thus reducing uncertainty and nervousness. Arms control agreements like SALT 1 (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, number 1) would not have been possible without this weapon, because they would have been wholly impossible to verify.

'These facts constitute a genuine paradox: that the moral result of avoiding nuclear war was achieved through certain weapons. I believe we must face this paradox squarely ... We face an appalling danger in nuclear war and have limited resources to cope with it. Since the 1950s, one of the resources that has been most useful is the redesign of weapons so that they will contribute to a true deterrent.'


Herman Kahn's 1959 testimony to the 22-26 June 1959 U.S. Congressional Hearings on the Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War:

Page 833:

'Let me start by making some remarks about quantitative computations. The most important reason for being quantitative is because one may, in fact, be able to calculate what is happening. Many of the witnesses have emphasized the uncertainities of thermonuclear war but ... Napoleon ... would have been impressed with the relevance of quantitative calculations; impressed with the accuracy with which people predict what a nuclear war is like. ... This is of some real interest; before World War II, for example, many of the staffs engaged in estimating the effects of bombing over-estimated the effects of bombing by large amounts. This was one of the main reasons that at the Munich Conference and earlier occasions the British and the French chose appeasement to standing firm or fighting. Incidentally, these staff calculations were more lurid than the worst imaginations of fiction. [Air bombing was predicted to destroy whole cities in firestorms in a single air raid, with clouds of poison gas killing everyone for hundreds of miles downwind, like fallout exaggerations from megaton surface bursts which assume that people are constantly outdoors on a smooth infinite unobstructed plane, etc.]'


Page 904:

'I would like to emphasise: Britain declared war on Germany in 1914. Britain declared war on Germany in 1939. If they had not been able to declare war in either of those 2 years, they would have had to let the Germans do whatever they wanted to do. ... I have a book ... which I recommend to those who want to exaggerate the impact of thermonuclear war. It is called Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, by Wheeler Bennett [this book is similar in many respects to President John F. Kennedy's own excellent book written from first hand experience in London when World War II broke out, on the perils of appeasement due to exaggeration of the effects of war, Why England Slept; remember that Hitler was widely praised by pacifists globally after he announced with a lot of hype but of course no sincerity, his grand '25-Year-Peace-Plan' on March 7, 1936]. Among other things Wheeler Bennett discusses why Chamberlain and Daladier folded. When they returned from Munich [where they enjoyed lovely tea and cakes while making useless pacifist treaties on bits of paper not worth a cent with the evil Adolf Hitler in 1938, being far too fearful of Hitler's ever increasing military power and its exaggerated explosive and poison gas effects to challenge him over his evil treatment of Jews even at that time] they were cheered by their people in Paris and London, because war had been averted. Over that weekend some people began to understand that war had been averted by a sellout of the worst sort. And on Monday some few were prepared to criticize. But ... The people who critized Chamberlain and Daladier, with a couple of exceptions, did not criticize them for not going to war; they said, "Hitler was bluffing, and you should have stood your ground".

'As far as we can tell, Hitler was not bluffing. The men who were in the room with him could see he was not bluffing. It was easy for the people back home to say he was bluffing, but not for the men who had the decision to make. The German people did not want war. The German Army did not want war. ... But Hitler seems to have been willing to have a war if he couldn't have his way.'


Pages 909-15:

'Our study distinguishes three types of deterrence in examining the implications for nonmilitary defense:

'Type I - Deterrence of a direct attack on the United States. ... It is not that the Soviets could reliably expect to be untouched, but that a situation might arise in which the Soviets might feel that going to war was the least risky of the available alternatives. ...

'Type II - Deterrence of extremely provocative behavior. The Soviets ... ask themselves if they can force the United States to accept peacefully the consequences of some extremely provocative action (say a large-scale attack on Europe or a Munich-type crisis). ... If the Soviets were not deterred then the United States might actually carry out an evacuation to try to persuade them to desist. If the evacuation did not persuade the Soviets to desist, then in the last resort the United States might decide that it was less risky to go to war than to acquiesce. ...

'Type III - Deterrence of moderately provocative actions. [Berlin Wall of 1961, Cuban missiles crisis of 1962, the Soviet backed war against South Vietnam, etc.] In this case it would be wishful thinking to expect deterrence to work most of the time. However, Soviet calculations which contemplate provoking the United States might be influenced by the existence of a U.S. plan for a crash nonmilitary defense program. ... Experience has shown that attempts to conduct large and overcoordinated programs tend to create inflexibility and to stifle new, unproven ideas or independent approaches.'


In the 22-26 June 1959 U.S. Congressional Hearings on the Biological and Environmental effects of Nuclear War following Kahn was the Nobel Laureate Willard F. Libby who stated on pages 924-5:

'We are led, when we review the history of man, ancient and modern, to the conclusion that it is wise to take out some insurance for our protection in the event that something goes wrong and peaceful international relations come to an end. The nature of the effects of modern nuclear weapons and the ranges over which these effects can produce casualties may provoke the question: "Is there really anything we can do?" My answer to this question is, "Yes." ...

'The committee will recall that we have announced that the fallout from the [15 megatons Castle-Bravo surface burst of] March 1, 1954, detonation at Bikini Atoll would have created radiation casualties in an area estimated at 7,000 square miles if no protective measures were taken. Casualties, seriously injured and dead from the initial effects of this bomb would have occurred in an area of perhaps 250 to 300 square miles [for people standing up, fully exposed to the effects of flying glass and thermal radiation from a 15 megatons bomb which is now long since obsolete and replaced by bombs with typically 100 times smaller yield, 150 kt]. There is a great difference between the two areas and I should like to focus on the need for protection and the capability for protecting the people in the 6,700 square miles or more beyond the range of initial blast, thermal and nuclear radiation. We can save them easily. We can lose them easily. ...

'The first action for anyone who does not already possess the knowledge is to learn what these weapons effects are. No one can be expected to act properly or at all for that matter on any problem unless he understands what makes it. It is necessary for people to learn about fallout, about nuclear radiation, about the effects of nuclear radiation on people, animals, plants, food, water: the things that are immutably linked to life.'


Dr Paul Tompkins of the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory stated on pages 953-4 of the Hearings:

'I had the experience of being on the Manhattan Division [developing the first nuclear weapons] in 1943. I am very familiar with the psychology of revulsion against the effect these weapons can produce. ... the results are catastropic enough in their own right. They need no imaginary amplification. The facts themselves are bad enough. However, it is crucially important to look those facts squarely in the face if one is going to face the necessity for survival if against your will or despite anything you can do about it, it is imposed on you. As far as I am concerned, if the chips ever go down and avoiding a conflict is not possible in the scheme of human events of the future, I for one do not propose to see this Nation come out the loser. ...

'The world of the future is going to be dangerous. The human capacity to inflict such damage will inevitably be there. The threat of the employment of that damage is something with which we will have to live unless something very drastic changes in our international relations. ... I personally never expect to see consequences of the type displayed on these maps. ...

'As far as I am personally concerned, by looking at the problems, understanding what they are composed of, and by necessity being an incurable optimist, I never expect to see a war of this kind happen. It is possible that more limited engagements of a more sharply defined type will be fought under the sword of Damocles hanging over our heads some time in the future. If so, let us be prepared for that. So, that at least, is my personal view as to the role that the nonmilitary defense should play, and it will never be perfect.'


Chairman Holifield then concluded the 1959 Hearings on pages 954-5 with the following words:

'These long technical testimonies were necessary in order that the basic record might be presented in as fair a way as we know how. In conclusion I want to say the challenge of the nuclear age is enormous and inescapable.

'The facts of nuclear war and the effects of nuclear war once established will not fade away because they are unpleasant. If we are prudent we will not ignore them.

'They will not disappear. Each of us must accept personal responsibilities because the nuclear war is a personal threat to our survival.

'The problem is too large to leave solely in the hands of the diplomats and the generals.'


I've blogged before about Samuel Glasstone, Philip J. Dolan, their book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 1977, and the neutron bomb which they avoid mentioning in that book but discuss elsewhere, such as in Dolan's classified manual Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons DNA-EM-1 and Glasstone's Microsoft Encarta encyclopedia article on Nuclear Weapons. The neutron bomb is the number 1 reason why a new edition of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons is needed, or at least open publication of Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons DNA-EM-1. The purpose of nuclear weapons in the world since 1945 has been to end world wars. They succeeded in ending WWII and preventing WWIII. But does it make sense to abolish them now that WWIII is no longer such a threat due to the collapse of communism? Certainly, thousands of high-yield strategic weapons may now be considered a "threat" of World War, rather than a vital deterrent to such a war. But some nuclear weapons are still needed to deter a smaller nuclear threat from proliferation, terrorist states, and so on:



So it stands to reason that the nuclear deterrent needs to be redirected towards the current smaller scale nuclear threat, now that the Cold War has been fading into history for twenty years and strategic stockpiles are diminishing. As General Charles de Gaulle famously observed, "generals are always fighting the last war". Things need to be updated. The neutron bomb is perfect: it is only effective for low kiloton yields, so it preserves and indeed enhances the credible deterrent aspect of nuclear weapons, while averting all risks of collateral damage (there is no blast, thermal or local fallout threat due to the low 1-2 kilotons yield of which 80% of the 17.6 MeV deuterium-tritium fusion energy comes out as 14.1 MeV neutrons - which, unlike 0.025 eV reactor moderated neutrons, can't be stopped by thin plastic, cadmium foil, etc. contrary to pseudoscientific propaganda - and the 500 metres burst altitude).

'The neutron bomb, so-called because of the deliberate effort to maximize the effectiveness of the neutrons, would necessarily be limited to rather small yields - yields at which the neutron absorption in air does not reduce the doses to a point at which blast and thermal effects are dominant. The use of small yields against large-area targets again runs into the delivery problems faced by chemical agents and explosives, and larger yields in fewer packages pose a less stringent problem for delivery systems in most applications. In the unlikely event that an enemy desired to minimize blast and thermal damage and to create little fallout but still kill the populace, it would be necessary to use large numbers of carefully placed neutron-producing weapons burst high enough to avoid blast damage on the ground [500 metres altitude for a neutron bomb of 1 kt total yield], but low enough to get the neutrons down. In this case, however, adequate radiation shielding for the people would leave the city unscathed and demonstrate the attack to be futile.'

- Dr Harold L. Brode, RAND Corporation, Blast and Other Threats, pp. 5-6 in Proceedings of the Symposium on Protective Structures for Civilian Populations, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Symposium held at Washington, D.C., April 19-23, 1965.


