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Wednesday, April 05, 2006

The ten biggest nuclear weapons tests (from 50 megatons down to 10.4 megatons yield), and Project Orion - the nuclear explosion powered spacecraft



Above: on 30 October 1961, the 50 Mt RDS-220 or Tsar Bomba, the world's highest yield nuclear weapon test, 8.0 m long, 2.1 m diameter and weighing 26 tons, was dropped with parachute retarded fall from a Tu-95 Bear bomber flying at an altitude of 10.5 km. (These precise bomb size details were published in: V. N. Mikhailov, et al., USSR Nuclear Tests, vol. 2, Technology of Nuclear Tests, Begell-Atom, 1999, pp. 82–84.) It exploded at an altitude of 3.9 km some 188 seconds after being dropped, at 73.85 degrees north, 54.50 degrees east.



In the film you can see the fireball expanding spherically until the shock wave bounces off the ground and back up into the fireball, flattening the bottom of the fireball and pushing it upwards ahead of the usual slow development of buoyant toroidal rise. Windows were partially broken (cracked) by the high altitude refraction and focussing of the shock wave out to distances of 900 km. When the detonation was triggered at the correct altitude, the white-painted Tu-95 and accompanying Tu-16 photographic aircraft were both 45 kilometres from the bomb.



The film stills above show the laboratory work in putting together TSAR BOMBA. You can see the boosted fission primary sits in the nose: fission of the material in the primary gave a total yield of about 1 megaton, with the other 49 megatons coming from clean nuclear fusion. The lithium deuteride fusion capsules were encased in lead instead of natural uranium, to keep the fission yield low. X-rays were channeled from the boosted fission primary to the fusion capsules inside the thick casing. Notice that you can see how thick the casing is from some photos of the nose cone of the bomb being fitted over the boosted fission primary.

The usual claims about retina eye burns and 3rd degree skin burns occurring out to vast distances for a 50 or 100 Mt bomb is a massive exaggeration, neglecting both the attenuation due to the atmosphere and the fact that the very long thermal pulse for a large weapon is very ineffective in causing burns (you have many, many seconds to take evasive action, and anyway even if you don't, a lot more thermal radiation is needed to cause a specific burn than for a low yield weapon, because the temperature rise in the skin is reduced due to the increased duration that the energy is distributed over, which allows cooling mechanisms like reradiation and blood circulation to deeper tissues, to mitigate damage).







(1) 50 Mt*, 30 Oct 1961 USSR clean 2-3 % fission air burst at 3,900 m altitude over Novaya Zemlya. (100 Mt design with U-238 pusher replaced by lead to reduce fission yield from 50% to 2.5% and total yield from 100 Mt to 50 Mt.)

(2) 24.2 Mt, 24 Dec 1962 USSR air burst at 3,750 m altitude dropped from Tu-95 (carried externally) over Novaya Zemlya. (50 Mt design with U-238 pusher replaced by lead to reduce fission yield from 50% to 2.5% and total yield from 50 Mt to 24 Mt.)

(3) 21.1 Mt, 5 Aug 1962 USSR air burst at 3,600 m altitude over Novaya Zemlya

(4) 20 Mt, 27 Sep 1962 USSR air burst at 3,900 m altitude over Novaya Zemlya

(5) 19.1 Mt, 25 Sep 1962 USSR air burst at 4,090 m altitude over Novaya Zemlya

(6) 14.8 Mt, 28 Feb 1954 US Castle-Bravo 67 % fission reef surface burst on the northern reef at Bikini Atoll

(7) 13.5 Mt, 4 May 1954 US Castle-Yankee 52 % fission water surface burst on barge over Bikini Lagoon

(8) 12.5 Mt, 23 Oct 1961 USSR air burst at 3,500 m altitude over Novaya Zemlya

(9) 11 Mt, 26 Mar 1954 US Castle-Romeo 64 % fission water surface burst on barge in Bikini Lagoon

(10) 10.4 Mt, 31 Oct 1952 US Ivy-Mike Elugelab Island surface burst, Eniwetok Atoll**. Mike was an 82 ton liquid deuterium device, the first full scale test of the Teller-Ulam staged radiation implosion principle, using a boosted fission primary bomb and a physically separate fusion stage (a Dewar vacuum flash filled with deuterium and surrounded by a 5-ton natural uranium pusher). The outer steel casing was 2 metres wide and 6.1 metres high, with walls 30 cm thick. The inside surface of the casing was lined with lead and polyethylene, forming a conduit from the primary to the secondary.





Above: IVY-MIKE fireball to cloud transition photo sequence (30 seconds, 2 minutes, 10 minutes and 20 minutes).


Above: ‘Operation Ivy’, produced by the U.S. Air Force Lookout Mountain Laboratory, Hollywood, California for the U.S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and presented very impressively by Western cowboy film star Reed Radley: ‘You have a grand stand seat here to one of the most momentous events in the history of science. In less than a minute you will see the most powerful explosion ever witnessed by human eyes. The blast will come up on the horizon just about there, and this is the significance of the moment: this is the first full-scale test of a hydrogen device. If the reaction goes, we’re in the thermonuclear era. For the sake of all of us, and for the sake of our country, I know you’ll join me in wishing this expedition well.’

* Close-in Russian data gave a yield of 50 Mt. Long-range Western micro-barographs suggested 56 and 58 Mt based on the peak overpressure and duration of the distant blast wave, when it had become a gravity wave-type disturbance in the atmosphere, but no burst altitude data was available, and close-in data are more accurate.

Information from Wikipedia relating to clean weapons and their eventual deployment for low yield tactical 'neutron bombs': In 1956, President Eisenhower announced the testing of a 95% 'clean' (2-stage) fusion weapon, later identified to have been the 11 July Navajo test at Bikini Atoll during Operation Redwing. This weapon had a 4.5 megatons yield. Previous 'dirty' weapons had fission proportions of 50-77%, due to the use of uranium-238 as a 'pusher' around the lithium deuteride (secondary) stage. (The fusion neutrons have energies of up to 14.1 MeV, well exceeding the 1.1 MeV 'fission threshold' for U-238.) The 1956 'clean' tests used a lead pusher, while in 1958 a tungsten carbide pusher was employed. Hans A. Bethe supported clean nuclear weapons in 1958 as Chairman of a Presidential science advisory group on nuclear testing:

'... certain hard targets require ground bursts, such as airfield runways if it is desired to make a crater, railroad yards if severe destruction of tracks is to be accomplished... The use of clean weapons in strategic situations may be indicated in order to protect the local population.' (Dr Hans Bethe, 27 March 1958 Top Secret - Restricted Data Report to the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group on the Technical Feasibility of a Cessation of Nuclear Testing (Bethe was the Working Group Chairman, page 9).

In consequence of Bethe's recommendations, on 12 July 1958, the Hardtack-Poplar shot on a barge in the lagoon yielded 9.3 megatons, of which only 4.8% was fission. It was 95.2% clean. It was the clean Mk-41C warhead. Cohen in 1958 investigated a low-yield 'clean' nuclear weapon and discovered that the 'clean' bomb case thickness scales as the cube-root of yield. So a larger percentage of neutrons escapes from a small detonation, due to the thinner case required to reflect back X-rays during the secondard stage (fusion) ignition. For example, a 1-kiloton bomb would need to have a case only 1/10th the thickness of that for 1-megaton. This means that although most of the neutrons are absorbed by the outer casing in a 1-megaton bomb, in a 1-kiloton bomb they would mostly escape. A neutron bomb is only feasible if the yield is sufficiently high that efficient fusion stage ignition is possible, and if the yield is low enough that the case thickness will not absorb too many neutrons. This means that neutron bombs have a yield range of 1-10 kilotons, with fission proportion varying from 50% at 1-kiloton to 25% at 10-kilotons (all of which comes from the primary stage). The neutron output per kiloton is then approximately 10-15 times greater than for a pure fission implosion weapon or a standard (high yield) strategic warhead like a W87 or W88.

In 1981, the Christian Science Monitor reported that there "are 19,500 tanks in the Soviet-controlled forces of the Warsaw Pact aimed at Western Europe. Of these, 12,500 are Soviet tanks in Soviet units. NATO has 7,000 tanks on its side facing the 19,500." (Joseph C. Harsch, 'Neutron Bomb: Why It Worries The Russians,' Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1981, p. 1.)

Cohen's neutron bomb is not mentioned in the unclassified manual by Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 1957-77, but is included as an 'enhanced neutron weapon' in chapter 5 of the declassified (formerly secret) manual edited by Philip J. Dolan, Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Department of Defense, effects manual DNA-EM-1, updated 1981 (U.S. Freedom of Information Act).

Provided that the weapon was not used in a thunderstorm, no fallout effects would occur from the use of a neutron bomb according to that manual, as the combination of 500 m burst altitude and low yield prevents fallout in addition to significant thermal and blast effects. The reduction in damage outside the target area is a major advantage of such a weapon to deter massed tank invasions. An aggressor would thus be forced to disperse tanks, which would make them easier to destroy by simple hand-held anti-tank missile launchers.

** http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/tests/multimegtests.html states this test had a fission yield of 60 % whereas http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Ivy.html states it was 77 %. I can add some comments to this issue. In the published U.S. Congressional Hearings of June 22-26, 1959, tables of data were presented showing the fission yields from all American and British tests, which the Americans had monitored (for Russian tests, the tables did not present fission yields but merely assumed 50 % of the total yield was from fission). Those tables showed that America detonated 15 Mt of fission in land surface bursts from 1952-54, i.e., the fission yield of Ivy-Mike and Castle-Bravo together was 15 Mt. Plenty of reports show that the fission yield of Castle-Bravo was known by 1956 to be 10 Mt, hence you can deduce a fission yield for Ivy-Mike of 5 Mt, or 48 %. However, other declassified data, for example the measured upwind fallout pattern for Ivy-Mike, suggests that the 77 % fission yield may be correct.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html wrongly states that the 57 Mt yield estimate was based on Western fallout analyses, which is false (although fallout analysis did imply a 2-3 % fission yield, i.e. the bomb was 97-98% clean). The total yield 57 Mt estimate came from rough measurements using micro-barographs to see the long range pressure and its duration, which are not as accurate as the Russian close-in blast data which indicated a yield of 50 Mt.



Above: TSAR BOMBA replica, photo credit Wikipedia.




Above: American toroidal fireball nuclear test films.


Above: British toroidal fireball nuclear test films (Christmas and Malden Islands, Pacific).



Above: Professor Freeman Dyson and Sir Arthur C. Clarke supporting the nuclear bomb powered spacecraft, Project Orion, the only economic practical way for human beings to holiday on Mars. (Excerpt from BBC's To Mars by A-Bomb (2003), with footage of the tests and comments by Arthur Clarke and Freeman Dyson.) The Orion spacecraft has a large thick steel pusher plate connected via hydraulic dampers to the crew accommodation. A series of nuclear explosions is detonated below the pusher plate, which shields the crew from nuclear radiation and recoils upwards when ablated by X-rays. The impulses from nuclear weapon explosions efficiently accelerate the spacecraft to high speed. It would have been launched to Mars from the Nevada nuclear test site, using relatively clean low fission yield detonations for the first few minutes (to minimise the EMP, air blast and fallout effects on Earth), and then larger detonations when a safe distance away. Project Orion was headed by Los Alamos nuclear weapons designer Dr Theodore Taylor, who developed many nuclear weapons (Scorpion, Wasp, Bee, Hornet Nevada tests, and the 500 kt pure fission implosion bomb tested as the IVY-KING shot in 1952). (The idea of utilizing explosions for work is not so crazy as it sounds, when you remember that the internal combustion engine doesn't 'burn' gasoline, it explodes it in a controlled way within the cylinder after mixing fuel with air and compressing the resulting mixture, and the engine converts the impulsive force of the explosion into useful work energy done against the piston to produce motion. Maybe a massive version of such a piston-in-cylinder engine could utilize recoil forces caused by thermonuclear explosions, which are more cost-efficient for releasing energy than the operation of a nuclear reactor to generate steam to power turbines.)

There were several other nuclear rocket systems as alternatives to Orion, although Orion is by far the best. One alternative was Project Thunderwell, the steam accelerated Jules Verne capsule, which was suggested by the speed of at least 6 times earth's escape velocity, achieved by the 10-cm thick, 1.2 m diameter steel cover blown off the top of the 152 m shaft of the 0.3 kt Plumbbob-Pascal B underground Nevada test on 27 August 1957. In that test, a 1.5 m thick 2 ton concrete plug immediately over the bomb was pushed up the shaft by the detonation, knocking the welded steel lid upward. This was a preliminary experiment by Dr Robert Brownlee which ultimately aimed to launch spacecraft using the steam pressure from deep shafts filled with water, with a nuclear explosion at the bottom; an improvement of Jules Verne's cannon-fired projectile described in De la Terre à la Lune, 1865, where steam pressure would give a more survivable gentle acceleration than Verne's direct impulse from an explosion. Some 90% of the radioactivity would be trapped underground. Like Project Orion, Project Thunderwell was cancelled for pseudoscientific (political) reasons after the nuclear test ban treaty was signed.

Another nuclear rocket system was simply to use a bare, uncluttered nuclear reactor core to directly heat hydrogen gas to high temperature and then expel it from an exhaust nozzle in lieu of burning it with oxygen. This was NASA's Kiwi rocket, which was extensively tested (producing a lot of radioactivity in the atmosphere) but, you guessed it, never deployed! The advantage of it is that you need to carry less fuel, because you're not burning hydrogen, you're just ejecting it to get a recoil by Newton's 3rd law of motion, and by ejecting it at high speed (fast hydrogen molecules) due to nuclear reactor heating, it can be more efficient than a conventional rocket engine.

There should be a note here about how unnatural radioactive pollution is (not) in space: the earth's atmosphere is a radiation shield equivalent to being protected behind a layer of water 10 metres thick. This reduces the cosmic background radiation by a factor of 100 of what it would be without the earth's atmosphere. Away from the largely uninhabited poles, the Earth's magnetic field also protects us against charged cosmic radiations, which are deflected and end up spiralling around the magnetic field at high altitude, in the Van Allen trapped radiation belts. On the Moon, for example, there is no atmosphere or significant magnetic field so the natural background radiation exposure rate at solar minimum is 1 milliRoentgen per hour (about 10 microSieverts/hour) some 100 times that on the Earth (0.010 milliRoentgen per hour or about 0.10 microSieverts/hour). The Apollo astronauts visiting the Moon wore dosimeters and they received an average of 275 milliRoentgens (about 2.75 milliSieverts) of radiation (well over a year's exposure to natural background at sea level) in over just 19.5 days. It is a lot more than that during a solar flare, which is one of the concerns for astronauts to avoid (micrometeorites are another concern in a soft spacesuit).

The higher up you are above sea level, the less of the atmosphere there is between you and space, so the less shielding you have to protect you from the intense cosmic space radiations (emitted by thermonuclear reactors we call 'stars', as well as distant supernovae explosions). At sea level, the air above you constitutes a radiation shield of 10 tons per square metre or the equivalent of having a 10 metres thick water shield between you and outer space. As you go up a mountain or up in an aircraft, the amount of atmosphere between you and space decreases, thus radiation levels increase with altitude because there is less shielding. The normal background radiation exposure rate shoots up by a factor of 20, from 0.010 to 0.20 milliRoentgens per hour, when any airplane ascends from sea level to 36,000 feet cruising altitude. (The now obsolete British Concorde supersonic transport used to maintain radiation-monitoring equipment so that it could drop to lower-altitude flight routes if excessive cosmic radiation due to solar storms were detected.) Flight aircrew get more radiation exposure than many nuclear industry workers at nuclear power plants. Residents of the high altitude city of Denver get 100 milliRoentgens (about 1 milliSievert) more annual exposure than a resident of Washington, D.C., but the mainstream anti-radiation cranks don't campaign for the city to be shut to save kids radiation exposure, for mountain climbing to be banned, etc.!


The point I'm making here, for the Green Warriors, is that a nuclear-powered rocket won't be a horrible unnatural thing polluting nice pristine non-radioactive 'clean' outer space with horrible human produced radioactive waste: the universe is full of nuclear reactors (called stars purely for reasons of political expediency) and unending nuclear explosions (called supernovae purely for reasons of political expediency). Live with it!


Above: Carl Sagan talking about Project Orion, which could be built today with existing technology if there was not insane groupthink about nuclear test effects. Dr Theodore Taylor gives the full technical details in John McPhee's book The Curve of Binding Energy, 1974. Cosmic radiation is 100 times higher in space than on the Earth's surface. The EMP and fallout effects could be suppressed by clean weapons designs with thick casings to absorb prompt gamma radiations (see blog posts here, here, here, and here).

Summary of Project Orion from Dr Taylor:



Project Orion began in 1958 when nuclear weapons designer Dr Theodore B. Taylor moved to General Atomic to design a nuclear bomb powered spaceship, sponsored by the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency. It would travel directly (in a straight line!) and quickly to Mars using 2,000 nuclear bombs, carrying 150 people and attaining a top speed of 45 km/second. The travel time would be 3 months for the minimum distance to Mars of 56 million km and 6 months for the maximum Mars-Earth distance of 101 million km. In 1959 the stability of the entire system was completely proved in a scaled-down demonstration test which impressed Dr von Braun so much that he supported Project Orion after seeing the demonstration film.



Above: blueprints for the nuclear rockets from R. S. Cooper, "Nuclear propulsion for space vehicles", Annual Review of Nuclear Science, v18, 1968, pp. 203-228. To resist the high temperatures, metals like tungsten (which has a very high melting point) are preferred to steel for the surface of the pusher. Graphite in a thin layer of droplets can be sprayed on to the pusher plate by retractable jet nozzle located within the central hole in the pusher plate. More advanced designs use a concave shaped pusher which detonates the bomb at the focus, to utilize a larger fraction of the case shock and X-ray ablative recoil energy. Project Orion was first proposed by Dr Stanislaw Ulam, of Teller-Ulam fame. It was developed by Dr Theodore Taylor at General Atomic.

Dr Taylor says in The Curve of Binding Energy (by McPhee) that the idea stemmed from the 15.2 kt REDWING-INCA nuclear test on June 26, 1956, where 30 cm diameter carbon-coated steel balls were placed 9 metres from the bomb by researcher Lew Allen, and were undamaged with only a loss of 0.1 mm of surface graphite! This gave rise to the design of the 75 ton, 41 metre diameter carbon-coated steel base pusher plate in the 76 metres high Project Orion spacecraft, where the base pusher plate is connected by hydraulic shock absorbers to the crew compartment. The steel plate acts as a radiation shield as well as ablative recoil mechanism to get propulsion: after each bomb was fired, oil would be sprayed on the plate to give it a carbon coating. The dynamics of X-ray ablation are well established in nuclear weapons design because this mechanism is what is used to cause the fusion stage in a bomb to explode: X-rays from the fission stage are channelled to the fusion stage, ablating the surface which causes a compression by recoil (Newton's 3rd law).

The nuclear test fireball experiments of Project 5.4 during Operation TEAPOT in Nevada, 1955, Project 5.9 of Operation REDWING at Bikini Atoll and Eniwetok Atoll in 1956, and then Project 8.3b of Operation PLUMBBOB in Nevada, 1957 proved that objects like steel spheres in the fireball only suffered a tiny amount of surface scarring because the thermal pulse just ablates a microscopic thickness of the surface, causing a recoil force. Actually, this kind of thin layer ablation had first been noted back on the TRINITY test of July 16, 1945:

‘The measured total radiation at [9.1-km] from the centre was 0.29 calories/cm2 ... Examination of the specimen exposed at [975 m] shows ... the charred layer does not appear to be thicker than 1/10 millimetre.... scorching of the fir lumber used to support signal wires extended out to about [1.9 km] ... the risk of fire due to the radiation ... is likely to be much less than the risk of fire from causes existing in the buildings at the time of explosion.’

– W. G. Marley and F. Reines, July 16th Nuclear Explosion: Incendiary Effects of Radiation, Los Alamos report LA-364, October 1945, originally Secret, pp. 5-6.


Dr Taylor explained that the first nuclear bomb to start ascent would only need to be 0.1 kt, the next a second later would be 0.2 kt, and so on up to bomb number 50 which would be 20 kt, by which time a total of 200 kt would have been detonated, and the spacecraft would then be in space without having caused any significant EMP or fallout damaging effects on the Earth compared to natural background radiation. There would be no radioactive trail left in space behind such a nuclear pulse rocket because the debris expands at a rate faster than the excape velocity of the solar system. The pusher plate would not be severely heated or damaged because of the 10 nanosecond duration of the ablative X-ray impulse from a nuclear explosion 60 metres away, which only ablates the surface layer (such as the layer of carbon rick grease sprayed on the pusher plate automatically after each detonation). Remember that in an automobile engine, the temperature attained by the exploding gasoline and air mixture is much higher than the melting point of the steel pistons and cylinders, but the latter don't melt because the duration of each explosion is too brief to heat up the material to that temperature, so the residual heat after expansion doesn't penetrate and destroy the piston and cylinder, but rapidly cools and ends up as warm exhaust gas!

“Observations of the remains of towers and shielding material after detonation at several ground zeros indicate that large masses of material are not vaporized. Observations of the residue of the Smoky tower [44 kt bomb atop a 700 foot high steel tower] indicated that a very significant portion of that tower remained, including the upper 200 feet of steel. Another example similar to Shot Smoky was Shot Apple II [29 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower], Teapot Series. Even though the total yield of Shot Apple II was about [29 kt], the floor of the cab [housing the nuclear bomb itself, at the top of the tower] and the main tower support columns remained intact. The results of the Shot Fizeau [11 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower] tower melt studies (W. K. Dolen and A. D. Thornborough, Fitzeau Tower Melt Studies, Sandia report SC-4185, 1958, Secret) show that about 85 percent of tower material was accounted for after the detonation and that only the upper 50 feet of tower was vaporized. No melting occurred beyond 175 feet from the top of the tower although the fireball theoretically engulfed more than 400 feet of the tower.”

- Dr Kermit H. Larson, et al., Distribution, Characteristics, and Biotic Availability of Fallout, Operation Plumbbob, weapon test report WT-1488, ADA077509, July 1966, page 59.


J. E. Kester and R. B. Ferguson report in Operation Teapot, Project 5.4, Evaluation of Fireball Lethality Using Basic Missile Structures, WT-1134 (originally Secret – Restricted Data), AD0340137, that within the 23 kt Teapot-Met (Nevada, 15 April 1955, 400 ft steel bomb tower) although the bomb test steel tower was blown down, it was not vaporized and much survived despite having been engulfed by the fireball itself, as stated on page 30:

“... nearly 225 feet of the main support members of the shot tower were still intact and laid out radially from their original position.”


Page 116 of WT-1134 states that after the 2 kt Moth shot atop a 300 foot triangular tower on 22 February 1955: “The three tower legs were laid out approximately radially from their pre-shot positions. The longest tower leg found was about 200 ft long. The other two legs appeared to be about 150 ft long. All three guy cables were still attached ... A few large pieces of the tower, about 20 to 30-ft long, were strewn to ranges of about 200 feet.” It adds that after the 7 kt Tesla shot atop a 300 ft square tower on 1 March 1955: “the four tower legs ... were laid out radially from their original position ... The tower legs remained intact to lengths of about 125 feet. All four guy cables were still attached ...” The 43 kt Turk nuclear test was fired atop a 500 ft square tower, leaving 100 ft lengths of tower lengths on the ground (page 118). The 8 kt Bee shot atop a 500 ft tower failed to even knock down most of the tower (pages 120-1): “A large portion of this tower was still standing after the shot. ... It is estimated that at least 150 feet of the tower was essentially undamaged and standing erect with an additional 50 to 75 feet of the tower slightly melted and drooped over at the top.” The 14 kt Apple 1 shot atop a 500 ft square tower results (page 121): “The main support members of the shot tower still remained to lengths of about 150 feet with the top 25 to 50 feet being crushed and split ... Some of the legs remained attached to the base.” The 23 kt Met shot was atop a 400 ft square tower (pages 123-4): “About 225 feet of the tower legs were still intact with the top 25 to 50 feet being crushed, split and slightly melted ....”






Above: color photo shows the lower 200 feet surviving from the 300 ft steel tower of the 0.2 kt Ruth nuclear test in Nevada on 31 March 1953. The black and white photographs are from the 23 kt Teapot-Met nuclear explosion (Nevada, 15 April 1955) ablation tests by J. E. Kester and R. B. Ferguson, Operation Teapot, Project 5.4, Evaluation of Fireball Lethality Using Basic Missile Structures, WT-1134 (Secret – Restricted Data), AD0340137, which showed that at just 80 feet only the outer 0.4 inch of steel balls was ablated by the fireball.

The error in the popular myth that everything is vaporized in the fireball is that the cooling rate of the fireball is so great that there is literally not enough time for the heat to penetrate more than a thin surface layer before the temperature drops below melting point. Good heat conductors like steel are protected by ablation. A very thin surface layer of the material is vaporized, protecting the underlying material, just as occurs with thermal radiation striking wooden houses (Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons):



References:

J. C. Nance, 'Nuclear Pulse Propulsion', IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, February 1965, p. 177.

T. W. Reynolds, 'Effective Specific Impulse of External Nuclear Pulse Propulsion Systems', Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, October 1973, p. 629.

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‘The President put his name on the plaque Armstrong and Aldrin left on the moon and he telephoned them while they were there, but he cut America’s space budget to the smallest total since John Glenn orbited the Earth. The Vice-President says on to Mars by 1985, but we won’t make it by “stretching out” our effort. Perhaps NASA was too successful with Apollo. It violated the “Catt Concept”, enunciated by Britisher Ivor Catt. According to Catt, the most secure project is the unsuccessful one, because it lasts the longest.’

- Robert P. Crossley, Editorial, Popular Mechanics, Vol. 133, No. 5, May 1970, p. 14.

E.g., compare the Apollo project with the Vietnam war for price, length and success. Both were initially backed by Kennedy and Johnson as challenges to Communist space technology and subversion, respectively. The Vietnam war – the unsuccessful project – sucked in the cash for longer, which closed down the successful space exploration project!






Above: neutron bomb supporter Dr Edward Teller of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory stated in the San Francisco KQED-TV television Fallout and Disarmament debate with Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling on 20 February 1958:

“I believe that the second world war was brought on by a race in disarmament. The peace-loving nations disarmed, and when the Hitler tyranny armed inertia was too great ... he got away with his army and he almost conquered the world. ... If there is war, if the terrible catastrophe befalls us, then next we must try to keep that war as small as possible, and at the same time we must try to be sure that no more people will unwillingly be subjected to the Russian yoke. ... If such should happen, then it would be of great importance that these weapons should do as little damage in human life as possible. If a war of this kind has to be fought, then the danger from radioactivity will be very great indeed. ... there should not be unnecessary, uncontrollable radioactive dust – radioactive contamination, which would kill friend and foe alike. ... It is even possible, to my mind, that there is no damage; and there is the possibility, furthermore that very small amounts of radioactivity are helpful. ...

“Here is a recent quotation from Nature - the British publication. This says that due to our wearing tight clothes, and due to the increased temperature of the sperm plasm, to the organs which make our sperm, there will be an increase in mutations. Then it goes on to say that since our modes of dress have been predominant for several centuries, it might explain almost half the present load of spontaneous mutations. So we see how modes of dress, based chiefly on sexual taboos, might present genetic hazards one hundred to one thousand times greater that those estimated from different sources of radiation. ... even in the terrible event of war, I believe that in this war, if it were fought with the highly flexible and highly mobile nuclear weapons, it would not be necessary to take so many young people away from their homes. I do not believe, if we can localize wars, that the casualties need be very great.”




Now should the public be informed about positive research reports on radiation such as the following report? Or do we suppress it? Do we cover-up evidence which doesn't fit the popular media "radiation is bad" ideology?

W. L. Chen, Y. C. Luan, M. C. Shieh, S. T. Chen, H. T. Kung, K. L. Soong, Y. C. Yeh, T. S. Chou, S. H. Mong, J. T. Wu, C. P. Sun, W. P. Deng, M. F. Wu, and M. L. Shen, ‘Is Chronic Radiation an Effective Prophylaxis Against Cancer?’, published in the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 6-10:

"An extraordinary incident occurred 20 years ago in Taiwan. Recycled steel, accidentally contaminated with cobalt-60 ([low dose rate, gamma radiation emitter] half-life: 5.3 y), was formed into construction steel for more than 180 buildings, which 10,000 persons occupied for 9 to 20 years. They unknowingly received radiation doses that averaged 0.4 Sv, a collective dose of 4,000 person-Sv. Based on the observed seven cancer deaths, the cancer mortality rate for this population was assessed to be 3.5 per 100,000 person-years. Three children were born with congenital heart malformations, indicating a prevalence rate of 1.5 cases per 1,000 children under age 19. The average spontaneous cancer death rate in the general population of Taiwan over these 20 years is 116 persons per 100,000 person-years. Based upon partial official statistics and hospital experience, the prevalence rate of congenital malformation is 23 cases per 1,000 children. Assuming the age and income distributions of these persons are the same as for the general population, it appears that significant beneficial health effects may be associated with this chronic radiation exposure."