Samuel Cohen, as discussed in earlier posts here and here, argues that his neutron bomb is safer than the high-yield relatively indiscriminate (i.e. collateral damage causing) strategic nuclear weapons now stockpiled. See this linked post for a detailed review of the history of the weapon and the hysterically lying propaganda it generated. Cohen invented the neutron bomb in 1958 at the RAND Corporation: it was a miniaturized successor to the 95% "clean" nuclear test Navajo of Operation Redwing in 1956. He summarizes the history of the neutron bomb in his online lecture (presented in front of an audience which included Edward Teller), Nuclear terrorism: a credible threat?

During research for an Electronics World article on EMP published in November 1994, at the suggestion of the Atomic Weapons Establishment Library, I obtained Dolan's declassified 1,651 pages long Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons. This information is vital for discrediting and debunking the media hype and ignorance of the wide variety of nuclear weapons effects resulting from different kinds of detonation depending on height and depth of burst in conjunction with weapon design factors such as casing and fission yield, many combinations of which produce no nuclear radiation injuries, thermal burns or blast effects. The information published in the widely cited unclassified 1977 Glasstone and Dolan book, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, is described in a footnote on page 1 of EM-1 as merely a "qualitative" introductory supplement to the secret manual EM-1.

I've blogged (in the 2006 Glasstone and Dolan post) about all of the history and technical details of the various updates to this manual to the present time. It started out in July 1951 as Capabilities of Atomic Weapons, TM 23-200, edited by Dr Gerald W. Johnson (Chief of the Analysis Branch, U.S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), and was a secret quantitative supplement to the more qualitative 1950 unclassified Effects of Atomic Weapons. Some 1,079 copies of each edition were published, and it was regularly updated with page changes as new information from testing became available. For example, the November 1957 edition includes an analysis of the effect of the blast wave "precursor" caused by desert sand popcorning into hot dust due to the thermal radiation flash on sandy soil, and also a brief mention of EMP effects on electronic equipment. Neither of these topics were even mentioned in the unclassified Effects of Nuclear Weapons until April 1962. In November 1964, the secret manual was revised and retitled Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, and the Scientific Advisory Group on Effects (SAGE) was formed to edit revisions to the manual.



Above: SAGE Panel in August, 1966.

Dolan's 2-part secret revision was published in 1972 with 17 chapters which fitted into two loose-leaf binders, and a 22 chapter secret update under the editorship of Brode was published in 1991 (consisting of 22 separate volumes). In 1993, this final unwieldy revision was summarised as a set of the basic equations for predicting effects and issued in September 1996 as the 736 pages long Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects: Calculational Tools Abstracted from DSWA's Effects Manual One (EM-1) edited by John A. Northrop, and published by the Defense Special Weapons Agency.



Above: John Northrop's 736 pages long Handbook of Nuclear Weapon Effects: Calculational Tools Abstracted from DSWA's Effects Manual One (EM-1) in September 1996 briefly summarized the formulas from the multi-thousand pages long 22-volume Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, DNA-EM-1, while in July 2001 the 535 pages long first edition of Charles Bridgman's Introduction to the Physics of Nuclear Weapons Effects summarized the physics behind the formulae in Northrop's book.



Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, DNA-EM-1
Philip J. Dolan (Editor), Stanford Research Institute
July 1, 1972
Change 1: July 1, 1978
Change 2: August 1, 1981
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Declassified on 13 February 1989.

Part 1. Phenomenology.
PDF download of Part 1, preliminary pages and contents pages, Change 2, August 1981 (45 pages, 1.6 MB) These pages are also available here.

Chapter 1. Introduction. 30 pages.
Chapter 2. Blast and Shock Phenomena. 306 pages. Blast wave section is here and ground shock/cratering/water bursts/underwater bursts section is here.
Chapter 3. Thermal Radiation Phenomena. 114 pages.
Chapter 4. X-Ray Radiation Phenomena. 30 pages.
Chapter 5. Nuclear Radiation Phenomena. 151 pages.
Chapter 6. Transient-Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE) Phenomena. 16 pages.
Chapter 7. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Phenomena. 40 Pages.
Chapter 8. Phenomena Affecting Electromagnetic Propagation. 94 pages.

Part 2. Damage Criteria.
PDF download of Part 2, preliminary pages and contents pages, Change 2, August 1981 (50 pages, 1.7 MB)

Chapter 9. Introduction to Damage Criteria. 187 Pages.
Chapter 10. Personnel Casualties. 38 Pages.
Chapter 11. Damage to Structures. 50 Pages.
Chapter 12. Mechanical Damage Distances for Surface Ships and Submarines Subjected to Nuclear Explosions. 147 Pages.
Chapter 13. Damage to Aircraft. 81 Pages.
Chapter 14. Damage to Military Field Equipment. 46 Pages.
Chapter 15. Damage to Forest Stands. 64 Pages.
Chapter 16. Damage to Missiles. 121 Pages.
Chapter 17. Radio Frequency Signal Degradation Relevant to Communications and Radar Systems. 32 pages.
Appendices A-F. 112 pages.




Dolan's Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Department of Defense manual EM-1 (1651 pages in two parts, 'Phenomenology' and 'Damage Criteria'; both originally loose-leaf binders to allow page updates) is the massive and complete 'Secret-Restricted Data' classified nuclear weapons effects compendium source used to write the relatively brief and less detailed unclassified book, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. The problem with the latter is that it omits vital nuclear effects data for civil defence, which we will review below. Now Dolan's massive secret compilation of nuclear test facts and computer simulation results is going online as PDF files. One example of something blanked-out in DNA-EM-1 is the graph showing predicted EMP electric field strengths at the earth's surface from high altitude nuclear detonations of various yields and altitudes, but that graph occurs in another declassified document as explained in a post on high altitude EMP effects, http://glasstone.blogspot.com/2006/03/emp-radiation-from-nuclear-space.html. There is also a supplement showing effects of nuclear weapons in arctic conditions, linked here. Some additional declassified details from DNA-EM-1 can be found on pages 164 and 168 of the 1998 Sandia National Laboratory Survey of Weapons Development and Technology, report WR-708. E.g., severe tank damage occurs at a peak overpressure of 49 psi, immediate radiation casualties at 8,000 rads, and the x-ray and nuclear radiation effects from an exoatmospheric burst in the vacuum of space (above about 100 km) can be represented by:

X-ray exposure (cal/cm2) = 5.97*106Wkt/Rm2 (this corresponds to 75% of the explosion energy in x-rays),

Peak gamma dose rate (rads/sec) = 5.37*1015Wkt/Rm2, and

Neutron fluence (neutrons/cm2) = 2.29*1018Wkt/Rm2.



Above: as a multimedia supplement to the Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, this excellent originally secret U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency film, High-Altitude Nuclear Weapons Effects: Part One, Phenomenology (20 minutes) discusses in detail, using nuclear test film clips, the effects of 1962 high altitude nuclear tests BLUEGILL, KINGFISH, and STARFISH. It is mainly concerned with fireball expansion, rise, striation along the Earth's natural magnetic field lines, and air ionization effects on radio and radar communications, but it also includes a section at the end explaining the high altitude EMP damage mechanism.

BLUEGILL (410 kt, 48 km detonation altitude, 26 October 1962) fireball was still fully ionized at a temperature of about 10,000 K and 'several kilometres in diameter' when the shock wave departed from the fireball at 0.1 second. The fireball expanded to 10 km in diameter at 5 seconds, at which time it was buoyantly rising at 300 m/sec. It was filmed from below and within a minute transforms while rising into a torus or doughnut shape. It attained a diameter of 40 km at 1 minute, and stabilised at an altitude of 100 km a few minutes later.

KINGFISH (410 kt, 95 km detonation altitude, 1 November 1962) initially had a fireball size is 10 times bigger than BLUEGILL, because of the lower air density at the higher detonation altitude. The KINGFISH fireball rises ballistically (not buoyantly) at 1,500 m/sec (which is 5 times faster than the buoyant rise speed of the lower altitude detonation BLUEGILL). The fireball diameter longways is 300 km at 1 minute, and it is elongated along the natural geomagnetic field lines while expanding. It reaches a maximum altitude of 1,000 km in 7.5 minutes before falling back to 150-200 km (it falls back along the magnetic field lines, not a simple vertical fall). The settled debris has a diameter of 300 km and a thickness of 30 km, emitting beta and gamma radiation which ionize the air in the D-layer, forming a ‘beta patch’. Photographs of beta radiation aurora from the fireball are included in the film: beta particles spiral along the Earth's magnetic field lines and shuttle along the field lines from pole to pole. The film above has a speeded-up film showing the development of the magnetically striated fireball from the KINGFISH fireball.

STARFISH (1.4 Mt, 400 km detonation altitude, 9 July 1962) according to the Nuclear Effects Group at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, for detonations above 200 km altitude, the “expanding debris compresses the geomagnetic field lines because the expansion velocity is greater than the Alfven speed at these altitudes. The debris energy is transferred to air ions in the resulting region of tightly compressed magnetic field lines. Subsequently the ions, charge-exchanged neutrals, beta-particles, etc., escape up and down the field lines. Those particles directed downwards are deposited in patches at altitudes depending on their mean free paths. These particles move along the magnetic field lines, and so the patches are not found directly above ground zero. Uncharged radiation (gamma-rays, neutrons and X-rays) is deposited in layers which are centered directly under the detonation point. The STARFISH event (1.4 megatons at 400 km) was in this altitude regime. Detonations at thousands of kilometres altitude are contained purely magnetically. Expansion is at less than the local Alfven speed, and so energy is radiated as hydromagnetic waves. Patch depositions are again aligned with the field lines.”

When STARFISH was detonated: “The large amount of energy released at such a high altitude by the detonation caused widespread auroras throughout the Pacific area, lasting in some cases as long as 15 minutes; these were observed on both sides of the equator. In Honolulu an overcast, nighttime sky was turned into day for 6 minutes (New York Times, 10 July 1962). Observers on Kwajalein 1,400 nautical miles (about 2,600 km) west reported a spectacular display lasting at least 7 minutes. At Johnston Island all major visible phenomena had disappeared by 7 minutes except for a faint red glow. The earth's magnetic field [measured at Johnston] also was observed to respond to the burst. ... On 13 July, 4 days after the shot, the U.K. satellite, Ariel, was unable to generate sufficient electricity to function properly. From then until early September things among the satellite designers and sponsors were ‘along the lines of the old Saturday matinee one-reeler’ as the solar panels on several other satellites began to lose their ability to generate power (reference: The Artificial Radiation Belt, Defense Atomic Support Agency, 4 October 1962, report DASA-1327, page 2). The STARFISH detonation had generated large quantities of electrons that were trapped in the earth's magnetic field; the trapped electrons were damaging the solar cells that generated the power in the panels.” (Defense Nuclear Agency report DNA-6040F, AD-A136820, pp. 229-30.)



Above: as a multimedia supplement to the Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, this excellent originally secret U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency film, High-Altitude Nuclear Weapons Effects: Part Two, Systems Interference (16 minutes), discusses the interference to radio and radar signals by high altitude nuclear detonations.