Thus, a dose rate of roughly 0.4 Sv per 9-20 years, i.e. a dose rate of 2.3-5.1 microGrays per hour (0.23-0.51 millirads per hour) or 23-51 times normal background causes the benefit of a fall in normal cancer rates by a factor of 116/3.5 = 33, and a fall in congenital heart malformations by a factor of 23/1.5 = 15. These are big numbers!

Let me repeat the facts again just clarify this very important point, Chen and thirteen other physicians investigated the apparent benefits of low level radiation in Taiwan, "Is Chronic Radiation an Effective Prophylaxis Against Cancer?", Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, v9 n1 2004. After a radioactive source was accidentally mixed into industrial steel and used to build apartments in Taiwan, 10,000 persons were unknowingly exposed to low-level radiation in Taiwan for periods of 9-20 years, and in this group cancer rates were lower than those in the general population by a factor of 33 (a reduction from 116 to just 3.5 per 100,000 person-years); while genetic defects fell by a factor of 15 (from 23 cases per 1,000 children to just 1.5). These are such enormous benefits that you would expect that all donor and publically funded "Cancer Research" institutes would be studying these benefits from dose rates of radiation a few hundred times background, which can apparently slash cancer risks and genetic defect rates to such an extent.

The statistics in the paper by Chen and others has been alleged to apply to a younger age group than the general population, affecting the significance of the data, although in other ways the data are more valid than Hiroshima and Nagasaki data extrapolations to low doses. For instance, the radiation cancer scare mongering of survivors of high doses in Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been prejudiced in the sense of preventing a blind to avoid “anti-placebo” effect, e.g. increased fear, psychological stress and worry about the long term effects of radiation, and associated behaviour. The 1958 book about the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, “Formula for Death”, makes the point that highly irradiated survivors often smoked more, in the belief that they were doomed to die from radiation induced cancer anyway. Therefore, the fear culture of the irradiated survivors would statistically be expected to result in a deviancy from normal behaviour, in some cases increasing the cancer risks above those due purely to radiation exposure.

For up-to-date data and literature discussions on the effects of DNA repair enzymes on preventing cancers from low-dose rate radiation, please see

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation_hormesis

There is also evidence for low dose radiation benefits from Hiroshima and Nagasaki's joint American-Japanese Radiation Effects Research Institute (RERF) which is being covered up by the statistical fiddle of "lumping together" the majority of the survivors into one large dose interval group, and only taking small dose intervals at high doses, which is a fiddle that falsely omits the benefits from the boosting of the P53 DNA repair enzyme by low radiation doses in those cities (the statistical bias in the table below from the RERF Brief Guide is in every sense a classic example of the biased presentation of data; remember that at high doses the cancer data are least reliable because the average amount of radiation shielding by buildings needed to survive the initial effects and get cancer years later was very high, and estimates of the exact shielding factors are one of the greatest uncertainties continuing in the DS02 dosimetry, as shown for example by the inconsistent curve of percentage temporary epilation versus dose in the same publication - the dosimetry is more accurate at lower doses because the average radiation shielding of survivors is much smaller at those lower doses):



Radiation delivered over long periods at a few hundred times the natural background dose rates stimulates the use of body resources to produce more of the natural DNA repair enzyme, protein P53, thus utilizing more of the energy resources of the body for repairing DNA breaks than is usually allocated, and this reduces the natural cancer and genetic risks. This effect is in some sense like working out at the gym regularly: you end up after regular exercise not generally more tired, but generally fitter and more muscular, because the body responds in the long run by using more resources to adapt by strengthening itself and maintaining hormesis (an effect well known in chemotherapy: "what doesn't kill you, makes you stronger").

In the West, freedom of speech allows politically incorrect facts to be censored by the fashionable media. If you want to see why this censorship of the benefits of low level radiation is continuing, see the relatively vague and unconvincing (apart from a quotation from Dr Robert Rowland) article by James Muckerheide in the year 2000, "It’s Time to Tell the Truth About the Health Benefits of Low-Dose Radiation", and see also weak graphical correlations shown in Dr T. D. Luckey's 2008 paper, "The Health Effects of Low-Dose Ionizing Radiation" in the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, v13, n2, pp. 39-42, which does at least summarize the 2004 Chen paper in the same journal concisely:

"In 1982-1983, several apartments in Taipei City, Taiwan, were built with structural steel contaminated with cobalt-60. Chen et al. noted the total cancer death rates for radiation-exposed adult occupants and controls in the city were comparable when the apartments were first occupied. As both groups aged, the cancer mortality rate in the radiation-exposed group decreased while the cancer mortality rate of controls increased. The cancer mortality rate of those who had lived 9–20 years in these buildings was only 3% that of the general adult population."


Of course, it's always been known since the work (mentioned above) of French radiologists that radiation is more effective at killing rapidly dividing cancer cells than normal cells (because cells are more vulnerable during cell nucleus fission than at other times, and more rapidly diving cells spend a greater percentage of the time in this vulnerable state than healthy cells do). But this discovery that low dose rates of radiation can produce a health benefit by preventing cancer in the first place is new.

What is happening here is the "what doesn't kill you makes you stronger" effect: dose rates of 20-50 times normal background over a period of 1-2 decades stimulates a stronger DNA repair enzyme system. The body simply devotes more energy from food into building more DNA repair enzymes, and it over-compensates, thereby reducing natural cancer rates. This positive benefit from radiation would occur up to the threshold for cancer seen in the radium dial painters, 57 microGrays per hour (5.7 millirads per hour) or 570 times normal background. Only if the dose rate becomes too high does the rate of damage overwhelm natural DNA repair mechanisms and cause cancer:

‘... it is important to note that, given the effects of a few seconds of irradiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, a threshold near 200 mSv may be expected for leukemia and some solid tumors. [Sources: UNSCEAR, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, New York, 1994; W. F. Heidenreich, et al., Radiat. Environ. Biophys., vol. 36 (1999), p. 205; and B. L. Cohen, Radiat. Res., vol. 149 (1998), p. 525.] For a protracted lifetime natural exposure, a threshold may be set at a level of several thousand millisieverts for malignancies, of 10 grays for radium-226 in bones, and probably about 1.5-2.0 Gy for lung cancer after x-ray and gamma irradiation. [Sources: G. Jaikrishan, et al., Radiation Research, vol. 152 (1999), p. S149 (for natural exposure); R. D. Evans, Health Physics, vol. 27 (1974), p. 497 (for radium-226); H. H. Rossi and M. Zaider, Radiat. Environ. Biophys., vol. 36 (1997), p. 85 (for radiogenic lung cancer).] The hormetic effects, such as a decreased cancer incidence at low doses and increased longevity, may be used as a guide for estimating practical thresholds and for setting standards. ...

‘Though about a hundred of the million daily spontaneous DNA damages per cell remain unrepaired or misrepaired, apoptosis, differentiation, necrosis, cell cycle regulation, intercellular interactions, and the immune system remove about 99% of the altered cells. [Source: R. D. Stewart, Radiation Research, vol. 152 (1999), p. 101.] ...

‘[Due to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986] as of 1998 (according to UNSCEAR), a total of 1,791 thyroid cancers in children had been registered. About 93% of the youngsters have a prospect of full recovery. [Source: C. R. Moir and R. L. Telander, Seminars in Pediatric Surgery, vol. 3 (1994), p. 182.] ... The highest average thyroid doses in children (177 mGy) were accumulated in the Gomel region of Belarus. The highest incidence of thyroid cancer (17.9 cases per 100,000 children) occurred there in 1995, which means that the rate had increased by a factor of about 25 since 1987.

‘This rate increase was probably a result of improved screening [not radiation!]. Even then, the incidence rate for occult thyroid cancers was still a thousand times lower than it was for occult thyroid cancers in nonexposed populations (in the US, for example, the rate is 13,000 per 100,000 persons, and in Finland it is 35,600 per 100,000 persons). Thus, given the prospect of improved diagnostics, there is an enormous potential for detecting yet more [fictitious] "excess" thyroid cancers. In a study in the US that was performed during the period of active screening in 1974-79, it was determined that the incidence rate of malignant and other thyroid nodules was greater by 21-fold than it had been in the pre-1974 period. [Source: Z. Jaworowski, 21st Century Science and Technology, vol. 11 (1998), issue 1, p. 14.]’

- Zbigniew Jaworowski, 'Radiation Risk and Ethics: Health Hazards, Prevention Costs, and Radiophobia', Physics Today, April 2000, pp. 89-90.



Protein P53, discovered only in 1979, is encoded by gene TP53, which occurs on human chromosome 17. P53 also occurs in other mammals including mice, rats and dogs. P53 is one of the proteins which continually repairs breaks in DNA, which easily breaks at body temperature: the DNA in each cell of the human body suffers at least two single strand breaks every second, and one double strand (i.e. complete double helix) DNA break occurs at least once every 2 hours (5% of radiation-induced DNA breaks are double strand breaks, while 0.007% of spontaneous DNA breaks at body temperature are double strand breaks)! Cancer occurs when several breaks in DNA happen to occur by chance at nearly the same time, giving several loose strand ends at once, which repair proteins like P53 then repair incorrectly, causing a mutation which can be proliferated somatically. This cannot occur when only one break occurs, because only two loose ends are produced, and P53 will reattach them correctly. But if low-LET ionising radiation levels are increased to a certain extent, causing more single strand breaks, P53 works faster and is able deal with faster breaks as they occur, so that multiple broken strand ends do not arise. This prevents DNA strands being repaired incorrectly, and prevents cancer - a result of mutation caused by faults in DNA - from arising. Too much radiation of course overloads the P53 repair mechanism, and then it cannot repair breaks as they occur, so multiple breaks begin to appear and loose ends of DNA are wrongly connected by P53, causing an increased cancer risk:



In another post, we examine in detail the May-June 1957 Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, where the false dose-threshold (not dose rate-threshold) theory was publically killed off (in a political-journalism scrum sense, not a scientific evidence sense) by a consortium of loud-mouthed and physically ignorant fruitfly and maize geneticists (headed by Nobel Laureates Muller and Lewis), with only an incompetent and quiet defense for the scientific data from cancer radiotherapy experts with experience that high dose rates cause more damage than low dose rates. The argument they made was that genetic effects of radiation on fruitflies and maize showed no signs of dose rate effects or dose threshold effects. They they extrapolated from flies and maize to predict the same for human beings, and they also claimed that this genetic result should apply to all normal cell division (somatic) radiation effects not just genetic effects! Glasstone summarized this linear-no threshold theory on page 496 of the 1957 edition of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons:

"There is apparently no amount of radiation, however small, that does not cause some increase in the normal mutation frequency. The dose rate of the radiation exposure or its duration have little influence; it is the total accumulated dose to the gonads that is the important quantity."


Flies and seasonal plants don't need DNA repair enzymes, which is why they show no dose rate dependence: they simply don't live long enough to get a serious cancer risk caused by DNA copying errors during cell fissions. This is not so in humans, and even mice. Glasstone and Dolan write in the 1977 edition of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, pages 611-612 (paragraphs 12.209-12.211):

"From the earlier studies of radiation-induced mutations, made with fruitflies, ... The mutation frequency appeared to be independent of the rate at which the radiation dose was received. ... More recent experiments with mice, however, have shown that these conclusions must be revised, at least for mammals.

"... in male mice ... For exposure rates from 90 down to 0.8 roentgen per minute ... the mutation frequency per roentgen decreases as the exposure rate is decreased.

"... in female mice ... The radiation-induced mutation frequency per roentgen decreases continuously with the exposure rate from 90 roentgens per minute downward. At an exposure rate of 0.009 roentgen per minute [0.54 roentgen/hour], the total mutation frequency in female mice is indistinguishable from the spontaneous frequency. There thus seems to be an exposure-rate threshold below which radiation-induced mutations are absent or negligible, no matter how large the total (accumulated) exposure to the female gonads, at least up to 400 roentgens."


The Oak Ridge Megamouse Radiation Exposure Project

Reference: W. L, ”Reminiscences of a Mouse Specific-Locus Test Addict”, Environmental and Molecular Mutagenesis, Supplement, v14 (1989), issue 16, pp. 16–22.


The source of Glasstone and Dolan’s dose-rate genetic effects threshold data (replacing the fruitfly insect and maize plant data of Muller, Lewis and other 1950s geneticists who falsely extrapolated directly from insects and plants to humans) is the Oak Ridge National Laboratory “megamouse project” by Liane and William Russell. This project exposed seven million mice to a variety of radiation situations to obtain statistically significant mammal data showing the effects of dose rate upon the DNA mutation risk (which in somatic cells can cause cancer). Seven different locus mutations were used, which showed a time-dependence on genetic risk from different dose rates, which could only be explained by DNA repair processes. This contradicted insect and plant response, which showed no dose rate effect on the dose-effects response. With the results of this enormous mammal radiation exposure project, observed human effects of high dose rates and high doses could be accurately extrapolated to humans, without using the false linear, no-threshold model that applies to insects and plants that lack the advanced DNA repair enzymes like P53 in mammals:

“As Hollaender remembers it: ‘Muller and Wright were the only two geneticists who backed the mouse genetics study. The rest of the geneticists thought we were wasting our time and money!’”

- Karen A. Rader, “Alexander Hollaender’s Postwar Vision for Biology: Oak Ridge and Beyond”, Journal of the History of Biology, v39 (2006), pp. 685–706.


For an interesting discussion of the way that the radiation controversy led to a change in thinking about DNA, from being a fixed chemical structure (as believed in 1957, after the structure DNA was discovered in its misleadingly non-cellular solid crystal form, which was required for X-ray diffraction analysis) to today’s far more dynamic picture of DNA in the cell nucleus as a delicate strand that is repeatedly being broken (several times a minute) by normal water molecular Brownian motion bombardment at body temperature, and being repaired by DNA repair enzymes like protein P53, see the article by Doogab Yi, “The coming of reversibility: The discovery of DNA repair between the atomic age and the information age”, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, v37 (2007), Supplement, pp. 35–72:

“This paper examines the contested ‘biological’ meaning of the genetic effects of radiation amid nuclear fear during the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, I explore how the question of irreversibility, a question that eventually led to the discovery of DNA repair, took shape in the context of postwar concerns of atomic energy. Yale biophysicists who opposed nuclear weapons testing later ironically played a central role in the discovery of DNA excision repair, or "error-correcting codes" that suggested the reversibility of the genetic effects of radiation. At Yale and elsewhere, continuing anticipation of medical applications from radiation therapy contributed to the discovery of DNA repair. The story of the discovery of DNA repair illustrates how the gene was studied in the atomic age and illuminates its legacy for the postwar life sciences. I argue that it was through the investigation of the irreversibility of the biological effects of radiation that biologists departed from an inert view of genetic stability and began to appreciate the dynamic stability of the gene. Moreover, the reformulation of DNA repair around notions of information and error-correction helped radiobiologists to expand the relevance of DNA repair research beyond radiobiology, even after the public concerns on nuclear fallout faded in the mid-1960s.”


In fact, the “safe dose rate” concept has always existed (most recently dressed up with health physics sophistry like ALARA, “As Low As Reasonably Achievable”) in the way that radiation safety guides have formulated as a maximum dose per unit time interval. For example, on page 102 of the 1957 Congressional Hearings The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, nuclear testing scientific director Dr Alvin C. Graves testifies:

“I have forgotten the title, but I think it is the American Commission for Radiation Protection, or something of that sort, originally stated that the workers in radioactivity could take one tenth of a roentgen per day forever without suffering injury. [This is 36.5 R/year or 1095 R over 30 years, roughly the minimum dose needed for bone changes in the radium dial painters.]”


Dr Jane Orient, 'Homeland Security for Physicians', Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, vol. 11, number 3, Fall 2006, pp. 75-9:

'In the 1960s, a group of activist physicians called Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) undertook to "educate the medical profession and the world about the dangers of nuclear weapons," beginning with a series of articles in the New England Journal of Medicine. [Note that journal was publishing information for anti-civil defense propaganda back in 1949, e.g. the article in volume 241, pp. 647-53 of New England Journal of Medicine which falsely suggests that civil defense in nuclear war would be hopeless because a single burned patient in 1947 with 40% body area burns required 42 oxygen tanks, 36 pints of plasma, 40 pints of whole blood, 104 pints of fluids, 4,300 m of gauze, 3 nurses and 2 doctors. First, only unclothed persons in direct line of sight without shadowing can get 40% body area burns from thermal radiation, second, duck and cover offers protection in a nuclear attack warning, and G. V. LeRoy had already published, two years earlier, in J.A.M.A., volume 134, 1947, pp. 1143-8, that less than 5% of burns in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were caused by building and debris fires. In medicine it is always possible to expend vast resources on patients who are fatally injured. In a mass casualty situation, doctors should not give up just because they don't have unlimited resources; as at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they would need to do their best with what they have.] On its website, www.psr.org, the group boasts that it "led the campaign to end atmospheric nuclear testing." With this campaign, the linear no-threshold (LNT) theory of radiation carcinogenesis became entrenched. It enabled activists to calculate enormous numbers of potential casualties by taking a tiny risk and multiplying it by the population of the earth. As an enduring consequence, the perceived risks of radiation are far out of proportion to actual risks, causing tremendous damage to the American nuclear industry. ... Efforts to save lives were not only futile, but unethical: Any suggestion that nuclear war could be survivable increased its likelihood and was thus tantamount to warmongering, PSR spokesmen warned. ...

'For the mindset that engendered and enables this situation, which jeopardizes the existence of the United States as a nation as well as the lives of millions of its citizens, some American physicians and certain prestigious medical organizations bear a heavy responsibility.

'Ethical physicians should stand ready to help patients to the best of their ability, and not advocate sacrificing them in the name of a political agenda. Even very basic knowledge, especially combined with simple, inexpensive advance preparations, could save countless lives.'


‘International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War: Messiahs of the Nuclear Age?’, The Lancet (British medical journal), 18 November 1988, pp.1185-6, by Jane M. Orient, MD:

'... history is apparently not among the areas of expertise claimed by IPPNW [international physicians for the prevention of nuclear war]. Its spokesmen have yet to comment on the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (for which Kellogg and Briand received the Nobel Peace Prize), the Oxford Peace Resolution of 1934, the Munich Agreement of 1938, or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, and on the effectiveness of these measures in preventing World War II. ...

'Sir Norman Angell (also a Nobel Peace Prize winner), in his 1910 best-seller entitled The Great Illusion, showed that war had become so terrible and expensive as to be unthinkable. The concept of ‘destruction before detonation’ was not discovered by Victor Sidel (Sidel, V. W., ‘Destruction before detonation: the impact of the arms race on health and health care’, Lancet 1985; ii: 1287-1289), but was previously enunciated by Neville Chamberlain, who warned his Cabinet about the heavy bills for armaments: ‘even the present Programmes were placing a heavy strain upon our resources’ (Minutes of the British Cabinet meeting, February 3, 1937: quoted in Fuchser, L. W., ‘Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: a Study in the Politics of History’, Norton, New York, 1982). ...

'Psychic numbing, denial, and ‘missile envy’ (Caldicott, H., Missile envy: the arms race and nuclear war, New York: William Morrow, 1984) are some of the diagnoses applied by IPPNW members to those who differ with them. However, for the threats facing the world, IPPNW does not entertain a differential diagnosis, nor admit the slightest doubt about the efficacy of their prescription, if only the world will follow it. So certain are they of their ability to save us from war that these physicians seem willing to bet the lives of millions who might be saved by defensive measures if a nuclear attack is ever launched.

'Is this an omnipotence fantasy?'


Here are some extracts from Dr Orient's letter to FEMA about the continued use of the lying LNT theory of radiation for long-term effects propaganda:

Jane M. Orient, M.D.
President, Physicians for Civil Defense
1601 N. Tucson Blvd. Suite 9
Tucson, AZ 85716
(520) 325-2680
www.physiciansforcivildefense.org

To Rules Docket Clerk
Office of the General Counsel
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Room 840, 500 C Street S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20472

RE: Docket #: DHS-2004-0029
Docket #: Z-RIN 1660-ZA02

FEMA-RULES@dhs.gov

We agree that flexibility is required in responding to incidents involving radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND). It is critical that actions taken do more good than harm. The dangers of panic, the shut-down of essential services, and disruption of the economy and social arrangements could vastly outweigh the supposed dangers of an increased exposure to radiation, particularly in the event of the use of an RDD.

We are disappointed that the document does not explicitly recognize that current radiation protection standards are based on the linear no-threshold (LNT) theory of radiation carcinogenesis. This theory calculates casualties based on collective doses. The assumptions are the equivalent of saying that if one person dies from ingesting one thousand aspirin tablets all at once, that one person will die if each one of the thousand persons ingests one aspirin tablet each. In fact, all actual evidence indicates that radiation, like most other potentially adverse exposures, exhibits a biphasic dose-response curve. While high levels are damaging or lethal, within a certain range at the lower end of the scale there is a seemingly paradoxical stimulatory or protective effect. Persons with accidental or occupational exposures within this “hormetic” range have a lower incidence of cancer and birth defects, and have had an increase in longevity as well. Thus, measures to “protect” people against exposures in this range may deprive them of a beneficial health effect, as well as harming them through excessive costs or deprivation of the other potential benefits of technology.

... It should be noted that the average background dose on the Colorado plateau is 600 mrem per year, and in some areas of the world, much higher than that. For example, in Ramasari, Iran, the average background is about 48 rems per year-that is 4,800 mrem per year-without noticeable adverse health effects. Forced resettlement, on the other hand, would cause many billions of dollars in damage to the economy as well as social upheaval. Because of widespread public fear of low-dose radiation, many people might choose to be resettled than face such increased exposure, but persons should not be forced to abandon their homes, personal property, and businesses based upon unfounded fears. ...

In appointing technical advisory committees, it would appear important to include persons whose reputation is not strongly invested in the linear no-threshold hypothesis, who would thus find it difficult or impossible to change their position. A full range of views must be heard and not suppressed by a “consensus” process that strongly pressures participants to approve a predetermined position and excludes those who do not.

We think it is critical that the United States government should not enable terrorists to destroy a large area of the country and cripple its economy by exploiting unwarranted fears. Instead, we need to be prepared to mitigate the damage should efforts at interdiction fail.

66 comments:

Anonymous said...

The General Advisory Committee, now under Rabi’s leadership, was also raising questions about the future of Livermore. At a GAC meeting shortly after the Oppenheimer verdict was announced, Rabi described the effort there as ‘amateurish,’ adding, ominously, that Teller’s lab did not have responsibility for any ‘necessary’ part of the weapons program. After Koon’s failure, the AEC had canceled its order for Ramrod, to Teller’s chagrin. (Stung by the move, Teller told the GAC that he had plans for a 10,000-megaton bomb—something that Rabi and colleagues dismissed as ‘an advertising stunt.’)” From Gregg Herken's "Brotherhood of the Bomb."
“However, he knew better than anyone that, following the failure of its first three tests in the spring of 1954, Livermore was in serious danger of closure. At a GAC meeting soon after the hearing verdict, Isidor Rabi described its performance as ‘amateurish’ and commented that Teller’s laboratory did not have responsibility for any ‘necessary’ part of the weapons programme. Then, that September, close on the heels of the Shepley-Blair book, Norris Bradbury wrote to the AEC suggesting that the second laboratory should be made subordinate to his own, Los Alamos. ‘The brilliant new ideas have not appeared,’ he pointed out.
To compound matters, the AEC also cancelled its order for Ramrod, the thermonuclear trigger that Teller had hoped would at last made feasible his old classical Super design. In response, Teller tried to impress Washington with plans for a device with a preposterous yield of no less than 10,000 megatons, a thousand times that of the Mike shot. It was dismissed by Rabi as an advertising stunt.” From Comparisons between Peter Goodchild's "Edward Teller:Real Doctor Stangelove.
However both books writen from weak point of view,since as theirs authors not physicists.

At the same time, DOD noted that while the AEC had already spent time and money on development effort of another weapon for which DOD never established a requirement, that device was undesirably heavy, and its yield loss when converted from conventional to "clean" configuration was totally unacceptable. In light of these factors, and because the new Class B weapon would be available relatively soon, the DOD recommended that the AEC discontinue its development of the device.From Hansen.

I believe this is about this device.
It would be interesting if Dr Edward Taylor executed this plans.
What would consequences of this detonation?.With largest fission fraction ~89%.What would be fallout effects on China,Japan and others (assuming Pacific detonation,of course).What would be political effects?.I believe this ended Cold war in mid 50-s.

Anonymous said...

Sorry ,I mean of course Dr Edward Teller.

nige said...

With enough broomsticks, everyone would have made it. See volume 2 of Dr Carl F. Miller's Fallout and Radiological Countermeasures, limited distribution to U.S. contractors and agencies only, January 1963. Miller shows that the heavier the fallout, the greater the relative efficiency of fallout. The worst case is where you are trying to decontaminate an invisibly small, harmless amount.

Where it looks like snow, you can throw away the geiger counter and sweep it into gutters, then flush it down drains. Out of cities, deep plow it into the soil, then use the soil to grow crops with short roots until it has decayed.

It decays fast. If you salt the bomb with cobalt, then the specific activity is relatively low than if you have a U-238 or thorium casing which undergoes fast neutron fission. You decontaminate the fallout before you get the lethal dose, because cobalt-60 has such a long half life.

About 72% of fission products have a half life less than 1 day, whereas cobalt-60 has a half life of about 5.3 years. So for every neutron captured by cobalt-59 to form radioactive cobalt-60, you get a measly 2.5 MeV of gamma rays (two gamma rays, one 1.17 MeV and one 1.33 MeV) spread over a mean life of 5.3/ln2 = 7.6 years (the mean life for normal exponential radioactive decay is always a factor of 1/ln2 ~ 1.44 times the half-life). Compare this to the 200 MeV of energy, including 7 MeV of delayed gamma rays, that you get from using the neutron to cause fission and create fission products!

This is why you can't do much with fallout! It is so easy to deal with. You can firehose it down drains while it lands to futher reduce doses, just like the "washdown" sprinkler system American ships used at nuclear tests in heavy fallout. Alternatively, you can evacuate while the radiation levels are high. Most "rainout" goes straight down the drain or deep into soil, shielding the radiation (only puddles present a danger).

As stated in this post, most of the radiation hysteria in the media is based on lies. There are very serious dangers from short and long term effects if you are exposed to high dose rates, especially over 0.5 R/hr or 0.5 cGy/hr, which is the very upper limit for the body's DNA repair enzymes like P53 to repair damage as it occurs. Beyond that level, the DNA breaks into multiple bits before the ends are rejoined (sometimes in the wrong order, either killing the cell or in a few cases causing cancer or genetic risks).

But at lower dose rates, especially 1 mR/hr (100 times background), the controlled, blindfolded experimental data shows benefits.

nige said...

One more thing about fallout hazards from the 10,000 megaton "doomsday device" you refer to.

The fallout arrival time increases with bomb yield. During that time when the fallout is still at high altitudes, the most intense radioactivity decays without irradiating people.

For the 1 kt Nevada "Sugar" first surface burst in 1951, fallout arrived within a minute near ground zero.

For the biggest surface burst ever tested, the Bikini Atoll "Bravo" test in 1954, fallout arrival times were carefully instrumented with automatic tray elevator collectors throughout the Atoll and lagoon fallout collection rafts (all under the mushroom cloud), giving a mean fallout arrival time of 28 minutes, a time to peak dose rate of 1 hour after detonation, and a cessation at about 2 hours after detonation (weapon test report WT-915).

As you go up to bigger yields, the fireball begins to rise so fast that it goes up ballistically to very high altitudes.

Since nuclear explosions don't affect gravity, and since gravity is one factor determining the time for fallout particles to be deposited (there is some downward downdraft motion at the periphery of the cloud as well, but that doesn't cancel out the tremendous updraft that increases fallout times as yield increases), the time for fallout gets bigger as yield increases.

This means that the doses don't scale up with fission yield.

The total amount of radioactivity actually deposited on the ground is a progressively smaller fraction as bomb yield increases, due to the high rate of decay at local times while the activity is still in the cloud or at high altitudes.

This is covered up by the presentation of 1 hour "reference" dose rates in Glasstone and Dolan and other sources. Those 1 hour reference dose rates are totally imaginary and never exist over most of the fallout area, where fallout simply hasn't arrived or been completely deposited within 1 hour of detonation. It's all lies for Cold War propaganda and confusion. If they wanted to present useful data, they would show instead the REAL WORLD dose rates after fallout was complete, and accumulated doses as a function of bomb yield, which fall off more rapidly than "1 hour reference dose rates" with increasing downwind distance, due to the increasing arrival time and thus the lower actual dose rate when fallout actually arrives, due to radioactive decay in the interim.

Anonymous said...