TM 23-200, Capabilities of Atomic Weapons, was a single volume consisting of 441 pages in 12 sections divided into 2 parts (it has only about a quarter as many pages as Dolan’s 1651 pages long 2-volume 1972 revision DNA-EM-1):

Contents of Capabilities of Atomic Weapons, U.S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Washington, D.C., technical manual TM 23-200, November 1957, Confidential (declassified in 1997)

Preliminary pages (22 pages consisting of title pages, distribution list, contents pages, page locator for physical phenomena figures and tables, and foreword)

Part 1: Physical Phenomena

Section 1: Introduction (13 pages)
Section 2: Blast and Shock Phenomena (95 pages)
Section 3: Thermal Radiation Phenomena (19 pages)
Section 4: Nuclear Radiation Phenomena (87 pages)

Part 2: Damage Criteria

Section 5: Introduction (21 pages)
Section 6: Personnel Casualties (20 pages)
Section 7: Damage to Structures (54 pages)
Section 8: Damage to Naval Equipment (15 pages)
Section 9: Damage to Aircraft (11 pages)
Section 10: Damage to Military Field Equipment (23 pages)
Section 11: Forest Stands (15 pages)
Section 12: Miscellaneous Radiation Damage Criteria (10 pages)

Appendix 1: Supplementary Blast Data (32 pages)
Appendix 2: Useful Relationships (10 pages)
Appendix 3: Glossary (7 pages)
Appendix 4: Bibliography (9 pages)

Page 4 of this bibliography cites the report: J. F. Canu and P. J. Dolan, Prediction of Neutron-Induced Activity in Soils, AFSWP-518, June 1957, Secret – Restricted Data.





It has a Foreword on page xxii by Edward N. Parker (Rear Admiral, USN), Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, stating:

'The purpose of this manual is to provide the military Services with a compendium of the phenomena manifested by the detonation of nuclear weapons and the effects thereof in terms of damage to targets of military interest.

'This edition of Capabilities of Atomic Weapons represents the continuing effort by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to make available the progressively improved data resulting from field testing, scaled tests, laboratory and theoretical analyses.


'... Every effort has been made to include the best available data which will assist the using Services in meeting their particular operational requirements. As additional or better data becomes available it will be incorporated herein.'

Concerning the early history of EMP as a damaging effect of nuclear weapons, a very brief and but pertinent discussion of EMP effects from low altitude and surface bursts occurs in the November 1957 edition of the Confidential (classified) U.S. Department of Defense, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project manual TM 23-200, Capabilities of Atomic Weapons, section 12, Miscellaneous Radiation Damage Criteria, page 12-2, paragraph 12.2c:

'Electromagnetic Radiation. A large electrical signal is produced by a nuclear weapon detonation. The signal consists of a rather sharp transient signal with a strong frequency component in the neighborhood of 15 kilocycles. Field strengths greater than 1 volt per metre have been detected from megaton yield weapons at a distance of about 2,000 miles. Electronic equipment which responds to rapid, short duration transients can be expected to be actuated by pickup of this electrical noise.'

'In November 1964, DASA (Defence Atomic Support Agency) consolidated nuclear effects knowledge in the classified publication, Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons. A revised edition was published in 1968. These publications preceded the two-volume Effects Manual-1 (EM-1), first published in 1972. ... Integrating Knowledge: In 1972, DNA published a two-volume nuclear weapons effects manual called Effects Manual-1 (EM-1). Two years later, DNA issued a NATO-releasable [less classified] version of EM-1. These volumes provided critical planning information for unified and specified CINCs, civilian civil defense activities, and NATO officials.'


- pages 16 and 19 of the colourful booklet, Defense Soecial Weapons Agency, 50th Anniversary 1947-1997. For a 466 page review published by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in 2002, see AD-A412977 (35.3 Mb).

All civil defence planning is either directly or indirectly (via Glasstone and Dolan Effects of Nuclear Weapons 1977) based on Dolan's Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons. The latest official American civil defence manual, for example, cites directly the secret 1988 revision of 'DNA EM-1 (Effects Manual 1), Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, Chapter 10, July 1, 1972'; 'NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS: Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities, Version 21.2 DRAFT, February 2006'.

There is a definite need to debunk general Planet of the Apes style nuclear effects exaggeration hype by politicans which simultaneously:

(1) encourages misguided nuclear proliferation (rogue states, dictators and terrorists think that simply having a nuclear threat will get them anything they want by intimidation, due to the exaggeration in the popular media) and

(2) discourages simple civil defense countermeasures from being taken seriously. If you're in the crater region, you don't need civil defense, but as we've seen, even the crater sizes have been grossly exaggerated in the public domain. The "overkill" areas are trivial compared to the areas over which even the simplest informed civil defense countermeasures like duck and cover and getting out of the immediate downwind area (or under cover there) before the wind blows fallout there, is effective at saving lives.



Why exaggerating the effects of aerial bombardment caused World War II

The tragedy of the exaggeration of the offensive capabilities of aerial attack was plain to see during the 1930s. Public opinion was on British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's side (appeasing Hitler) because the effects of war had been exaggerated in 1938 by the British War Office: aerial bombing was (inaccurately) predicted to cause 121 casualties/ton, and the German air force was expected (for no reason other than doom mongering, it seems) to deliver its maximum capacity of 600 tons of chemical incendiary, gas and explosive bombs daily on Britain, killing 2.2 million people per month.

Chamberlain and the British public were scared by these false "predictions" which were based on the WWI unopposed attacks in daylight and had no relevance for inaccurate nighttime bombing when enemy bombers were subject to AA and fighter defenses.

In World War II a total of 71.27 kilotons (in average units of 175 kg of explosive, according to the British Home Office) of bombs, V1 cruise missiles and V2 supersonic ballistic missiles hit Britain, killing 60,595 and injuring 86,182, a casualty rate of 2 casualties/ton, 60 times fewer than the prediction based on World War I data!

If Chamberlain and - more important - the general public had known the true civilian threat in 1938 from aerial attack instead of the hysterical exaggerations officially promoted, then Hitler might have been stopped or effectively deterred earlier on, with less cost in human lives. Delaying the war gave Germany years to prepare for war, which made the war worse than it would otherwise have been.

As an example, what could happen when Iran gets the U-235, and maybe gets some lithium and heavy water to make lithium deuteride to get a H-bomb (it's now known than lithium-6 deuteride isn't necessary; the 11-Mt Castle-Romeo nuclear test used only natural lithium and was a great success)? It may be just like Munich and Iran will be appeased through fear of a nuclear war, due to lying exaggerations hyped in the media just like the prediction of 2.2 million casualties per month from Nazi air raids.

Update: the nuclear weapons proliferation exaggerated threat is already causing Britain to appease Iran and take no notice of violation of human rights, according to Martin Fletcher's front page story in The Times newspaper, 24 September 2009.

Britain is appeasing Iran, Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi says
by Martin Fletcher
The Times online, September 24, 2009


The only Iranian to win the Nobel Peace Prize accused Britain of ignoring the regime’s savage suppression of opposition in order to safeguard talks on its nuclear programme.

Shirin Ebadi, the human rights lawyer, said that her worst fears were confirmed when she saw the British Ambassador at President Ahmadinejad’s inauguration.

“That’s when I felt that human rights were being neglected,” she told The Times. “I’m very sorry to say the West cares more about its own security than human rights. I think they’re wrong . . . Undemocratic countries are more dangerous than a nuclear bomb. It’s undemocratic countries that jeopardise international peace.”

Dr Ebadi said that sanctions should have been imposed on the Iranian regime over the alleged theft of the election and the subsequence killing, beating and imprisoning of opponents. She has called for the downgrading of Western embassies, the withdrawal of ambassadors and the freezing of the assets of Iran’s leaders.
...

Dr Ebadi plans to go home in two months, daring the regime to arrest the first Muslim woman to win a Nobel prize. In 2000 she spent three weeks in solitary confinement after lodging a complaint against Tehran’s police chief for a lethal attack on pro-democracy students.

If not imprisoned, she will fight to secure justice for the families of those killed in the crackdown — a trail that could lead all the way to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. She has been approached by the mother of Neda Soltan, the student whose death made her an icon of the opposition.

Dr Ebadi said that she was enraged by the crimes that the regime had perpetrated in the name of Islam, but that ordinary Iranians were united as never before, with women at the fore, and that they would not forgive or forget the regime’s crimes. “The opposition has gained unstoppable momentum,” she said. “The people have reached a point of no return. I am sure they will be victorious, but when? The fall of the Berlin Wall was totally predictable but no one could say when.”


Before 9/11, Weinberger was quizzed by skeptical critics on BBC News Talking Point on Friday, 4 May, 2001, Caspar Weinberger quizzed on new US Star Wars ABM plans:


It is like saying we don't like chemical warfare - we don't like gas attacks - so we are going to give up and promise not to have any defences ever against them and that of course would mean then we are perfectly safe. ...


‘The ... idea that you are somehow endangering people by having a defence strikes me almost as absurd as saying you endanger people by having a gas mask in a gas attack. ...


‘Now if you tell an aggressive nation that [chemical or nuclear weapons are] the one system of weapons that is never going to be defended against - what are they going to do? They are going to make every effort to get that kind of system of weapons. That is what is happening ...’



Update: Google have now digitized in quality freely downloadable PDF format (and also in much poorer quality online-viewer format) a 377 pages long unclassified 1965 U.S. National Academy of Sciences nuclear weapons effects compendium, Proceedings of the symposium on protective structures for civilian populations. (This begins with Dr Brode's review of nuclear weapon effects.) Other relevant Google free downloads in PDF format can be found here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and the 15 September 1961 issue of Life magazine with President Kennedy's famous letter on civil defense against fallout can be found here.




Above: Life magazine (Kennedy's civil defense issue) makes it clear that in the absence of an all-out nuclear war, survival means having not just the ability to hit back, but also having civil defence so that the other side is unable to cause excessive intimidation with their nuclear stockpile; any cold war has a winner and a loser. As detailed in the Glasstone and Dolan post earlier, the refusal to be intimidated held back the Soviet Union long enough for it to collapse.

Marshall of the Soviet Union Vasiliy D. Sokolovsk, Military Strategy (Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1969): ‘A war will end lawfully [i.e. in accordance with the presumed ‘laws’ of Marxism-Leninism for the evolution of society] with the victory of the progressive Communist social and economic system over the reactionary capitalist system, which is historically destined to go under.’

Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, 1979 (the year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan): ‘The Soviet Union has superiority over the United States. Henceforth it will be the United States who will be threatened. It had better get used to it.’

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn interviewed in the Wall Street Journal, 23 June 1983: ‘There are two Soviet Unions. The people - millions of them - dream of an end to wars, to armaments. The government, to the contrary, does not contemplate that idea even for a minute. It does, of course, want the WEST to disarm. But not one item of Soviet military equipment will ever be given up. ... It is normal to be afraid of nuclear weapons. I would condemn no one for that. But the generation now coming out of Western schools is unable to distinguish good from evil. Even those words are unacceptable. This results in impaired thinking ability. Isaac Newton, for example, would never have been taken in by communism! These young people will soon look back on photographs of their own demonstrations and cry. But it will be too late. I say to them: You are protesting nuclear arms. But are you prepared to try to defend your homeland with NON-nuclear arms? No: These young people are unprepared for ANY kind of struggle.’

Tens of millions died in World War II because of the 1930s efforts to negotiate with totalitarians through a false fear of war due to the quantitative exaggeration of the effects of aerial attack, and a widespread belief that peace could be guaranteed by exaggerating the effects of war into a dogmatic religion of pseudo-science, which would brainwash humanity into avoiding war. This lying only encouraged the proliferation of weapons to the despotic dictatorships which wanted to have the threat of such weapons in order to achieve political intimidation, ‘peaceful invasions’ and genocide without opposition. See, for example, the article:

INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR: MESSIAHS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE?’, The Lancet (British medical journal), 18 November 1988, pp.1185-6, by Jane M. Orient, MD.

Leaders of the Nobel Peace Prize winning group International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) claim that their struggle against the nuclear threat may be ‘one of the significant contributions of our profession to the survival of humankind’ (Lown, B., ‘Looking back, seeing ahead’, Lancet, 1988; ii: 203-4). Citing their ‘unique knowledge and expertise’ as qualifications for working for the abolition of nuclear weapons, IPPNW urges physicians to educate the public about nuclear war and to offer sound prescriptions for nuclear war prevention (Lown, B., ‘Looking back, seeing ahead’, Lancet, 1988; ii: 203-4).

In science, good intentions and noble sentiments do not exempt one's work from critical scrutiny. Because the advocacy of IPPNW is cloaked in scientific authority, it should be (but rarely is) subjected to the usual rigors of scientific criticism.

IPPNW has indeed played a major role in educating the public about nuclear war, and consequently in gaining widespread acceptance of fallacious beliefs, some of which are repeated in the Lancet (Lown, B., ‘Looking back, seeing ahead’, Lancet, 1988; ii: 203-4). For example, Lown speaks of nuclear winter as a “discovery” rather than as a hypothesis. IPPNW has pointedly ignored the criticism (Penner, J. E., ‘Uncertainties in the smoke source term for “nuclear winter” studies’, Nature, 1986; 324: 222-226; Seitz, R., ‘Siberian fire as “nuclear winter” guide’, Nature, 1986; 323: 116-117; Seitz, R., ‘In from the cold: “nuclear winter” melts down’, National Interest, 1986; 2(1): 3-17; Chester, C. V., et al., ‘A preliminary review of the TTAPS nuclear winter scenario’, Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1984, report ORNL/TM-9223) of the original nuclear winter report, as well as the later, more sophisticated studies that have debunked the doomsday scenario ...

In referring to the Chernobyl disaster, Lown (Lown, B., ‘Looking back, seeing ahead’, Lancet, 1988; ii: 203-4) states that the odds of a meltdown were estimated to be 1 in 10,000 years, according to Soviet Life. (A mere meltdown would have been a trivial event in comparison with the graphite-fueled fire that actually occurred.) Yet American engineers recognized the danger of reactors with a positive void coefficient (like the Chernobyl reactor) as early as 1950 (Teller, E., ‘Better a shield than a sword: perspectives on defense and technology’, New York: Free Press, 1987). Why did the Soviets choose an unsafe design for a reactor built quite recently? One possible explanation is that such reactors can be refueled while in operation, permitting the production of weapons-grade plutonium as a byproduct (Cohen, B. L., ‘The nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl, USSR’, Am. J. Phys, 1987; 55: 1076-1083).

The assertion that civil defense might ‘foster illusions but would not mitigate any of the dreadful consequences’ (Lown, B., ‘Looking back, seeing ahead’, Lancet, 1988; ii: 203-4) is in conflict with the data. ... citing the experience of the Hamburg firestorm of 1943 as ‘proof’ of the futility of shelters (Ervin F. R., et al., ‘Human and ecologic effects in Massachusetts of an assumed thermonuclear attack on the United States’, New England Journal of Medicine, 1962; 266: 1127-1137; Leaf A., ‘New perspectives on the medical consequences of nuclear war’, New England Journal of Medicine, 1986; 315: 905-912; Geiger, H. J., ‘Illusion of survival’, in: Adams, A. and Cullen, S., eds., ‘The final epidemic: physicians and scientists on nuclear war’, Chicago: Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1981: 173-181; Leaning, J., ‘Star Wars revives civil defense’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1987; vol 43(4): 42-46), even though 85% of the population in the firestorm area survived, including most persons who were in minimally adequate bomb shelters (U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, No. 154: Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany; Earp, Kathleen A., ‘Deaths from Fire in Large Scale Air Attack – with Special Reference to the Hamburg Fire Storm’, Whitehall, U. K. Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch, Report CD/SA 28, April 1953, discussed in summary here and in detail here, but ignored by Brode).

... history is apparently not among the areas of expertise claimed by IPPNW. Its spokesmen have yet to comment on the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (for which Kellogg and Briand received the Nobel Peace Prize), the Oxford Peace Resolution of 1934, the Munich Agreement of 1938, or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, and on the effectiveness of these measures in preventing World War II. ...

Sir Norman Angell (also a Nobel Peace Prize winner), in his 1910 best-seller entitled The Great Illusion, showed that war had become so terrible and expensive as to be unthinkable. The concept of ‘destruction before detonation’ was not discovered by Victor Sidel (Sidel, V. W., ‘Destruction before detonation: the impact of the arms race on health and health care’, Lancet 1985; ii: 1287-1289), but was previously enunciated by Neville Chamberlain, who warned his Cabinet about the heavy bills for armaments: ‘even the present Programmes were placing a heavy strain upon our resources’ (Minutes of the British Cabinet meeting, February 3, 1937: quoted in Fuchser, L. W., ‘Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: a Study in the Politics of History’, Norton, New York, 1982). ...

Psychic numbing, denial, and ‘missile envy’ (Caldicott, H., ‘Missile envy: the arms race and nuclear war’, New York: William Morrow, 1984) are some of the diagnoses applied by IPPNW members to those who differ with them. However, for the threats facing the world, IPPNW does not entertain a differential diagnosis, nor admit the slightest doubt about the efficacy of their prescription, if only the world will follow it. So certain are they of their ability to save us from war that these physicians seem willing to bet the lives of millions who might be saved by defensive measures if a nuclear attack is ever launched.

Is this an omnipotence fantasy?


Upate: there is an article by Zbigniew Jaworowski of Poland's Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection, "Radiation Hormesis - A Remedy for Fear" in BELLE Newsletter, pp. 14-20, Vol. 15, No. 2, May 2009. The long-term effects of radiation were reviewed in detail on the earlier post, linked here. (For a video introduction to this topic, see the presentation by Dr Gary Sanquist, Low-Level Radiation: Is It Good for You?)

See also: Bernard L. Cohen, Ph.D., "The Linear No-Threshold Theory of Radiation Carcinogenesis Should Be Rejected", published in Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2008, pp. 70-76, linked here. There is an audio file of a talk by him linked here. One issue I have with his papers is that he doesn't lucidly go into the scientific details of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki threshold dose cover up by the RERF and the radium dial painters threshold dose cover-up.



Update on 19 October 2009: PhD research student Melissa Smith of the Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine at University of Manchester, has just had published a vital new scholarly paper on the role of the British Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch nuclear test research programme in shaping the 'Protect and Survive' advice (one fragment of which was actually published as a paper in the little read 1965 U.S. National Academy of Sciences civil defense compendium, Proceedings of the symposium on protective structures for civilian populations, giving experimental data on the 1.25 MeV mean gamma Co-60 radiation protection factors for emergency 'core shelters' inside typical British homes):

Melissa Smith, 'Architects of Armageddon: the Home Office Scientific Advisers' Branch and civil defence in Britain, 1945–68', British Journal for the History of Science (published by Cambridge University Press), 8 October 2009.

Abstract:

'In 1948, in response to the perceived threat of atomic war, the British government embarked on a new civil defence programme. By the mid-1950s, secret government reports were already warning that this programme would be completely inadequate to deal with a nuclear attack. The government responded to these warnings by cutting civil defence spending, while issuing apparently absurd pamphlets advising the public on how they could protect themselves from nuclear attack. Historians have thus far sought to explain this response with reference to high-level decisions taken by policymakers, and have tended to dismiss civil defence advice as mere propaganda. This paper challenges this interpretation by considering the little-known role of the Home Office Scientific Advisers' Branch, a group of experts whose scientific and technical knowledge informed both civil defence policy and advice to the public. It explores both their advisory and research work, demonstrating their role in shaping civil defence policy and showing that detailed research programmes lay behind the much-mocked government civil defence pamphlets of the 1950s and 1960s.'


This paper is an expanded version of the essay awarded the Singer Prize of the British Society for the History of Science for 2008:

Ms Melissa Smith wins 2008 Singer Prize

The BSHS Singer Prize judging panel has selected the essay entitled "Architects of Armageddon: Scientific advisers and civil defence in Britain, 1945-68" by Ms Melissa Smith (CHSTM, University of Manchester), as the winner of the 2008 Singer Prize. The judges were impressed by the flair and ambition of the essay, by its critical engagement with the existing literature on post-war British science and government, and by its extensive use of primary archival sources. They found the essay original, well written, engaging and informative.


We have also blogged about this research. As previously explained, the government should have published nuclear weapons effects research based on nuclear test data in order to substantiate the scientific basis for civil defense. Hiding the factual scientific evidence for public civil defense advice behind a solid wall of secrecy is a guaranteed way to allow the advice to be falsely ridiculed and ignored by ignorant 'scientists' with a political agenda, thereby maximising the scale of tragedy in the event that civil defense is needed in a disaster. Allowing the popular media to wrongly discredit civil defence also increases the risk of war by encouraging dictators and terrorists to spend money trying to get hold of weapons of mass destruction in the belief that there is no effective defense against such weapons. It's vital to publish the facts!

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities, by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter




Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities, by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter (Criterion Books, New York, 1958), page 139:

"It is generally believed that the First World War was caused by an arms race. For some strange reason most people forget that the Second World War was brought about by a situation which could be called a race in disarmament. The peace-loving and powerful nations divested themselves of their military power. When the Nazi regime in Germany adopted a program of rapid preparation for war, the rest of the world was caught unawares. At first they did not want to accept the fact of this menace. When the danger was unmistakable, it was too late to avert a most cruel war, and almost too late to stop Hitler short of world conquest."