In the Bulletin of Atomomic Scientists, November 1961, W. H. Clark discussed similar things: "A large mine containing 1000 tons of heavy water would fission 5000 tons of uranium. Fifty such mines would be requred to produce any lethal remote fallout." (So this device yield from fusion-17.6 gigatons, from fission-88 gigatons,total-105.6 gigatons, total fission yield - 4.4 teratons". Later, he wrote: Cobalt bombs are much more effective because half-live of cobalt is well matched to the residence time of bomb debris in stratosphere. Long ago Leo Scilard pointed out that only 50 tons of neutrons , obtainble from 2500 tons of heavy water ,would produce enough cobalt-60 to give a dose of 10,000 roentgens over the whole earth. The lethal dose of man, for radiation distributed over a long period of time is thought to be 5000 roentgens, but it is not certain that a 10,000 roentgen dose in open would kill the entire population...." Finally, he concluded : cobalt bombs designed to exterminate the human race will require a few hundred thousand tons of heavy water and equal amount of cobalt. But, how accurate this estimate? How large such bomb would be (I mean a proper design -mix of u-238 and cobalt) to kill humans?

Anonymous said...

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,828877,00.html

Science: fy for Doomsday
Friday, Nov. 24, 1961

Herman Kahn's ponderous shocker, On Thermonuclear War, frequently mentions a weapon whose purpose is to end all human life: the Doomsday Machine. Kahn discusses its political uses as calmly as if it were a bug killer, but he gives few technical details. In the latest Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Physicist W. H. Clark spells out some little-known facts about Doomsday Machines—and some of the more refined horrors that nuclear war could bring. Both the U.S. and Russia already can build near-Doomsday bombs, but far more disturbing is the fact that they are sufficiently inexpensive and simple to be built by smaller nations with an emerging atomic technology.

The detonator of a thermonuclear bomb is a fission bomb containing plutonium or uranium 235, and its explosion sets off the main charge of fusion material, which is essentially deuterium (heavy hydrogen). Fission detonators are expensive, but a single one can explode any amount of comparatively cheap fusion material. Result: the bigger the bomb, the cheaper it is in terms of explosive yield. Clark figures that a ten-megaton bomb costs somewhat more than $1,000,000, mostly for the detonator. But further increases in yield cost only about $5,000 per megaton, so that the price tag on a 100-megaton bomb is roughly $1,500,000. A 1,000-megaton bomb would cost $6,000,000. Once they acquired enough fission material, many middle-sized countries could fashion even bigger bombs and, by using certain techniques, produce near-Doomsday destruction and death by exploding comparatively few of them.

Among the techniques: >A nuclear bomb could be loaded on a submarine or barge and planted on the ocean bottom near the coast of a target country. Exploded under two miles of water (at the aggressor's will and from great distance), a 20,000-megaton bomb would stir up a wave whose crest would still be 100 feet high after it had traveled 200 miles. It would wash most coastlines bare and ride far inland.

Anonymous said...

[continued]

>For better Doomsday effect, large bombs could be made as radioactive as possible. One way is to "salt" them with sodium, which becomes intensely radioactive when it absorbs neutrons. Clark figures that a 20,000-megaton bomb of this kind would contaminate 200,000 square miles (four times the area of New York State) so heavily that even people in basement shelters would surely die. But since the half life of radioactive sodium 24 is only 15 hours, the bomb's products would lose much of their punch before the wind could carry them around the earth. Thus, a sodium-salted bomb would not be a true Doomsday Machine.

> More deadly yet would be large fission-fusion-fission bombs whose outer blankets of cheap uranium 238 yield energy as well as deadly fission products. Clark believes that any nuclear power could easily destroy a nation with the close-range fallout effect from this type of bomb, but he thinks that the human race as a whole would be more resistant.

> Probably the most effective bomb in spreading worldwide death would be salted with cobalt, which absorbs neutrons and turns into radioactive cobalt 60. Since cobalt 60's half life is five years, it would be carried all over the earth before losing its activity. About 50,000 megatons of cobalt-salted bombs would theoretically provide enough long-lasting radioactivity to kill everyone on earth.

Despite the massive destructive potential of these bombs, Clark believes that not even such a Doomsday Machine—should any nation ever be suicidal enough to use one—would completely wipe out human life. In deep caves or far-underground shelters, enough people might find refuge to wait out the radioactivity and emerge to begin again. Concludes Physicist Clark: "The indications are that the human race will survive the H-bomb, though it will be a close thing. Until some more efficient process is discovered, extermination will require a major effort by one or both of the great powers. Lesser states will have to be content with destroying most people and making the rest miserable."

nige said...

Anonymous,

Like the rest of the crackpots and quacks, the lying rubbish you are quoting is a danger to peace, freedom and security in the way Herman Kahn explained over 50 years ago in On Thermonuclear War:

"At no time did Hitler threaten to initiate war against France and England. He simply threatened to 'retaliate' if they attacked him. The Munich crisis had an incredible sequel in March 1939. ... Hitler occupied the rest of Czechslovakia. The technique he used is such an obvious prototype for a future aggressor armed with H-bombs that it is of extreme value to all who are concerned with the problem of maintaining a peaceful and secure world ..."

- Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 403.


On Thermonuclear War, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 390-1:


“... in spite of the tremendous scale of the violations it still took the Germans five years, from January 1933 when Hitler came in to around January 1938, before they had an army capable of standing up against the French and the British. At any time during that five-year period if the British and the French had had the will, they probably could have stopped the German rearmament program.... it is an important defect of ‘arms control’ agreements that the punishment or correction of even outright violation is not done automatically ... but takes an act of will ... one of the most important aspects of the interwar period [was] the enormous and almost uncontrollable impulse toward disarmament ... As late as 1934, after Hitler had been in power for almost a year and a half, [British Prime Minister] Ramsey McDonald still continued to urge the French that they should disarm themselves by reducing their army by 50 per cent, and their air force by 75 per cent.

“In effect, MacDonald and his supporters urged one of the least aggressive nations in Europe to disarm itself to a level equal with their potential attackers, the Germans. ... Probably as much as any other single group I think that these men of good will can be charged with causing World War II. [Emphasis by Herman Kahn.] ... Hitler came into power in January 1933 and almost immediately Germany began to rearm ... but it was not until October 14, 1933 [that] Germany withdrew from a disarmament conference and the League of Nations ... Hitler's advisors seem to have been greatly worried that this action might trigger off a violent counteraction - for example, a French occupation of the Ruhr. But the British and the French contented themselves with denouncing the action.”

nige said...

AS STATED BEFORE, THE LIES ABOUT LONG-LIVED COBALT-60 OR WHATEVER IN FALLOUT STEM FROM THE "SITTING DUCK ASSUMPTION".

IT IS POSSIBLE TO DECONTAMINATE THE FALLOUT BEFORE YOU GET A SIGNIFICANT DOSE.

WHAT PART OF THIS IS UNCLEAR TO YOU?

THE MAN WAS A WAR MONGERER, EXAGGERATING NUCLEAR EFFECTS TO APPEASE THE TERRORISTS WHO WANTED, LIKE HITLER AND LENIN, TO DO HARM.

DON'T BELIEVE THE LIARS WHO EXAGGERATE THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MAKE CIVIL DEFENSE SEEM "UNTHINKABLE" OR INEFFECTIVE. SUCH PEOPLE WERE THE BIG DANGER IN THE 1930S, BUT WERE NEVER OPPOSED BY POLITICIANS, THE MEDIA, THE MILITARY, OR THE PUBLIC.

THIS IS THE RISK!

nige said...

THE LIARS WERE ACTUALLY GIVEN PEACE PRIZES BY FUNDS ESTABLISHED BY THE WAR MONGERER ALFRED NOBEL, OR THE "LENIN PEACE PRIZE". THE LIARS WERE SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY, THE MEDIA, THE PUBLIC AND THE TERRORISTS WHO EXPLOITED THEIR LIES TO GET AHEAD IN ARMS RACES AND GENOCIDE.

THEY ARE EVIL. DON'T BELIEVE THEM!

Anonymous said...

Thanks.
2 last comments were not mine.
I'm understand this,I'm only asked you about threshold.In principle there existed amount of CO-60
lethal to whole Earth,so much that caused death very quick.But probably very large.I can make a calculation of course,but this calculation would be based on uniformal destrubution,so I'm asked you.
P.S. I make a mistake,this is almost 16.6 gigatons from fusion,not 17.6.
Lenin of course was a terrorist,but not so much as Stalin.But what about Genghis Khan and his heirs?

nige said...

Global fallout mainly comes down with rain because the particle size is too small for much dry deposition. The rainout runs down drains or deep into the soil, where the gamma radiation is shielded.

Again, look up the research by the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory led by Dr Carl F. Miller (who was killed by fallout, dying from leukemia after getting a high dose in various tests).

This research on both "washdown systems" (decontamination by continuous firehosing of surfaces, to get rid of fallout while it is actually being deposited, as used to protect U.S. ships from fallout successfully at Castle and Redwing nuclear tests in 1954 and 1956) is being ignored by everyone, as is the decontamination and countermeasure research on already-deposited fallout.

You can equip roadsweeper trucks with some shielding around the driver's seat, or you can install radio-control and TV cameras in them, like the U.S. Navy did with ships YAG-39 and YAG-40 at Operation Castle!

You can take shelter and decontaminate the area with radio-controlled street cleaners and such like, without anyone getting exposed. ... IF YOU HAVE GOOD CIVIL DEFENSE RESEARCH, PLANNING, AND PREPARATIONS IN PEACETIME, AHEAD OF SUCH A DISASTER!!

nige said...

This research on decontamination was costly in both money and human terms, and can't be replicated. It should not be ignored, but utilized!

Anonymous said...

In :The end of the world: the science and ethics of human extinction by John Leslie even stated that Teller thinking about devices in million-megaton range (for destruction of asteroids)!


P.S. I'm even hear that Teller proposed H-bomb "capable blown -up Entire USSR" (I'm read this on anti-LHC sites -cerntruth.com and www.lhcdefence.org ,this claim probably have been made in Atomic movie: Trinity and beyound( i'm not seen this movie),but stated that Eisenhower cancelled this and call Soviet leadership for talk on disarmament-this means 1955(Open Skies),so this most likely this 10,000-megaton design(most likely Alarm clock-style(Teller proposed 1000-mt Alarm Clock in 1950)).

Rabi was simply -a worst Teller's ENEMY,but have a far greater influence on Ike than Teller.

nige said...

Hyperlink to your reference: John A. Leslie, The End of the World: the Science and Ethics of Human Extinction, 1996.

Anonymous said...

"In January 1992, Teller was among the hundred participants at a meeting at los Alamos to discuss new nuclear armaments. The event coincided with his eighty -four birthday. He called for producing largest- ever bomb, ten thousand times larger than any that had hitherto been built ;it would be so large that it could never be exploded on Earth but would be used to destroy asteroids. According to the report about the meeting ,as Teller described this super-super bomb, his protégé at the Livermore Laboratory ,Lowell Wood, could not contain his excitement and shouted from audience, ”Nukes forever”."
From Judging Edward Teller: A Closer Look at One of the Most Influential Scientists of the Twentieth Century by Istvan Hargittai.
So why, He said that this bomb (1000 000 megatons) so large to be detonated on Earth? What main concern?Fallout?

nige said...

Your reference:

http://www.amazon.com/Judging-Edward-Teller-Influential-Scientists/dp/1616142219

Judging Edward Teller: A Closer Look at One of the Most Influential Scientists of the Twentieth Century [Hardcover]
Istvan Hargittai (Author)


Thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation, ground shock, cratering, EMP and and blast could be key problems at that kind of yield, depending where it was detonated. If you fired it above one fireball radius over the middle of the Atlantic or Pacific, you would limit effects to blast and tsunami innundation of islands. But near land the problems would be severe. Below 100 megatons or so, thermal radiation is easy to deal with by duck and cover and elementary firefighting (the thermal pulse can't ignite thick wood below 100 megatons, so you can stamp out the fires that begin in outdoor dry crumpled newspapers newspaper, etc.). But at a yield of 1,000,000 megatons the thermal pulse becomes many minutes long, which is enough to dry out and ignite thick wood over wide areas, so it's a far worse problem with firestorms in forests. The blast would refract in the atmosphere and break windows for thousands of miles. Fallout would also be a relatively severe problem, although obviously the decay rate is still quick (approx t^-1.2 regardless of yield) so people would survive if they take the right countermeasures.

As Edward Teller stated correctly, it is not something to test here on Earth. It's restricted for use in space against asteroids that might hit the earth, like the >100,000,000 megatons K-T event 65 million years ago. You would have to detonate it far enough from the Earth in space to avoid EMP problems and satellite radiation damage problems.

Anonymous said...

There exist one thing with large bombs-horizon.
There was one weapon thereotized -Orbital bomb for SR-181 program.
There around 37000 pound vehicle delivered by Saturn class booster to 100 n.m.orbit.Its included 100-megaton bomb (weighing 17500 pounds).Detonation on this orbit.

LeMay also wanted this warhead as counter-force weapon on Titan3 as ICBM.JFK and Mcnamara canceled development tests for high-yield warheads,but fear was that USSR would deploy such weapons.
So would be effects on ground of this 100 n.m. detonation ?

Anonymous said...

See for this warhead for example :
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, first session, on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st session .1028 pages.Perhaps you never seen this.Also Hansen and NRDC data is complete false.

SR-181 was huge study for dozens of weapon systems:

"Cold War American Spacecraft Projects and the “Paperclip” connection.

The Allied Intelligence units…specifically U.S. in nature infuriated, angered, and outfoxed our allies (French, Canadians, British, and of course the Russians), by initiating “Operation Plunder,” within it being “Operation Paperclip” the collection of scientists, engineers, technicians, technology, etc., and to prevent the talented Germans from slipping out of Germany via any “ratline,” were hunted within another project called “Safeghaven:” Safehaven was specifically created to prevent wherever possible, talented Germans from slipping out of Germany, Austria and other German occupied nations, to continue their research in other nations-specifically, South America. Source; Secret Agenda, Linda Hunt, St. Martin’s Press, 1991.


Part.1.

Anonymous said...

Part.2.
During the 1950s G. L. Martin Aircraft of Baltimore, Maryland possessed an Advanced Design Teams department. Martin Design Teams presided over by George S. Trimble, was involved in pure science, future over-the-horizon advances in aeronautics, anti-gravity and its applications, nuclear propulsion for aerial vehicles, and the little publicized lenticular aircraft-spacecraft design studies plus studying and applying natural phenomena or the laws of nature, and advanced missile-spacecraft design.
Source: Aviation Week, October 18, 1953.

Martin Aircraft at their Middle-River, Maryland facility reorganized one facility into a special subsidiary that was born in 1946, and was engaged in the guided missile field. In the 1950s specific Design Teams operated within a separate unit known as RIASI-Research Institute for Advanced Study Incorporated, and performed building-block research into varied projects. This streamlined unit engaged in various missile projects, electronics, electro-mechanical weapons systems, and especially to “make the spaceship respectable,” and solve the problems of space travel. Another RIAS goal was to close the gap between basic scientific discoveries and their applications to engineering problems in their various projects.
Source: Aviation Week June 3, 1957.