Above: 9.3 megatons Hardtack-Poplar fireball in 1958. This photo has only been recently released with the name of the test. Maybe the proximity of the fighter (which survived) creates the wrong (not so doomsday-like) impression?



Above: a different regime of nuclear effects phenomena. Colour photos now available of the Teak fireball and surrounding red shock wave air glow. The bomb was 3.8 Mt (50% fission yield fraction) detonated at 77 km altitude nearly over Johnston Island, and was photographed in 1958 from a mountain top on Maui, 794 nautical miles away. As we mentioned in a previous post, Teller and Latter related the case of the Plumbbob-John air burst of 18 July 1957, where five men stood at ground zero (directly below the rocket carried bomb burst) without injury (although they were not looking directly at the fireball at zero time, or they would have received retinal burns). Teak was a similar case: proving that nuclear weapons can be used (for instance as high altitude bursts to destroy incoming missiles) without hazards, if they are designed to minimize prompt gamma ray output and thus EMP radiation (this can be done by the use of clean nuclear weapons with suitable tamper materials that will minimize the high-energy secondary gamma ray yield when hit by neutrons).

Teller and Latter explain that radiological warfare is a benefit compared to the carnage of using conventional weapons

"The lifetime of the radioactive material may be long enough to give an opportunity to the people to escape from the contaminated area [longer half lives mean that the chance of a radioactive atom decaying in any given second is lower, so the specific activity is lower; e.g. if you have N radioactive atoms with a half life of T time units, then the decay rate is simply (lne2)*N/T ~ 0.693N/T atoms decaying per unit time, thus the longer the half-life T the lower the radioactivity level that a given number of radioactive atoms produces, where 1/(lne2) ~ 1.44 which is the factor by which you must multiply the half-life to get the statistical mean life, defined as the time to zero activity if the initial straight-line asymptotic gradient of the decay curve, i.e. exp(-AT) ~ 1 - AT, were followed instead of the exponential curve which of course is itself just a mathematical idealization because it can never reach zero, despite the quantum reality check that in the real world some day the final radioactive atom will decay, and zero activity will be attained after a finite time]. At the same time, one may precipitate almost all the activity near the explosion [using shallow underground detonations produced by earth penetrator warheads, like Redwing-Seminole 13.7 kt shot surface burst inside a water tank at Eniwetok Atoll in 1956 to simulate shallow burial] so that distant localities would not be seriously affected. It is conceivable, therefore, that radiological warfare could be used in a humane manner. By exploding a weapon of this kind near an island one might be able to force evacuation without loss of life. No instrument, not even a weapon, is evil in itself. Everything depends on the way in which it is used."

- Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter, Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities (Criterion Books, New York, 1958), p. 136.



Above: Redwing-Seminole 13.7 kt shot inside a water tank at Eniwetok Atoll in 1956 to simulate shallow burial. The Wilson cloud shields much of the thermal radiation, while the enhanced cratering action deposits almost all of the radioactivity in the local fallout, seen here as the throwout from the crater. Teller and Latter explain how this kind of radiological warfare could make enemy forces evacuate an island like Iwo Jima (where the island had to be shelled with conventional weapons and flame-throwers, resulting in the death of 21,703 of the 22,786 Japanese soldiers, and the death of 6,825 allied soldiers) before receiving a lethal radiation dose, without any of the immoral carnage of shelling or other gross effects from conventional weapons. Another moral use of nuclear weapons that circumvents the carnage of conventional warfare is air bursts at altitudes just over the maximum fireball radius, to clear the conventional weapons defending coastal areas and beaches prior to an invasion such as the D-day landings: neutron-induced activity covers only a small area and the dose rates are relatively low once the aluminium-28 has decayed with a half-life of only 2.3 minutes.

Sr-90 exaggerations

Teller and Latter also explain how the threat from strontium-90 is grossly exaggerated. Sr-90 is more important than the equally long-lived Cs-137 because Cs-137 like potassium resides in tissues whose cells are regularly renewed and thus is rapidly eliminated from the body, whereas a small fraction of Sr-90 ends up in the bones for life, creating a larger dose. (The I-131 problem and its countermeasures was discussed in detail earlier in the blog post linked here.) Once the fallout comes down, there is a brief spell of danger while the fallout particles are physically present on the leaves and stems of crops, but this can be washed off and wind and rain soon wash the fallout particles into the soil where root uptake is important for the soluble component of the fallout activity. In coral soil or limestone based soil there is an abundance of calcium (coral is calcium carbonate) so chemically similar strontium gets crowded out and diluted.

In most American soils, however, there is less calcium, so with an average natural strontium to calcium mass abundance of 1:100, there is only about 27 kg of soluble natural strontium per acre. Adult humans have a natural strontium to calcium mass ratio of just 1:1,400 and contain only 0.7 gram of natural strontium. Hence, strontium uptake via the food chain from soil to human beings is discriminated against (relative to calcium) by the factor 14. These figures allow the dilution of strontium-90 to be calculated. Each step of the food chain discriminates against strontium relative to calcium (see also pages 1521-9 of the U.S. Congressional Hearings The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, May-June 1957, which states on page 1529: "100 metres [depth] of sea water has 370 grams of dissolved calcium per square foot compared to the average of 20 grams per square foot for the top 2.5 inches of soil which absorbs and holds the fallout radiostrontium"):

(1) Soil: 1 g of Sr for every 100 g of Ca (protection factor = 1)

(2) Plants: 1 g of Sr for every 140 g of Ca (protection factor = 140/100 = 1.4)

(3) Milk: 1 g of Sr for every 980 g of Ca (protection factor = 980/100 = 9.8 for root uptake of soluble Sr in soil by grass, or 980/140 = 7 for Sr ingestion by cattle from fresh fallout particles still adhering directly to the grass)

(4) Human: 1 g of Sr for every 1,400 g of Ca (protection factor of 1400/100 = 14 for fallout in the soil, or 1400/140 = 10 for fallout on plants which are ingested by cattle)

J. L. Kulp's report "Sr-90 in Man" published in Science, 8 February 1957, vol. 125, p. 219, showed that in 1955 the average diet for the human population of the United States contained 7 micro-microcuries of Sr-90 per gram of calcium. It also reported an average worldwide total body burden of 0.12 micro-microcuries per gram of skeletal calcium, and a concentration in young children 3-4 times higher (due to growing bones and thus greater calcium intake from drinking milk).



In 1996, half a century after the nuclear detonations, data on cancers from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors was published by D. A. Pierce et al. of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, RERF (Radiation Research vol. 146 pp. 1-27; Science vol. 272, pp. 632-3) for 86,572 survivors, of whom 60% had received bomb doses of over 5 mSv (or 500 millirem in old units) suffering 4,741 cancers of which only 420 were due to radiation, consisting of 85 leukemias and 335 solid cancers.


‘Today we have a population of 2,383 [radium dial painter] cases for whom we have reliable body content measurements. . . . All 64 bone sarcoma [cancer] cases occurred in the 264 cases with more than 10 Gy [1,000 rads], while no sarcomas appeared in the 2,119 radium cases with less than 10 Gy.’


- Dr Robert Rowland, Director of the Center for Human Radiobiology, Bone Sarcoma in Humans Induced by Radium: A Threshold Response?, Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting, European Society for Radiation Biology, Radioprotection colloquies, Vol. 32CI (1997), pp. 331-8.


Zbigniew Jaworowski, 'Radiation Risk and Ethics: Health Hazards, Prevention Costs, and Radiophobia', Physics Today, April 2000, pp. 89-90:


‘... it is important to note that, given the effects of a few seconds of irradiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, a threshold near 200 mSv may be expected for leukemia and some solid tumors. [Sources: UNSCEAR, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, New York, 1994; W. F. Heidenreich, et al., Radiat. Environ. Biophys., vol. 36 (1999), p. 205; and B. L. Cohen, Radiat. Res., vol. 149 (1998), p. 525.] For a protracted lifetime natural exposure, a threshold may be set at a level of several thousand millisieverts for malignancies, of 10 grays for radium-226 in bones, and probably about 1.5-2.0 Gy for lung cancer after x-ray and gamma irradiation. [Sources: G. Jaikrishan, et al., Radiation Research, vol. 152 (1999), p. S149 (for natural exposure); R. D. Evans, Health Physics, vol. 27 (1974), p. 497 (for radium-226); H. H. Rossi and M. Zaider, Radiat. Environ. Biophys., vol. 36 (1997), p. 85 (for radiogenic lung cancer).] The hormetic effects, such as a decreased cancer incidence at low doses and increased longevity, may be used as a guide for estimating practical thresholds and for setting standards. ...


‘Though about a hundred of the million daily spontaneous DNA damages per cell remain unrepaired or misrepaired, apoptosis, differentiation, necrosis, cell cycle regulation, intercellular interactions, and the immune system remove about 99% of the altered cells. [Source: R. D. Stewart, Radiation Research, vol. 152 (1999), p. 101.] ...


‘[Due to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986] as of 1998 (according to UNSCEAR), a total of 1,791 thyroid cancers in children had been registered. About 93% of the youngsters have a prospect of full recovery. [Source: C. R. Moir and R. L. Telander, Seminars in Pediatric Surgery, vol. 3 (1994), p. 182.] ... The highest average thyroid doses in children (177 mGy) were accumulated in the Gomel region of Belarus. The highest incidence of thyroid cancer (17.9 cases per 100,000 children) occurred there in 1995, which means that the rate had increased by a factor of about 25 since 1987.


‘This rate increase was probably a result of improved screening [not radiation!]. Even then, the incidence rate for occult thyroid cancers was still a thousand times lower than it was for occult thyroid cancers in nonexposed populations (in the US, for example, the rate is 13,000 per 100,000 persons, and in Finland it is 35,600 per 100,000 persons). Thus, given the prospect of improved diagnostics, there is an enormous potential for detecting yet more [fictitious] "excess" thyroid cancers. In a study in the US that was performed during the period of active screening in 1974-79, it was determined that the incidence rate of malignant and other thyroid nodules was greater by 21-fold than it had been in the pre-1974 period. [Source: Z. Jaworowski, 21st Century Science and Technology, vol. 11 (1998), issue 1, p. 14.]’


W. L. Chen, Y. C. Luan, M. C. Shieh, S. T. Chen, H. T. Kung, K. L. Soong, Y. C. Yeh, T. S. Chou, S. H. Mong, J. T. Wu, C. P. Sun, W. P. Deng, M. F. Wu, and M. L. Shen, ‘Is Chronic Radiation an Effective Prophylaxis Against Cancer?’, published in the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2004, page 6, available in PDF format here:


‘An extraordinary incident occurred 20 years ago in Taiwan. Recycled steel, accidentally contaminated with cobalt-60 ([low dose rate, gamma radiation emitter] half-life: 5.3 y), was formed into construction steel for more than 180 buildings, which 10,000 persons occupied for 9 to 20 years. They unknowingly received radiation doses that averaged 0.4 Sv, a collective dose of 4,000 person-Sv. Based on the observed seven cancer deaths, the cancer mortality rate for this population was assessed to be 3.5 per 100,000 person-years. Three children were born with congenital heart malformations, indicating a prevalence rate of 1.5 cases per 1,000 children under age 19.


‘The average spontaneous cancer death rate in the general population of Taiwan over these 20 years is 116 persons per 100,000 person-years. Based upon partial official statistics and hospital experience, the prevalence rate of congenital malformation is 23 cases per 1,000 children. Assuming the age and income distributions of these persons are the same as for the general population, it appears that significant beneficial health effects may be associated with this chronic radiation exposure. ...’


‘Professor Edward Lewis used data from four independent populations exposed to radiation to demonstrate that the incidence of leukemia was linearly related to the accumulated dose of radiation. ... Outspoken scientists, including Linus Pauling, used Lewis’s risk estimate to inform the public about the danger of nuclear fallout by estimating the number of leukemia deaths that would be caused by the test detonations. In May of 1957 Lewis’s analysis of the radiation-induced human leukemia data was published as a lead article in Science magazine. In June he presented it before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the US Congress.’ – Abstract of thesis by Jennifer Caron, Edward Lewis and Radioactive Fallout: the Impact of Caltech Biologists Over Nuclear Weapons Testing in the 1950s and 60s, Caltech, January 2003.


Dr John F. Loutit of the Medical Research Council, Harwell, England, in 1962 wrote a book called Irradiation of Mice and Men (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London), discrediting the pseudo-science from geneticist Edward Lewis on pages 61, and 78-79:


‘... Mole [R. H. Mole, Brit. J. Radiol., v32, p497, 1959] gave different groups of mice an integrated total of 1,000 r of X-rays over a period of 4 weeks. But the dose-rate - and therefore the radiation-free time between fractions - was varied from 81 r/hour intermittently to 1.3 r/hour continuously. The incidence of leukemia varied from 40 per cent (within 15 months of the start of irradiation) in the first group to 5 per cent in the last compared with 2 per cent incidence in irradiated controls. …


‘What Lewis did, and which I have not copied, was to include in his table another group - spontaneous incidence of leukemia (Brooklyn, N.Y.) - who are taken to have received only natural background radiation throughout life at the very low dose-rate of 0.1-0.2 rad per year: the best estimate is listed as 2 x 10-6 like the others in the table. But the value of 2 x 10-6 was not calculated from the data as for the other groups; it was merely adopted. By its adoption and multiplication with the average age in years of Brooklyners - 33.7 years and radiation dose per year of 0.1-0.2 rad - a mortality rate of 7 to 13 cases per million per year due to background radiation was deduced, or some 10-20 per cent of the observed rate of 65 cases per million per year. ...


‘All these points are very much against the basic hypothesis of Lewis of a linear relation of dose to leukemic effect irrespective of time. Unhappily it is not possible to claim for Lewis’s work as others have done, “It is now possible to calculate - within narrow limits - how many deaths from leukemia will result in any population from an increase in fall-out or other source of radiation” [Leading article in Science, vol. 125, p. 963, 1957]. This is just wishful journalese.


‘The burning questions to me are not what are the numbers of leukemia to be expected from atom bombs or radiotherapy, but what is to be expected from natural background .... Furthermore, to obtain estimates of these, I believe it is wrong to go to [1950s inaccurate, dose rate effect ignoring, data from] atom bombs, where the radiations are qualitatively different [i.e., including effects from neutrons] and, more important, the dose-rate outstandingly different.’




Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities, by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter (Criterion Books, New York, 1958):

Page 167:

'If we continue to consume [fossil] fuel at an increasing rate, however, it appears probable that the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere will become high enough to raise the average temperature of the earth by a few degrees. If this were to happen, the ice caps would melt and the general level of the oceans would rise. Coastal cities like New York and Seattle might be innundated. Thus the industrial revolution using ordinary chemical fuel could be forced to end ... However, it might still be possible to use nuclear fuel.'

Page 147:

'All the energy in that Nevada explosion was not quite sufficient to evaporate the water droplets in a cloud one mile broad, one mile wide, and one mile deep. This is not a very big rain cloud. ... Nuclear explosions are violent enough. But compared to the forces of nature - compared even with the daily release of energy from not particularly stormy weather - all our bombs are puny.'


Above: Dr Zaius in Planet of the Apes simultaneously held religious and scientific positions, leading him to suppress scientific findings which contradicted the religious dogma. You know, like my suppression by Britain's Open University physics department chairman, Professor Russell Stannard, author of books like Science and the Renewal of Belief:

"offering fresh insight into original sin, the trials experienced by Galileo, the problem of pain, the possibility of miracles, the evidence for the resurrection, the credibility of incarnation, and the power of steadfast prayer. By introducing simple analogies, Stannard clears up misunderstandings that have muddied the connections between science and religion, and suggests contributions that the pursuit of physical science can make to theology",


arguing that science should be alloyed with dogma again as a "unification" of physics and religion, as it was in the time of Galileo.
Actually, this makes some sense when you recognise that Stannard takes "physics" to include the religious belief in uncheckable pseudoscience: a landscape of 10500 different universes to account for the vast number of possible particle physics theories which can be generated by the 100 or more moduli for the shape of the unobservably small compactification of 6-dimensions assumed to exist in the speculative Calabi-Yau manifold of string theory, as well as other rubbish like Aspect's alleged "experimental evidence" on entanglement via correlation of particle spins:

"In some key Bell experiments, including two of the well-known ones by Alain Aspect, 1981-2, it is only after the subtraction of ‘accidentals’ from the coincidence counts that we get violations of Bell tests. The data adjustment, producing increases of up to 60% in the test statistics, has never been adequately justified. Few published experiments give sufficient information for the reader to make a fair assessment." - http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9903/9903066v2.pdf

"The quantum collapse [in the mainstream interpretation of quantum mechanics, where a wavefunction collapse occurs whenever a measurement of a particle is made] occurs when we model the wave moving according to Schroedinger (time-dependent) and then, suddenly at the time of interaction we require it to be in an eigenstate and hence to also be a solution of Schroedinger (time-independent). The collapse of the wave function is due to a discontinuity in the equations used to model the physics, it is not inherent in the physics." - Thomas Love, California State University.

As a physics student with a mechanism for gravity that predicted correctly the cosmological acceleration two years ahead of its discovery, Russell didn't even personally reply but just passed my paper to Dr Bob Lambourne who in 1996 wrote to me that my prediction for quantum gravity and cosmological acceleration was not important because it is not within the metaphysical, non-falsifiable domain of Professor Edward Witten's stringy speculations on 11-dimensional 'M-theory'. In 1986, Professor Russell was awarded the Templeton Project Trust Award for ‘significant contributions to the field of spiritual values; in particular for contributions to greater understanding of science and religion’. So who says the Planet of the Apes story is completely fictional, aside from a little hairiness?


Above: Nova (Linda Harrison) portrayed in 3978 AD, in the 1968 movie Planet of the Apes. A nuclear war destroys 'civilization' leaving beautiful dumb girls like Nova. However, the film is politically correct and adds mutant aggressive apes to earth's survivors to make sure that the nuclear war 'survivors will envy the dead' (as Nikita Khrushchev claimed, quoted in Pravda, 20 July 1963), just as politically correct dogma requires.


Above: another view; maybe the alleged evidence for health benefits like enhanced lifespan and lower cancer rates from low level residual radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki contribute to her very healthy appearance?



‘Planet of the Apes’ started out as a Pierre Boulle novel in which a couple discover a bottle containing the story of how humans become dictatorial, slovenly and lazy by using apes as slaves to do their work, until there is a rebellion and an ape revolution reverses the situation. Humans are too cowardly to fight back and submit to the chains of oppression. Apes become the masters of human slaves. The twist at the end of the novel occurs when Boulle reveals that the story in a bottle has not been found by humans but rather by a couple of apes (who have read it with astonishment and dismiss the story just as a silly hoax).



The film, however, is another story and is based on a film script by ‘Twilight Zone’ master Rod Serling and Michael Wilson, and in some ways is a reversal of the underlying politics of Boulle's book (producer Arthur P. Jacobs contacted Pierre Boulle and asked him to take a look at the script; Boulle responded on April 29, 1965 that "he truly did not like the Statue of Liberty ending, feeling that it cheapened the story as a whole, and served as the 'temptation from the Devil'...") Instead of the disaster coming through the pacifist humans refusing to fight against oppression, it instead occurs (in the film) as a result of humans fighting one another with nuclear weapons and destroying the cities of human civilization, giving the apes in jungles the opportunity to take over the planet. However, some parts of Pierre Boulle's original plot are resurrected in the sequels to the 1968 film, where the mechanism by which the apes take over the planet is the use of ape slaves who rebel.



The first film, in the script by Rod Serling, starts with three astronauts taking an 18-month (ship time) journey supposed to cover a distance of 320 light years in 2,000 earth years, at a velocity of 320/2000 = 0.16c. At 16% of light velocity, ship time travels at just [1 – 0.162]1/2 = 0.987 of the rate of earth time, so the ship time passing would be 1974 years, not the 18 months that is claimed in the film. Deep sleep cubicles in the ship are used to keep the astronauts alive with the use of minimal resources during the journey. Serling changed the twist that Boulle used by having the ship hit an asteroid half way into the trip, cracking the plastic cubicle of the female astronaut and causing her to prematurely age and die in her sleep. This causes the computer to automatically abort the mission and turn the ship back towards the earth, which in the screenplay by Serling is discovered when the computer tapes are read later (this episode was omitted from the film). The ship, returning to a grossly altered earth with no surviving runways, crash lands in a lake.



The astronauts discover that on this planet the apes rule dumb, ignorant humans. In the final scene, the twist revealing that the planet is actually the earth (which should have been pretty obvious from the similar gravity, atmosphere, sun, moon, star positions in the sky, and so forth) is done by showing the Statue of Liberty half buried by beach sand. A nuclear war has apparently occurred during the 2,000 years that elapsed. The second film in the series, Beneath the Planet of the Apes, furthers this theme by having the surviving astronaut Taylor (Charlton Heston, appropriately nicknamed ‘Charlie Hero’ off-set by the Chimpanzee actor Roddy McDowell) and beautiful savage girl Nova discover an underground colony of surviving radiation-mutated humans worshipping a cobalt-cased ‘alpha-omega doomsday bomb’. Sublime political message: ‘the survivors in a nuclear war will have to live for thousands of years underground and will be mutants that envy the dead.’ Not exactly the truth about the harmlessness of slowly-decaying (i.e. low dose rate) cobalt fallout (which can simply be swept up and buried long before anyone gets a dangerous dose) compared to the survivable but more dangerous fast-decaying (i.e. high dose rate) fission products:

'Everybody's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around...Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it.'