Anonymous said...

Part.3.
The most exotic division other than RIAS was the Martin-Denver facility (where the Martin Titan series ICBM and follow-on heavy boosters), where a research unit known internally as “Force XXIV” became heavily involved in advanced space research. One aspect was to study and apply spacecraft for military applications in an area defined as a “synchronous corridor-an area 19,340 miles into space directly over the Earth’s equator. Other space-flight avenues proposed were Macro-Life spacecraft and the self-conscious, self-repairing Micro-life craft that protectively housed a human colony of space-farers. Also studied were “planetoid” or Astroid harvesting, hollowing large Astroids out to transform them into deep space exploration outside of our own Solar System. One of the more extreme thinkers based at Martin Denver was Dr. Dandridge MacFarlan Cole a high level engineer proposed some of the most extreme and advanced projects concerning human space travel. Martin Museum and other historians have spoke in very denigrating terms of Dr. Cole that border on the charge of insanity among other terms.




Aerospace author Lloyd Mallan was one of a very few writers who received the invitation for a grand tour of the Martin-Denver facilities. He wrote up the numerous space research projects at “Force XXIV” in his quite revealing book “Space Science,” based mostly upon the work of “Force XXIV.” In fact, Mr. Mallan is the only author who provided an in-depth report complete with photography, drawings, and projects being studied inside the Martin-Denver facility.
Source; Missiles and Rockets, July 19, 1965.
Time Magazine January 27, 1961 within the Science column.

Many people are familiar with the split-up of the original German Peenemunde Rocket Research Center Team-von Braun and his team surrendering to the American Forces, while the other half surrendered to the Russians. The rest is history.

What is not known is that many German lesser known scientists-engineers-technicians were involved in numerous American space projects, many of which would be applied to what the USAF secretly created immediately after the initial Russian Sputnik series were launched. The USAF SR-181 Strategic Orbital System, encompassed a series of weapon systems and support spacecraft constituting the T.O. (Table of Organization) of a tightly classified USAF organization known as EOMSF…Earth Orbital Military Space Force, with a planned operational timeframe between the late 1960s and early 1970s. This very thorough study is still classified today.

A few known German scientists and engineers absorbed into the U.S. Aerospace community that were directly involved in hypersonic boost-glider spacecraft studies were:

Bell Aircraft;

Dr. Walter R. Dornberger Bell’s chief Guided Missile Specialist cum Chief Scientist and before retirement, Vice President for Research. Responsible for Bell initiating a series of continuous rocket powered and rocket boosted reconnaissance-bombardment glider project studies, operated up to orbital speeds and altitudes, including the final follow-on to other projects…the Dyna Soar I contract.

Ing; Rudolph H Reicher joined Bell 1953, R&D on rocket engines, and in 1959 joined Boeing Airplane Company performing Propulsion Analysis and Interaction work.

Anonymous said...

Part.5.
Dr. Krafft A. Ehricke engineer-physicist worked for Dr. Dornberger at Bell Aircraft and left to join Convair in San Diego to work on the Atlas ICBM and Centaur Projects.

Heinz Mueller joined the Bell Aircraft Rocket Laboratory in 1950 and created “thrust chambers” and associated rocket motor work.

Dipl. Ing. Daus Chamburg-Harburg specialist in rocket-transportation and;
Dipl. Ing. Wilhelm Emil Schlitt specializing in Guidance Systems may have worked at Bell Aircraft.

Dipl. Haas or Haase of which little is known who was German and worked at Bell Aircraft on unspecified projects…either rocket engines or their Rocket Boosted reconnaissance-bombardment glider projects.

A brief list of advance and cutting-edge Bell Projects are;

Anonymous said...

Part.6.
MX-2145 cum MX-2276 BoMi
R459L “Hi Fi Recce” a.k.a. ”Brass Bell.”
System 118P two phase aircraft and glide-rocket study.
Study Requirement or SR-126 RoBo.
R464L Dyna Soar I cum RS-620A Dyna Soar.
Hypernias I and Hypernias II EMS…Energy Management System for Dyna Soar, SLOMAR, Lenticular Re-entry Saucer spacecraft, and all Lifting-Body Spacecraft designed by other firms.
Ramora Space Maintenance Vehicle in conjunction with Model 7045 Saucer spacecraft and their Orbital Bombardment Station or Platform.
Nuclear armed Reentry Missile in conjunction with Bell or Martin Orbital Bombardment Platforms.
REACTION CONTROL MOTOR Contracts Boeing Dyna Soar and various spacecraft projects..
Bell’s Lenticular spacecraft studies culminating in the Bell Model 7045 Modified
Lenticular Re-entry Vehicle submitted for the Apollo Project, to service Orbital Bombardment Platforms within the SR-181 Strategic Orbital System study.
Continuous USAF-NASA Contracts to continue to develop and refine Bell Aircraft’s Patented double-wall liquid and solid insulation systems for hypersonic vehicles that included winged orbital weapons systems that must negotiate a glide-reentry into earth’s sensible atmosphere. This author has now discovered that such contracts involved double-wall cooling-insulation panels, test sections, and boost-glider fuselage-wing cross sections that were refined and actually flight-tested and wind tunnel tested. Bell’s future research was agreed upon by Larry Bell and Dr. Dornberger in 1951. The double-wall cooling-insulation system contract series ran as late as 1968, such was the confidence the USAF and Bell exhibited in their lengthy research work.


G.L. Martin Aircraft;

NOTE-the following individuals were nicknamed “The Blue Angels,” despite being assigned to the Dyna Soar I competition with Bell Aircraft against the Boeing-Vought Team. The Middle-River Plant (probably the RIAS Department), where they work was painted throughout the building with two shades of Blue paint, hence the term “Blue Angels.”

Hans Multhopp; A Director and Principal Scientist under Martin Dyna Soar I boss…Mr. Bastian (Buz) Hello, also involved in design of the Martin-Bell Dyna Soar I and lifting-body spacecraft.

Dr. Peter Friedrich Jordan, structural specialist assigned to Martin-Bell Dyna Soar I Project and other Martin spacecraft projects.

Dr. Julius Friedrich Vandrey; Aerospace Physics also assigned to Dyna Soar I.

The above list of course, is by no means complete and it is curious that other Germans constituting a list of approximately 1,500 plus German-Austrian scientists and other talented people are not listed as to their employment either within the U.S. Government, Industry, the military branches and other sources.

Anonymous said...

Part7.
MARTIN PROJECTS;

ASTROROCKET
START PROGRAM.
PILOT/PRIME
S-5
M-103, SV-5, X-24A X-24B, X-24C-FDL.
X-23A Prime mini-lifting body
SR-89774 Fly-back Titan II
SLOMAR
DYNA SOAR
RAPT
HL-10 STUDY
FDL-8
HASP

Martin projects listed above were applicable to inspect, maintain and support Bell or Martin’s manned and robotic Orbital Bombardment Platform proposals, crew-changes and resupply of Space Stations, etc. They offered both lifting body and lenticular plus Greatly enlarged and very heavy Dyna Soar Bombers and other spacecraft known as “SLOMAR” for a multitude of USAF missions. Martin also designed their own versions of highly modified boost-glider and lifting body spacecraft derived from the START Program. It must be noted that the plethora of U.S. Industry spacecraft designs, proposals, and Dyna Soar were to be incorporated into the still classified SR-181 Strategic Orbital System composing the hardware of the USAF planned SR-181 EOMSF…Earth Orbital Military Space Force studied between 1957-1963.

Source; numerous Martin Dyna Soar Reports and Proposal Booklets.














Boeing Airplane Company

Few German scientists and engineers worked for BAC and are unidentified.

MX-2145 Study.
SR-168 Air-Launch Glide Missile
SR-126 RoBo.
SR-178 GSS.
SR-181 Strategic Orbital System
ABMD Orbital Interceptor or Boeing nomenclature…AICBM interceptor.proposal.
SR-79500 Hypersonic Glide Misisle
ICGM
BOSS-IOC
BOSS-WEDGE
R464 a.k.a. RS620A Dyna Soar I

There are numerous contracts that either remain classified or have been destroyed by the contractor or have been buried by the Dod/USAF.

End."

I'm not Hansen or NRDC staff

Anonymous said...

SR-181 was not alone.
SR-181 -orbital nukes and related things.

SR-183 lunar based nukes and related things.Again huge work was done there.Threre even were concepts for lunar missile base..........

Anonymous said...

Where this stated that wood cannot be ignited by 100-megaton explosion?There all altitudes?
I'm have seen prediction that 100mt detonated at 100 n.m. would set fires on 100 000 square miles.

nige said...

For my debunking of thermal ignition lies please see:

http://glasstone.blogspot.com/2006/04/ignition-of-fires-by-thermal-radiation.html

Anonymous said...

One more thing about Teller's 10,000-megaton bomb.In reality this bomb was not alone.One more think to debunk revisionist books like Herken'Brotherhood.
"DECISION NOT TO DEVELOP HIGH-YIELD WEAPONS
The CHAIRMAN. Did you participate in the decision apparently
made in 1954 and, I suppose, in years subsequent to that, not to go-
in for the very high yield weapons ?
Dr. FOSTER. No, sir. I was not in a position to participate in the
decisions.
The CHAIRMAN. You did not. You are familiar with that?
Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who did make that determination not to pursue
the high yields?
Dr. FOSTER. Well, the instructions came from the Atomic Energy
Commission to the laboratory.
The CHAIRMAN. You think this was a mistake?
Dr. FOSTER. At the time, Senator, I think it was the right thing
to do, to decide not to build THEM and, as a matter of fact, at that
time, at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory we had DESIGNS to do
JUST this job, and it was these designs that raised the question.
Now, the question of whether or not 1 megaton or 10 or 100 is the
right one depends an awful lot on what you think the situation on the
other side is, and this changes as a function of time.
The CHAIRMAN. Then, do I understand you to say at the time, you
mean in 1954 it was the right thing to do?
Dr. FOSTER. That is correct."
From Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, first session, on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st session .Statement of Foster Dr. Jhon S., Jr.,Director ,Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,Livermore,Caliv.

In 10000-megaton device effective primary must be for final stage an order of 1000 megatons.This must be second device.But seems,that Foster stated about larger than 2.
It must be that additional several designs existed.
It even may be that "H-bomb to blown up entire USSR" not 10000 megatons,larger.Blown up means by fallout.
What yield needed for shipborn extemely dirty H-bomb to cover entire USSR with lethal fallout(based on contemporary understanding)?

Anonymous said...

Also Teller showed on calculations on early supercomputers in Livermore that Classical Super works!But unfortunately for devices with many gigaton yields and higher.
See:Lowell Wood and John Nuckolls,The development of nuclear explosives,Energy in Physics ,War and Peace:A Festschrift Celebrating Edward Teller's 80th Birthday ,edited by Hans Mark and Lowell Wood,p.317.


One more thing to consider a GUT magnetic monopole bomb.

Anonymous said...

Teller have a lunch with Turok ,they talking about magnetic monopoles.Teller immediately consider ,that they could be used as basis for bomb.However this is only estimation.

So what would be effects of this thing ?This is very interesting.

Anonymous said...

In the Chuck Hansen's Swords 10,000 mt bomb described very well compared to political books like Brotherhood.
"In other discussions, several members of the GAC expressed
concern over Teller's 10,000 MT device; some wondered what
fraction of the Livermore lab's effort was being expended on
high-yield devices named the GNOMON and the SUNDIAL. Drs. von
Neumann and Rabi stated that "the (Livermore) laboratory
clearly has very capable people on its staff; it is
unfortunate that they are not being effectively utilized up to
their abilities."
Its unclear whether or not 10,000 mt bomb one of them,or they smaller.The main reason not build them was that they not have military requirement,that was difference between US an USSR.

What would be effects of its explosion around Leningrad coast ?
Its capable to wipe out Soviet population?

nige said...

"What would be effects of its explosion around Leningrad coast ?"

Teller would have been stopped from sailing his ship through the Baltic sea to get anywhere near Leningrad.

A 10,000 megaton bomb would need a ship to deliver it. Assume 50% fission yield. You get about 17 kilotons per kilogram of uranium-238 fissioned by high-energy fusion neutrons. However, not all of the uranium-238 will be fissioned, because many fusion neutrons will be captured by uranium-238 without fission to form uranium-239, -240, 241, etc. So non-fission capture competes with fission. If the total neutron capture-to-fission ration is 1 capture per fission, then you only get 8.5 kilotons per kg of uranium-238, which means you need 118 kg of uranium-238 per megaton of fission yield.

So for 10,000 megatons at 50% fission (5,000 megatons of fission yield), the bomb needs 590 tons of uranium-238. In addition you need a massive quantity of lithium deuteride or deuterium. You'd have to build the bomb inside a container ship, because you would not have a crane capable of lifting such a massive bomb on board. It's just stupid. The effects wouldn't be that impressive anyway, the cube-root scaling law means that 10,000 megatons has a radius of diffraction-type (peak overpressure) destruction only 10 times bigger that the 10 megaton Mike test. The wind effects would last 10 times longer for any given peak pressure, so things would be blown along for 10 times longer, but the maximum wind speed for any peak overpressure is not dependent on the bomb power.

Because of the weight of a 10,000 megaton device, it would be virtually impossible to air burst it (unless you had a massive Project Orion type nuclear explosion propelled rocket), so it would have to be surface burst. If you want to use fallout, you're dependent on the weather, wind and rain. It's not a good military weapon for many reasons.

Also, as I've blogged elsewhere, the Russians survived about 2,000,000 casualties during the terrible onslaught and near starvation from the Nazis in the 872 days Siege of Leningrad 18 January 1943 from 27 January 1944, and the Nazis lost.

I don't see why anyone would want to try to attack Leningrad with a bomb.

During the Cold War, it was only a minority of the people in Russia who were members of the Communist Party. You can't blame the people in the street for the crimes of the minority of evil dictators like Stalin.

It's the same with Vietnam, where America should have used high-yield, low-fission yield (Redwing-Navajo type) air burst nuclear weapons to safely blast down a demilitarized zone through the Jungle, instead of using Agent Orange. This would have saved lives, stopped jungle-cover insurgency, prevented the need for chemicals like Agent Orange and American ground troops, and also sent out a strong message to the USSR and others that America wasn't going to be intimidated by pacifist anti-nuclear propaganda into pro-Communist rubbish. Instead, the Cold War went on until Reagan forced it to an end in the 1980s.

The targets for weapons should be military targets. Enemy propaganda and threats to our civilians should be overcome by increasing our civil defence and air defense (ABM/Star Wars) as Reagan did from 1980-88, which brought the Soviets to the negotiating table and forced them to abandon their Cold War mentality and listen to reason.