- Thomas K. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Research and Engineering, LA Times 16 January 1982.










The apes follow them underground and, after his girlfriend Nova is killed in the fighting, the bitter, love-cheated Charlie Hero decides to destroy the planet in anger, finally succeeding by falling on to the doomsday button which ends the story, just as in Pierre Boulle’s previous film Bridge on the River Kwai the crazy hero falls on the detonator switch when shot, blowing up the bridge. Fortunately the alpha-omega bomb - presumably because it's capable of destroying the whole planet - is the one bomb made which doen’t have a permissive action link and require authority codes and dual key activation to arm, with the key holes too far apart for one person to simultaneously turn both together. After all, you don't want to make such a dangerous bomb very hard to accidentally set off, do you, at least not if you're using it as the ending to a fine film?



This fictional tale, in lieu of the full facts on nuclear weapons effects, helped to cement the myth in popular culture that nuclear weapons are a danger to human civilization, rather than deterring world war.

Fraction of activity in local fallout

One of the interesting things about this 1958 book by Teller and Latter is that it gives details of how the atmospheric Nevada testing tried to minimise local fallout. E.g., on page 98, they claim that if the test is on a 'tower so tall that the fireball cannot touch the surface ... the amount of close-in fallout is reduced from eighty per cent to approximately five per cent.'

However, this figure is misleading! The actual percentage of the gamma activity in local fallout from 30 Nevada tower bursts at heights exceeding 100Wkt1/3 feet (it did not decrease at heights above that, due to the contribution to local fallout from the condensed iron oxides produced by the fireball enveloping the tower material) was 20% of that of a surface burst, not 5%.

This 20% figure comes from Jack C. Greene, et al., Response to DCPA Questions on Fallout, Prepared by the Subcommittee on Fallout, Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, DCPA Research Report No. 20, November 1973. This report was written by a committee composed of top experts on fallout such as Dr Carl F. Miller who had collected the fallout at Castle and Plumbbob and developed the fallout model used by DCPA, and Dr R. Robert Rapp of RAND Corporation who had analyzed the effect of the toroidal distribution of activity in the mushroom clouds of Bravo and Zuni upon the fallout pattern.

The proportion of activity in local fallout depends on which nuclides you are considering, so it is a different number for gamma and beta activity and for different times after burst. If you quote the percentage of unfractionated activities (like Zr-95) in local fallout, that is much larger than the percentage of the fractionated I-131, Cs-137, Sr-89 and Sr-90 in local fallout. Most of the fractionated nuclide decay chains have somewhat different volatilities, so they fractionate to different degrees. Therefore, there is no natural way to define what is meant by the fraction of activity that comes down in local fallout. One artificial way to define it is to consider the local fallout fraction as the gamma exposure rate normalized to 1 hour after burst an integrated over the area of the local fallout pattern. This includes fractionation to the extent that it reduces the average gamma exposure rate at the reference time of one hour after burst.

On page 3 they note that the radiation level at a fixed time after burst from a unit mass of fallout per unit area increases as the particle size decreases, e.g. the radiation level for a given deposition density at a fixed time after burst actually increases as you move further downwind from ground zero:

‘This observation is consistent with the consensus that radiochemical fractionation causes this ration to decrease with increasing particle size.’

In other words, the value of the ratio (R/hr at 1 hour)/(fission kiloton/square mile) is smaller for highly fractionated close-in fallout (which is depleted in volatile fission products) than it is for the unfractionated and enriched fallout deposited at great distances:

‘This problem has been customarily circumvented by using what amounts to an average of this ratio over the region of “local” fallout, where “local” was defined at the convenience of the author.’

They denote the average “local” fallout (R/hr at 1 hour)/(fission kiloton/square mile) ratio as K1, while the unfractionated fission product value is K0, so K1/K0 = fraction of activity in local fallout.

K1 is reduced by 25% due to instrument response to multidirectional gamma rays from fallout when calibrated using point sources. The batteries in the instrument partly shield the detector from gamma rays coming from certain directions, and the partial shielding of the instrument by the body of the person holding the instrument is also important for fallout measurements. It is also reduced by about 25% due to terrain shielding of direct gamma rays from fallout that collects in small hollows (microrelief) on the ground. Hence, the actual measured ratio, K2 = 0.77x0.75K1 = 0.56K1.

‘Local fallout’ has been defined in three different ways by different people, causing confusion over how to average K1. One way is to define local fallout according as fallout larger than a particular fallout grain size, another way is to define it as radiation levels greater than a particular dose rate at a given time after detonation, and a third way is to define it as the fallout deposited within a certain period of time, such as 24 hours after detonation.

Page 4 states that the best surface burst data is for 0.5 kt Johnie Boy (1170), 1.5 kt Buffalo-2 (980), 3.53 Mt Zuni (1150), 5.01 Mt Tewa (920), and 1.2 kt Sugar (1215), giving a mean of 1090 for K2 and 1930 for K1.

P. 8 states that the average K2 for 30 Nevada steel tower tests with tower heights (scaled by cube-root of yield to 1 kt) of 100 ft or more (due to the steel of the tower the fallout did not diminish below this value) is 220 (R/hr at 1 hour)/(fission kiloton/square mile), while for 40 air bursts at similar scaled altitudes, the mean is K2 = 25 (R/hr at 1 hour)/(fission kiloton/square mile).

Hence, high tower shots produce 100*220/1090 = 20% of the local fallout gamma dose rates of surface bursts, while free air bursts at heights above the fireball radius produced only 100*25/1090 = 2.3% of the fallout of surface bursts.

The Trinity result of K2 = 690 for 37Wkt1/3 feet steel tower burst is 100*690/1090 = 63% of the fallout of a surface burst and is equivalent to a 1 Mt detonation on a 30 storey steel framed building.



On p. 13, after investigating the local fallout fractions from Pacific surface bursts on coral islands, reefs and on the ocean water surface, they concluded that the type of surface did not have a substantial effect on the measured amount of local fallout produced by nuclear surface bursts.

On p. 17, after observing that iodine in fallout is highly fractionated since volatile and condenses late in the fireball history on to the surfaces of the remaining small particles (i.e., it is depleted from the local close-in fallout), they explain that the Japanese fishermen exposed to Bravo fallout on 1 March 1954 just north of Rongelap Atoll were found to have 7 times as much external gamma radiation exposure as thyroid iodine exposure.

In the July 1962 104 kt Sedan test in Nevada, a man who was exposed in the open to the base surge without any protection received a thyroid gland dose due only slightly higher than his external gamma exposure. Three air samplers determined that no more than 10% of the iodine in the Sedan fallout was present as a vapour during the cloud passage; i.e., 90% or more of the iodine was fixed in the silicate Sedan fallout and was unable to evaporate from the fallout particles to give a soluble vapour.

P. 19: ‘There is evidence that much if not all heavy fallout observed during atmospheric nuclear tests was visible as individual particles falling and striking objects, or as deposits ... the forehead will feel like sandpaper to the touch of the hand. The gritty sensation will also be felt on the hands and on bared arms. ... Probably you do not have a radiation-measuring instrument (if you do you can work outside until the instrument reads 0.5 R/hr), but heavy fallout can still be detected by one of these several clues: Seeing fallout particles, fine, soil-coloured, some fused, bouncing upon or hitting a solid object, particularly visible on shining surfaces such as the hood or top of a car or truck. ... Feeling particles striking the nose or forehead ... In the rain, after turning on the windshield wiper of your car, seeing fallout particles in raindrops slide downward on the glass and pile up at the edge of the wiper stroke, like dust or snow.’

P. 20: ‘Typical specific activities of fallout particles are 5 x 1014 fissions/gram of fallout; thus for each R/hr at 1 hour exposure rate produced, 5 milligrams of particles would be deposited per sq ft of area.’ For a minimal sickness gamma dose of 150 R over a week outdoor, 50 R/hr at 1 hour would be needed, requiring 0.25 gram per square foot of fallout to be deposited at 1 hour, which is readily visible on surfaces.

P. 27: Dr Timothy Fohl and A. D. Ealay of Mt. Auburn Research Associates (MARA) used a buoyant vortex fireball in their 1972 report Vortex Ring Model of Single and Multiple Cloud Rise, DNA-2945F, to model to simulate the effect of two simultaneous 13.5 Mt nuclear surface bursts. If they are detonated within 5 fireball diameters of each other, they merge while rising into a single cloud which reaches only 66% of the altitude reached by an individual detonation.

Going back to the Teller and Latter book, their figure of 5% for high tower shots roughly applies to the fractionated I-131, Cs-137, Sr-90 and Sr-89 in local fallout, rather than to the mixture of unfractionated and fractionated activities which give rise to the total gamma radiation field from local fallout. On page 99 they state:

'In the case ... where the fireball almost touches the ground, the close-in fallout is also only about five percent [actually, as we saw above, for 40 free air bursts where the fireball did not touch the ground, it was only 2.3% of the fallout gamma activity of surface bursts]. This is a somewhat surprising fact since in this case photographs show large quantities of surface material being sucked up into the cloud, just as they are in a true surface explosion.

'This material certainly consists of large, heavy dirt particles which subsequently fall out of the cloud. Yet most of them somehow fail to come in contact with the radioactive fission products.

'This peculiar phenomenon can be understood by looking at the details of how the fireball rises. At first the central part of the fireball is much hotter than the outer part and thus it rises more rapidly. As it rises, however, it cools and falls back around the outer part, creating in this way a doughnut-shaped structure. The whole process is analogous to the formation of an ordinary smoke ring.

'In most of the photographs one sees, the doughnut is obscured by the cloud of water that forms, but sometimes when the weather is particularly dry, it becomes perfectly visible. During the rather orderly circulation of air through the hole, the bomb debris and the dirt that has been sucked up remain separated.'


Above: toroidal circulation in the 1953 Climax test: dust passes up through the middle of the toroid without mixing with the ring shaped fireball, then it cools as it hits cold air at the top, causing it to cascade back around the outside of the fireball. Result: harmless, non-radioactive fallout of dust which has never come into contact with the radioactive toroidal shaped fireball (a ring doughnut shape with a hollow in the middle.



Above: toroidal fireball in the 1953 Grable nuclear air burst.