Anonymous said...

"At the same time that Eisenhower was being informed that
REDWING was to test low-contamination "clean" bombs, the Air
Force was expressing its interest in "salted" or "dirty" high-contamination
weapons:
The DOD has asked the AEC to study salted
weapons. This letter is written in the
belief that it will be helpful to AEC
scientists working on this project to know a
little more about AF requirements
contemplated for this sort of weapon.
The AF has made some studies of the
military effects of salted weapons. A
summary of some results is attached for
your information.
Initial emphasis should be placed on large weapons. The AF is interested in a "salted
version" of the new Class A (25,000 lb.)
and of the MK 21, if feasible. The ideal
isotope should emit an energetic gamma ray
and have a half-life of the order of a week
or so. Yield losses should be no more than
25%.
These remarks as to the most desirable
ranges of parameters -- size, half-life,
tolerable yield loss -- are not intended to
preclude your consideration of wider
ranges."

From Chuck Hansen Swords.
Tantalum?

Class A mean a 60-megaton weapon in a normal version.

Mk21 yield was in reality 15 megatons in a normal version.
So what about this ?

Anonymous said...

20 mt and 19.1 mt soviet devices were a competitor devices for heavy warhead for r-36 missile (ss-9).


choice was a arzamas-16 device-20 megatons.

both were designed to be 18mt.

chelyabinsk device was heavier by 5-10 percents.


design.

weight around 4 tons .
dropped in the rds-6s drop case.

2-stage,boosted primary that have been tested in 1957-1958.
aluminium alloy casing.
electrodetonators have been used.


210 were deployed on r-36 icbm.

8f675 heavy rv.

later 30 of them were deployed on r-36m in 1975 and were in arms up to 1992-purpose was to destroy hardened structures.


interesting facts:

Soviets not considered bombers as reliable weapon at least against US so they not build a bomb version.


This weapon was a highest-yield weapon ever stockpiled by USSR.

21.1 mt test was in fact clean test of the 40mt device,scaled-down Tsar ,considered as warhead for UR-500 configurated as ICBM,but UR-500 ICBM have been canceled and device never been weaponized.



Question about Soviet megatonnage.

R-36 310 were build,23 were fired.

at peak 210 were deployed with 20mt,46 with 8.3mt,18 orbital with 2.3mt and 12 with 3 MRV 2.3mt.

Consider this, I'm believe 210-220 20mt warheads were build,46-60 8.3mt.


For R-16 ICBM.

First warhead was a 2.3 mt same as on R-36.

Second was a 3.4 megatons.
Combination not known .
R-9A was a 2.3 mt.


3 and 6mt for R-16 were CIA estimates.

R-16 202 were produced.

Anonymous said...

As for Mk21 ,275 units produced that only mod 0.

Its absurd that NRDC claimed that.


Mk21-0 produced -december 1955- july 1956.

Mk-21 -1 october 1956-april 1957.

mk-21-2 april 1957-june 1957.


And of course, 940 mk-36-s were new constructions.

Anonymous said...

Mk-41 500 were produced.

There were Mk 41 mod 0.

See for example:History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons July 1945 to September 1977.

All have a 25mt yield.


But small fraction of mk36-s were clean,six-megaton variant,compared to 19 megatons in the full-yield version.Data that existed claimed that only dirty variant was deployed.


Mk-36 production run april 1956-june 1958.

Mk36-0 production started in april 1956.

mk-36-1 in october 1956.

clean mk-36-0 started production in june 1957.

mk-36-2 same month.

So it possible to determine a maximum number of clean variant.


Mcnamara stated in 1967 that change of the bomber loadings -retirement of Mk36-s reduced total megatonnage by 40%.


B-52 loadings were at this time:

2 Mk-21 later 2 Mk-36 up to end FY 1960.


Later:

2 Mk-41
4 Mk-28Y1

1Mk-41+2 Hound Dog.

4Mk-28Y1+2 Hound Dog.

Later since Mcnamara destroyed medium bomber force and since FUFO version of MK41(15,000 pound weight) never existed Mk41 start to retire for Mk53 FUFO.


Other B-52 loadings were:

1 Class A (60MT)-canceled in 1957.

1Mk-41+4Skybolt.

4Mk-28Y1+4 Skybolt.

Skybolt canceled by Mcnamara .

Anonymous said...

Herken mixed up facts.


1000-megaton yield of the device that Teller described in 1947 in the report LA-643,he also described its explosion.

But yield of the Super 162 feet in dimeter and 30 feet in lenght would be hundreds of the gigatons.

In 1970-s was shown that Classical Super works,and not only it,but All Teller's early proposals and designs.
See:
A Festschrift Celebrating Edward Teller's 80th Birthday ,edited by Hans Mark and Lowell Wood.

nige said...

Thanks for the information!

Please note that I have comment moderation turned on to prevent people writing nonsense on this blog, and I cannot always log in to approve comments regularly.

So if your comment is not quickly approved it's possibly I'm away from internet access, dead, etc.

Anonymous said...

I'm was not right-Herken not mixed up facts.

1.1000-megaton device that Teller described in report LA-643 was a Alarm Clock not Super.


2. 1000-megaton that Herken mentioned was another Super design.
From From Chuck Hansen's Swords :

At this time, the proposed Super was so huge and unwieldy that
delivery by boat or railroad train were the only choices (any
probable enemy was unlikely to permit either).165

Citation 165-AEC THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS CHRONOLOGY, p. 21.

It seemed
impossible to package the Super into a droppable bomb, and
even if it were possible, its yield would be so great that the
airplane carrying it would have to be sacrificed.166


Citation 166-AEC THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS CHRONOLOGY, p. 70; Borden-Walker
H-bomb chronology, p. 25.



One Super design in early 1949 included a fission trigger
that in itself weighed 30,000 lbs.; the overall length of the
bomb was estimated at approximately 30 feet, with a diameter
in excess of 162 feet. Under these circumstances, the scientists at Los Alamos preferred not even to estimate the
gross weight: this configuration represented essentially a
huge fission trigger in the middle of a container of liquid
deuterium the size of a large oil storage tank.167
Citation 167-AF ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, Vol. IV, p. 187.

From Herken’s Brotherhood :
The hypothetical Super under consideration was some 30 feet long and a stunning 162 feet.,fission trigger weighed itself 30,000 pounds.
Citation-“A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943-1953” (USAF history), vol. IV, 188; Rhodes (1995), 379.

Another problem facing AIR Force planners was how any aircraft dropping the bomb could escape the shock wave from mammoth 1,000-megaton explosion.
Citation- “A subsequent Air Force memo envisioned an H-bomb 20 feet long, nine feet wide, and weighing between 35,000-80,000 pounds. Wood to Commanding General, July 12, 1951, #471.6, series 197, USAF/NARA”
So this bomb was a smallest Classical Super design proposed at this time.

Classical Super feasibility.

Teller's Memories:
"Work on thermonuclear weapons is complicated to conceptualize and describe,and accurate description of it are still highly classified.I have described my role in the development of thermonuclear weapons as fully as is allowed.I can only point out that during 1970s ,when more powerfull computers became avaible ,some of my original ideas were reexamined .As it turned out ,Ulam 's calculations,as well Johnny von Neumann's were based on incomplete assumptions.As Hans Mark and Lowell Wood wrote in 1988 :
Remarkably enough, all of Teller's earlier thermonuclear explosive designs and proposals were subsequently shown to be feasible-in experimental demonstrations.1"
1. Energy in Physics ,War and Peace : A Festschrift Celebrating Edward Teller's 80th Birthday,(Dodrecht,Boston and London :Kluwer Academic Publishers,1988).

Its,possible,that asteroid-buster,that Teller described, actually a Classical Super-one of the devices that were studied in 1970-s,that’s because Classical Super is essentially a cryotank of liquid deuterium,i.e. its mass much smaller for same yield compared to ordinary Teller-Ulam bomb.

Anonymous said...

Unfortunately, fact that Classical Super works known since publication of paper of Lowell Wood and Thomas Weaver, Necessary conditions for the initiation and propagation nuclear-detonation waves in plane atmospheres ,Physical.Review.A.vol.20.1.pp.316-328.
From section VIII .Prospects for the nuclear detonation of the oceans.” Its worth noting ,in conclusion ,that the suscectability of thermonuclear detonation of large body of hydrogenous material is exceedingly sensitive function of its isotopic composition ,and, specifically to the deuterium atom fraction, as is implicit in the discussion just preceding. If, for instance, the terrestrial oceans contained deuterium at any atom fraction greater than 1:300 (instead of actual value of 1:6000) ,the ocean could propagate an equilibrium thermonuclear-detonation wave at temperature >~ 2kev (although a fantastic 10^30 ergs-2*10^7 MT ,or the total amount of solar energy incident on the Earth for a two –week period –would be required to initiate such a detonation at deuterium concentration of 1:300).Now a non-negligible of the matter in our own galaxy exists at temperatures much less than 300K,i.e. the gas- giant planets of our Solar system, nebulas ,etc. Furthermore, it is well known that thermodynamically-governed isotopic fractionation even more strongly favors higher relative concentration of deuterium as temperature decreases ,e.g., D:H ratio in the 100 K Great Nebula of Orion is about 1:200.Finally,orbital velocities of matter about the galactic of mass are of the order 3*10^7 cm/sec at our distance from the galactic core.
It is quite conceivable that hydrogenous matter (e.g., CH4 ,NH3,H2O ,or just H2) relatively rich in deuterium (>~ 1at.%) could accumulate at its normal ,zero-pressure density in substantial thickness on planetary surfaces ,and such layering might even be fairly common feature of the colder, gas-giant planets. If thereby highly enriched in deuterium (>~ 10 at.%),thermonuclear detonation of such layers could be initiated artificially with attainable nuclear explosives. Even with deuterium atom fractions approaching 0.3 at.% (less than that observed over multiparsec scales in ),however ,such layers might be initiated into propagating thermonuclear detonation by the impact of large (dia >~10^2m),ultra high-velocity (v>~10^7cm/sec) meteors or comets ,originating from nearer galactic center. Such events, though extraordinary rare, would be spectacularly visible on distance scales of many parsecs.”

So ,what would be yield of initiator needed to propagate wave with temperature of 50 kev in liquid deuterium?
And why Classical Super works only starting with devices in the gigaton range ?

Anonymous said...

Information have been revealed that Classical super works in Energy in Physics ,War and Peace : A Festschrift Celebrating Edward Teller's 80th Birthday ,edited by Hans Mark and Lowell Wood,Kluwer Academic Publishers,1988, in article :Lowell Wood and John Nuckolls, The development of nuclear explosives on p.317.
They stated that Classical Super works for gigaton devices,but they not give exact minimal yield,but it seems its possible to estimate yield of minimal device.

nige said...

The classical superbomb of Teller from 1946 or so was a gun-type fission weapon with a beryllium oxide wall at the end of the cylinder of fissile material, with an adjacent chamber containing some tritium (to start off fusion) then a long cylinder of liquid deuterium.

This "classical super" differs from the 1951 Teller-Ulam breakthrough by NOT compressing the fusion material axially using recoil from X-ray ablation of a heavy metal pusher cylinder around the fusion stage.

So the classical superbomb is purely using the temperature of a gun-type bomb (a gun type bomb being used to allow the hot end of the fissile material to cause heating, avoiding cooling in the TNT implosion debris around an implosion weapon).

The Greenhouse-George test (yield 225 kt) in 1951 was a scaled-down classical super (external tritium chamber separated from fissile material by beryllium oxide wall), but without the main deuterium charge and using cylindrical implosion instead of a gun type device. (Cylindrical implosion, like a gun-type device, has the advantage of exposing the ends of a cylinder of fissile material and thus allowing a maximum of unattenuated radiation to escape from there, for heating tritium.)

What really is interesting is Ulam's idea in December 1950 to create a pure fission bomb of using separate stages. I.e., one fission bomb compresses second fission stage more efficiently than chemical explosives can. So you can, using Ulam's scheme, make a fission bomb arbitrarily powerful without using any fusion materials at all. You just need to use a series of stages, which are ignited by compression. Ulam's idea was to use neutrons; Teller pointed out X-rays can do the job and then worked out the recoil from ablation of a pusher around the secondary stage. This will work either for a fusion or a fission secondary stage.

Anonymous said...

Nige ,this information well known for me,I'm even read sources that Chuck Hansen used on the subject.

Later for gigaton Super designs (1949-1951) they planned to use a Multi-Crit gun,such weapon could give up to several megatons-never actully build.

Failed Morgenstern (in reality designed to be 3Mt) and scaled -up Morgenstern-Ramrod -were in reality thermonuclear trigers for Classical Super.

Classical Super from physical point of view -propagation of thermonuclear detonation wave and not necessary in liquid deuterium and even deuterium.

In devices that they stuidied in 1970-s they of course used multi-megaton trigers,and they revealed that 2*10^7Mt needed to initiate 2kev detonation wave in ocean with D:H 1:300.
Based on this data its possible estimate energy of triger needed to initiate 50kev wave in pure deuterium.

Anonymous said...

Clean Mk36 described as 96% pure.

This mean 240kt from fission.

So what about Pu spark plug ?


Spark plugs actually existed or they speculations of Hansen and others?

nige said...

Yes, they did, from the 1952 Ivy-Mike device onwards, and the spark plug (not just the fission primary) inside the liquid deuterium Dewar flask (the secondary stage of Ivy-Mike) was hollow and contained tritium gas to boost the fission, according to the interview of Ivy-Mike designers by Richard Rhodes in his 1995 book "Dark Sun". It's a big part of the story, because the tritium they added disappeared causing a drop in pressure. They thought it was leaking out, but then they realised that it was was reacting with the uranium metal surface on the inside of the sparkplug (they put in the tritium while it was still warm, before the large deuterium liquid DeWar secondary was filled). Uranium tritide formed on the inner surface of the hollow spark plug, causing the gas pressure to fall.

This tells you the time-sequence of events in the compression of the secondary stage.

If the sparkplug compression and fission occurred after the fusion reaction had got going, then the boosting of the centre of the sparkplug with tritium gas would have been unnecessary.

Clearly, the secondary stage is compressed and the fission of the sparkplug must proceed effectively to burnout, before the main fusion reaction in the secondary stage gets started. Otherwise, boosting the sparkplug is unnecessary, because it would undergo fission from the neutrons produced in the main fusion event.

In other words, the fusion stage takes a longer time to start fusing than the time taken for the fission of the sparkplug, which occurs first. So it is an advantage to boost the sparkplug, to help it heat up the centre of the fusion charge.

Anonymous said...

Hello Nige,


Do you read a second edition of Hansen's Swords?