Above: photos taken at 17, 27 and about 50 seconds after the French nuclear test Licorne (a 914 kt balloon suspended shot, at 500 m altitude on 3 July 1970). The fireball thermal radiation is initially shielded by the expanding Wilson condensation cloud, which forms in humid atmosphere the low pressure, cooling air in the negative pressure blast phase (some distance behind behind the ever expanding compressed shock front). Edward Teller and Albert Latter clearly describe the scientific phenomena of the white 'skirt' surrounding the mushroom stem for bursts in humid air, on page 84 of their 1958 book Our Nuclear Future:

'It is actually a cloud: a collection of droplets of water too small to turn into rain but big enough to reflect the white light of the sun. ... The white skirts (which are not always present) do not consist of any material that is falling out of the cloud. On the contrary, a moist layer of air is sucked up into the cloud from the side and the droplets which form in this layer give rise to a cloud-sheet with the appearance of a skirt.'


Above: the lethal global fallout fallacy started with the 1949 book by David Bradley, No Place to Hide, which grossly exaggerated the Crossroads-BAKER fallout.

The effects of small doses of plutonium were falsely claimed to be harmful using metaphysical linear extrapolation from high dose radium effects, in lieu of actual data for low doses. When eventually in the 1970s and 1980s the detailed dosimetry for thousands of early radium dial painters was done (by exhuming the corpses and actually measuring the radium in the bones), in was discovered that alpha radiation effects internally were a threshold effect requiring a minimum of 1,000 rads or 10 Gy, so the linear dose-effects theory was bunk:

‘Today we have a population of 2,383 [radium dial painter] cases for whom we have reliable body content measurements. . . . All 64 bone sarcoma [cancer] cases occurred in the 264 cases with more than 10 Gy [1,000 rads], while no sarcomas appeared in the 2,119 radium cases with less than 10 Gy.’

- Dr Robert Rowland, Director of the Center for Human Radiobiology, Bone Sarcoma in Humans Induced by Radium: A Threshold Response?, Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting, European Society for Radiation Biology, Radioprotection colloquies, Vol. 32CI (1997), pp. 331-8.



DCPA Attack Environment Manual -

Sunday, August 09, 2009

Blast Wave


Above: Figure 2-23 on p. 2-59 of Dolan's Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, DNA-EM-1, 1972, showing the rapid decay of the peak overpressure with increasing distance from a 1 kt nuclear surface burst:

R (feet) - P (psi)

25 - 300,000
40 - 60,000
70 - 10,000
150 - 1,000
400 - 70
1,000 - 10
20,000 - 0.1

The curve, based on Brode's theoretical calculations with programs that include both hydrodynamic motion and radiation flow, can be represented by the simple equation:

P (psi) = (1.7 x 1010 /R3.4) + (7.0 x 106 /R2) + (1,700 /R),

where R is distance in feet. The R3.4 fall in pressure at the smallest distances differs from the simple theoretical R3 prediction for the fall in overpressure due to dispersal of energy over the increasing mass of engulfed ambient air (this mass is proportional to R3) because the shock front is losing energy by radiating thermal radiation at the highest overpressures, which causes an additional fall in peak overpressure with distance. Scaling to other explosion yields is done by multiplying the distances by the cube-root of the total kiloton yield.

Dolan gives also a free air burst curve in Figure 2-2 on p. 2-7, which can be obtained by scaling the surface burst peak overpressure curve to a yield of about 0.565 kt, implying that surface bursts have an effective yield (due to reflection of blast wave energy into a hemispherical region) of 1.77 times the free air burst yield. Hence, the distance for any given pressure in a surface burst extends about 1.771/3 = 1.21 times as far as in a free air burst in sea level air. For a perfectly rigid surface, an effective yield increase factor of 2 would be expected since the same amount of blast energy for any radius would be concentrated in a hemisphere with only half the volume of the sphere for that distance. A reflection factor of 1.77 therefore implies that only 100(1 - 1.77/2) = 11.5% of the blast energy in a surface burst is permanently absorbed by the ground in the cratering, ground shock, and soil heating (fallout formation) processes. If the initial blast energy is 50% of the total yield in a free air burst, then in a surface burst it will be reduced to 44%. A discussion of blast theory and some test data is given in an earlier post linked here.

PRECURSOR EFFECTS

The history of the precursor is discussed in earlier blog post about Glasstone and Dolan. The billowing of thermally-raised smoke and dust in the blast wave of the TRINITY test (100 feet over dark desert soil) in 1945 should have been the suggested a modification of the blast by dust loading of the air in that region, but the first film of the precursor shock wave was obtained on the DOG shot of TUMBLER-SNAPPER in the Nevada in 1952. Dark coloured (brown) desert sand, consisting of crystals of silica, was exploded or 'popcorned' into hot dust by thermal radiation exposures of 11-19 cal/cm2 for yields of 35 kt to 1.4 Mt; a similar effect on lighter coloured (grey-white) coral sand required 15-27 cal/cm2. This formed a cloud of hot dust-laden air several metres high over the ground, which caused the blast wave to speed up and change in characteristics. The density of the dust added to the air increased the blast wind or dynamic pressure (which is directly proportional to the density), while the added momentum increased the duration of the blast winds, greatly increasing damage to structures and vehicles by the 'sandstorm effect' of the air-blasted dust cloud. The peak overpressure is somewhat reduced by the upward refraction of energy due to the temperature-height profile in the precursor region.

In 1953, the precursor effect was demonstrated by a comparison of damage from the ENCORE and GRABLE shots. The second test was at lower altitude so the thermal radiation was able to popcorn the desert effectively, creating far greater dynamic pressure effects than ENCORE at the same overpressures for drag effects on jeeps, trucks, and other dynamic-pressure sensitive targets. At subsequent tests in Nevada, selected areas around ground zero were flooded to form shallow lakes, while other areas were coated with asphalt, concrete, grass and other surfaces to investigate precursor development as a function of the reflective and physical nature of the surface. Precursors were noted at higher overpressures over coral sand, including surface bursts of over 30 kt yield (so that the fireball at thermal maximum is high enough to irradiate the ground with sufficient thermal energy to cause popcorning). Dolan's Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, DNA-EM-1, 1972, p. 2-81, states that dust blast precursors will occur over dark city asphalt for burst altitudes below 800W1/3 feet, for W kilotons total yield, and for bursts over dark desert sand precursors will occur for burst altitudes below 650W1/3 feet. These formulae are valid for yields of 1-50 kt where observations are available (for other yields consideration must be given as to whether there is sufficient thermal exposure in the time before blast arrival for a dust layer to be produced).



Above: some typical qualitative precursor blast waveforms for overpressure and dynamic pressure, taken from Dolan's DNA-EM-1, 1972, which on pages 2-81 to 2-89 includes a detailed predictive system to indicate the shape of the precursor waveforms as a function of yield, height of burst and distance from ground zero. This was later developed into a quantitative precursor waveform prediction system in the late 1990s. At very high overpressures, the blast arrival is so soon after that detonation that very little of the thermal radiation has been emitted by the fireball, so there has been little development of a precursor in the available time. Therefore, the precursor develops gradually as the shock travels outward into areas which have been irradiated for longer times after burst, where enough thermal radiation has been emitted to cause a hot dust layer ahead of the shock wave. At long distances, the blast wave runs out of the dust layer because it encounters a region where the thermal radiation exposure has simply not been strong enough to 'popcorn' the sand or to 'smoke' the asphalt or grass. When this happens, the precursor encounters cooler air which makes it slow down, allowing the main blast wave (still travelling through air warmed by the precursor) to catch up and merge with the precursor, forming an ideal shaped blast wave once again.

Friday, August 07, 2009

Thermal radiation pulse shape and Russian nuclear weapons test effects on animals



Above: Ernest Bauer's August 1990 Institute for Defense Analyses report, Physics of High-Temperature Air. Part. 2. Applications, ADA229778, contains a useful section summarising a little of the available nuclear testing data on the mass of fallout as a function of burst altitude for surface bursts, free air bursts, and tower burst nuclear weapons tests, as well as the family of computed curves above showing the transition from a single thermal pulse for a 1 Mt air burst at 50 km altitude to a double-pulse for a 1 Mt sea level air burst. The main reason for the transition is the weakening of the shock wave due to the lower air density at higher altitudes: the lower air density at high altitudes simply allows the X-rays (which comprise 75% of the primary energy emission from a typical 1 ton mass, 1 megaton yield detonation) to travel much larger distances before being absorbed by the air.

This means that same amount of energy is spread over a larger volume of air in a high altitude burst, so the energy density (energy per unit volume) in the fireball is lower than it is for the tiny initial X-ray fireball at sea level, and this lower energy density produces a smaller temperature rise, and thus a weaker blast wave. This weaker blast wave at high altitudes is unable to compress air to a high enough density to form the concentrations of nitrogen dioxide that shield thermal radiation after shock formation in a sea level detonation. The nitrogen dioxide formed in the shock wave from compressed hot air absorbs the thermal radiation from the fireball core in a sea level detonation, causing the minimum and thus the two pulses, but nitrogen dioxide is not formed in a high altitude burst because the shock wave is not strong enough to produce it, hence the thermal minimum gradually disappears as the burst height is increased, merging the two pulses together into a single pulse for a 1 Mt detonation at 50 km altitude.

Another interesting report now online (23 MB PDF) is Dan H. Holland, et al., Physics of High-Altitude Nuclear Burst Effects, Mission Research Corp., Santa Barbara, CA., ADA068541, December 1977:

'This compendium presents a reasonably thorough summary of the physics and chemistry that is particularly relevant to the prediction of effects of high-altitude nuclear bursts on radar, optical, infrared, and communication systems. The various chapters have been written by experts on the particular subjects. Most of the presentations are on a fairly advanced level, but a serious attempt has been made to keep in mind the special needs of new workers in this field. It is assumed that the reader has a thorough general background in physics.'



A 57 MB March 2008 report by V. A. Logachev and L. A. Mikhalikhina, Animal Effects from Soviet Atmospheric Nuclear Tests, ITT Corp., Alexandria, VA., report ADA485845, is available online in PDF download format. There is another version available in more compressed PDF format here. The Soviet Union exposed 8,000 animals (sheep, horses, cattle, camels, etc.) in various structures, vehicles, and in the open and shadowed positions, to nuclear explosions in order to assess the effects in different situations, and to different combinations of the various effects of nuclear detonations. Instead of simply giving the straightforward data on effects from specific nuclear tests, the data is presented only as processed output having been combined into three categories of yield range. However, it is still an important report. Table 11 on page 27 gives the following burns energies comparison for bare skin, light summer clothing and heavy winter clothing (as with most Russian nuclear weapons research, they seem to make every effort to cause confusion and ambiguity in the simplest presentations; here it is not stated for which yields the data for burns under clothing apply to):




Above: American data for thermal energy needed for burns under clothing, from page 6.2b of the 1960 (change 2 pages revision) Capabilities of Atomic Weapons, TM 23-200, Confidential. It is interesting to compare this data to the Russian test results.