I'm not read them yet,but it seems that he provided data about new(1962) Livermore high-yield devices ?

nige said...

I have only read Hansen's 1988 published book, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons" (Aerofax), when it was in the British Library's SRIS. I exchanged emails with Hansen about nuclear weapons effects data, e.g. non-fission neutron capture ratios in U238 which produce U239 and U237 and their effects on fallout decay rates, but he replied he did not have any data on that. Presumably he did not have possession of the fully declassified detailed DASA-1251 volumes on the composition of fallout actinides. I don't think they have been fully declassified, apart from the fallout pattern compilations. The most important compilations of close-in EMP waveforms from nuclear tests are also still secret today, because the presence and relative yields of the primary fission and thermonuclear stages can be inferred from EMP data.

I rececently re-read the original 1945 Smyth report "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes", where General Groves writes in the foreword that the purpose of the report is to give out all unclassified data on the subject, and anyone securing or releasing any further data will be punished. The end of the book contains a conclusion by Smyth, stating that the American people need to be informed of the facts in order for democracy to work.

I think Hansen's point is that the secrecy failed to stop Stalin and others getting the H-bomb, so what's the point? Secrecy is a dangerous delusion which only keeps the very people who deserve the facts and pay for the research through their taxes, from being told the facts. It doesn't stop spies giving the data to the enemy. There is no security in keeping the facts secret from millions of taxpayers who fund the research, and it has the very grave danger of increasing terror and fear by allowing ignorance and superstition to go out of control.

nige said...

The only way to guarantee national security is through efficient military and civil defense, and by safeguarding fissile and thermonuclear materials like deuterium for lithium deuteride, not a "top secret" stamp.

All the same, I don't think it would be wise to publish tested, detailed design data on deliverable nuclear weapons, because there will be some rogue states out there (ahem, Iran, to be specific, maybe also North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel to some degree) which have a nuclear weapons program and the necessary materials, so are at the stage that could well utilize ideas in detailed blueprints of 1962 American thermonuclear weapons.

So I don't think it is wise to discuss this kind of data openly. The only design related materials I've seen are fusion boosting and implosion force calculations in Bridgman's 2001 book Introduction to the Physics of Nuclear Weapons Effects (which gives some details in order to calculate in detail the neutron and prompt gamma ray emissions for different weapon designs), Rhode's 1995 book Dark Sun on the 82 ton undeliverable liquid deuterium Ivy-Mike test, Arnold and Pyne's 2000 book (they are the British government's official historians), Britain and the H-Bomb which contains the most detailed data on actual tested H-bomb design details I've seen (the book reprints a detailed summary report on all the 1950s British H-bomb tests, written at the time by AWRE physicist Dr John Corner, which shows how early designs failed and were then modified and re-tested to improve performance), and thr Cox report, http://www.house.gov/coxreport/cont/gncont.html

nige said...

Arnold and Pyne's 2001 book is mainly about British H-bomb designs, but contains some interesting discussion about early American devices. The story goes that when in 1958 Britain and America finally began to exchange H-bomb secrets, the British physicists were shocked to see the very simple and crude-looking long cylindrical fusion stage in the design blueprint for the Mk28 megaton H-bomb. They were stuck a completely different British system, using spherically shaped secondary stages in all the 1957-8 British tests. According to the Cox Report, the final W87 and W88 American devices use spherical or egg-shaped secondary stages, not cylinders like early American bombs.

The key reason why some of this information should be available is for the design of long range cheap, efficient Orion type nuclear explosion propelled spacecraft for exploring the galaxy.

If spacecraft designers knew more about the safety and efficiency of thermonuclear weapon designs, there would be more progress in this area to overturn political obstacles and to abandon the worthless, expensive and inefficient gimmicks like short-ranged chemical rocket technology in favour of the only technology which can really go places.

Anonymous said...

Consider 1954 year devices.

10,000 -megaton device -the Sundial.
1.Document that Hansen cited - Minutes of the Forty-First Meeting of the General Advisory Committee to the USAEC, July 12-15, 1954. Mr.Herken used this version of document .

Full document contain 74 pages.
This version was a greatly reduced :
Document Type: CONFERENCE
Publication Date: 1954 Jul 15
Declassification Status: Sanitized
Document Pages: 0067
Accession Number: NV0073403
Document Number(s): AECGAC41
Originating Research Org.: ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION-GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTE
OpenNet Entry Date: 1994 Aug 26 .
You can download it as PDF at www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/16091554-OR1Oon/16091554.pdf.
Part of content:
Weapons briefings.pp.2-35.
Livermore Briefings.pp.30-42.
Deleted Analysis 30.
Livermore Thermonuclear Plans 32.
Sundial and Deleted 33.
Possible Deleted tests 34.
All deleted.Only on pages 55 GAC they discussed Livermore program.
Actuall quotes were :
Dr.Fisk said that he felt that Committee could endorse small weapon program.He was concerned ,however ,about Dr.Eward Teller’s 10,000 MT gadget and wondered what fraction of the Laboratory’s effort was being expended on deleted .Mr.Whitman had been shocked by thought of 10,000 MT;it would contaminate the earth.Dr.Rabi’s was that talk about this device was an advertising stunt, and not to be taken to seriously.(So Rabi’s reaction was just emotions, this is entirely clear from Teller’s Memories on many other occasions after Oppie’s case). von Neumann reaction was a quite different :”Dr.von Neumann agreed that Laboratory was being by very bad organizational principles ;but functioning fell pretty well in spite of this.He said that presentation have been good”.

New redacted version of document not avaible as PDF-file ,but could be ordered via e-mail to DOD.

Publication Date: 1954 Jul 15
Declassification Status: Sanitized
Document Pages: 0073
Accession Number: NV0411974
Document Number(s): AEC-GAC 41
Originating Research Org.: AEC-GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
OpenNet Entry Date: 2006 Feb 13 .

So highly unlikely that Hansen seen this version.

Second device-GNOMON. GNOMON-deleted from old version.

But on 1000MT Hansen cited doc ( there several versions of doc on opennet,but they decl. in roughly same time.)

Title: STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER THOMAS E MURRAY AT HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY ON FEBRUARY 23, 1956 (DELETED)
Author(s): UNK (AEC-ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THE U.S.)

Document Location: DOE/NV Nuclear Testing Archive, P.O. Box 98521, City: Las Vegas, State: NV, Zip: 89193-8521, Phone:(702)295-0712, Fax:(702)295-1808, Email:cic@nv.doe.gov
Document Type: REPORT
Publication Date: 1955 Nov 23
Declassification Status: Sanitized
Document Pages: 0015
Accession Number: NV0108397
Originating Research Org.: NO DATA AVAILABLE
OpenNet Entry Date: 1994 Aug 27


So ,Hansen take GNOMON from this document.

So there were 2 devices (remember ,Dr.Foster said about 1954) .
10,000MT Sundial (its possible that original name for device was SUN) and 1000 MT Gnomon-efective primary for it.

It may be that in new redacted version of Minutes theirs dimensions and weights given.

Anonymous said...

So ,Hansen falsely described it.

But Herken's description is complete fake.

In some other occasions Hansen also created rubbish:
For example Rhodes and Hansen's description may lead you to think that Hansen have a full copy of Teller's LA-643,On the Development of Thermonuclear Bombs.
Hansen claimed that report have been written in September 1947 and updated in February 1950.
But in fact this is fake.
In reality this report is still SECRET ,its actual description: E. Teller, LA-643, “On the Development of Thermonuclear Bombs: May 7,1948, LASL, 29.
[This Report is Secret-RD].
See Anne Fitzpatrick’PHD - Igniting light elements :The Los Alamos thermonuclear weapon project,1942-1952.LA-13577-T.376pages.
This is beautiful reading, since as she used ALMOST ENTIRELY CLASSIFIED Documents.

Hansen was wrong ,when he said that Teller “hypothesized” 1000mt Alarm Clock in LA-643.

In fact “Teller conceded that delivery of a super by aircraft --at least in 1947 --
would work. He suggested other technological fixes: a boat or submarine
might provide suitable alternatives to aircraft delivery. The Alarm Clock at
this time did not constitute a lighter alternative to the Super: the version
that Teller and Richtmyer had envisioned in 1946 appeared in theory capable
of producing a billion-ton TNT equivalent explosion. It too could not be
transported by air”
This is from this source.So device have have investigated.
I’m believe that in some way Sundial was a redesigned lithiated 1000MT Alarm Clock with separation of fusion stages.
And most likely its weight was 4000 000 pounds,York’s testimony on these hearings also illuminating.

So,in fact technical reports on TN weapons is still highly classified.

And docs. that Hansen obtained not technical,and he obtained only few thousand,not millions ,of course.

Anonymous said...

Part.1.
Also Hansen in 1988 created a lot of rubbish,when he falsely claimed
much Smaller ,absurd yields for a largest US weapons that were build.

He stated 10mt for mk41 instead of actual 25mt,even when he obtained docs about Mk41 and new A he tried to give 10mt fake for mk41.

When he cited 328Minutes of AEC Meeting No. 1221, August 2, 1956,he only cited for A-"On June 24, 1955,
the AEC had received a DOD request for a feasibility study of
a new Class "A" weapon with a maximum weight of 25,000 lbs.
and a 60 MT yield'

But for new B he NOT cited 10,000 lbs and 25Mt.


Old B was a Mk21 -15mt,he and his NRDC friends faked and give yield of never existed clean version for it.

MK36 described as enriched mk21 in Lee Bowen and Stuart Little ,History of AF Atomic Energy programm,five volumes,9 parts.

yield of Mk36 as 20Mt known ... since 1956 U. S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Establishment — Unification of the Armed Services, Hearings, 80th Cong., 1stsess., on S. 758, GPO, Washington, 1947; Universal Military Training, Hearings, 80th Cong., 1st sess., GPO, Washington, 1948; Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., GPO, Washington, 1951; Committee on Foreign Relations, Statements of... John Foster Dulles and Adm. Arthur Radford... on Foreign Policy and Its Relation to Military Programs, Hearings, 83d Cong., 2d sess., GPO, Washington, 1954; Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, Study of Airpower, Hearings, 84th Cong., 2d sess, GPO, Washington, 1956.

Anonymous said...

Part.2.
Yield of Mk41-25Mt,known since 1962,Dr.Foster stated this several times on various hearings.

But main question :What was yield of MK17/24 weapon,10-15,15-25Mt?

No,yield was 40mt.

New A (design study began in 1955) was 60Mt.

New b-25mt.

Old b-15mt.

Weights-new A-25kp,newb-10kp.
old a-42kp,old b-17kp.

Points to support this,Herken's interview with Rabi(1983).
". Rabi’s influence was already subtly evident at Ike’s briefing on Hardtack, where Strauss had justified high-yield H-bombs as necessary to compensate for aiming errors. Whereas Eisenhower in his first term had innocently suggested that it might be possible to confuse the Russians about U.S. capabilities by simply not announcing thermonuclear tests, Ike reminded Strauss on this occasion that a 40-megaton weapon would only cause about half again the damage of a 10-megaton bomb because “the scaling laws apply on a cube route basis...”

This was a new A question,40mt refers to old.However,Herken not understand that says about old A.

minutes of 39th Gac meeting,p.23."
The possibility that 30 megatons could be achieved in Alarm Clock (TX-14)-type device ,employing 95% Li-6 was a impressive'

From 41th GAC minutes stated that mk-17/24 used 95% Li-6.

From Letter dated September 23, 1955 to Lewis L. Strauss,
Chairman, USAEC, from I. I. Rabi, Chairman, GAC

"One question addressed to us was whether
information on the external characteristics
of a thermonuclear weapon (including size,
weight, shape, and center of gravity, but
specifically excluding any details about
the interior) and certain information on
yields, effects, and delivery systems would
reveal to another country "important
information concerning the design or
fabrication of the nuclear components" of
the thermonuclear weapon.
We arrived at the following opinion after
devoting a great deal of discussion to this
difficult question. We believe that the
information cited would not directly reveal
important information concerning the design
and fabrication of the nuclear components
of the weapon.
Nevertheless, we feel that the information,
taken in combination, may give valuable
clues and stimulus and direction to the
development of similar weapons. We are
particularly concerned in this regard with
the thought that revelation of the very
high specific energy release attained in
our weapons (on the order of two megatonsper ton weight) would call attention to the
fact that a radical new technique has been
developed and is being exploited.

So yield was 40Mt,and in AF Atomic Energy program stated that were plans to increase weight to 50,000 pounds and obtain larger yield.

Anonymous said...

And....SUNDIAL have been a LAST device designed by Teller HIMSELF.

Anonymous said...

"The lab was still studying a device called the SUNDIAL, which was to a very-high
yield weapon based upon one of the early ALARM CLOCK designs. The SUNDIAL
would be so large that it could only be transported by ship. Although design of the
SWORDS OF ARMAGEDDON
IV- 54
SUNDIAL was still very much in a preliminary stage, Livermore thought it might be
possible to test the primary of this device – called the GNOMON – during the next Pacific
test series.92 (The GNOMON was reduced to a study program with the assignment
of the XW-27 warhead and bomb to UCRL in the summer of 1955."

This is from new Swords.

As you may seen I'm was a completely right.


GNOMON was a 1000MT device.

The main problem that Hansen's research was a mainly compilation.

And reasons not to build them were not Rabi and GAC.This was a absurd conclusion by Herken and me(however I'm have a huge doubts) because we are not have information,same story with Rhodes 's book,killed by Igniting the light elements.


P.S.Minimal size of the Classical Super device an order of tens gigatons,and in 1970-s trigers for them were designed that have yield-to weight ratio ~40kt/kg-and this information open.Triger also several gigatons but with this ratio. Do you understand this ?

P.P.S.

This is absurd that you reject my comments on you blog.Howver there were emotions in them.

Anonymous said...

Ha,my attacks on Chuck were pointless,he coorrected all things-25Mt for MK41 and only 25Mt,plans were for a clean version in 1958,but were broken in 1959.,19mt for mk36y1,15mt for Mk21,yes and 40mt for Mk17/24 -so stupid sites you cited now dead,but he not corrected you Radiation mirror speculation,but he provided only a first data on warheads,like 35Mt Titan 2 warhead,the main point -Clean FRAUD.,so clean bombs were fake,ALL strikes planned against USSr in 1950-s were ground bursts,you dismissing of this is fake.

Fallout area mission-was a special mission.

in one doc.exist a chart about this.-on gorizontal axis number of delivered MK36Y1(all ground bursts),on vertical axis -radiation deaths after H+60 days.

100 bombs-(1300MT fission yield)-95 million deaths.(out of total population-210 millions).
200 bombs(2600 MT fission yield)-135 million deaths.
350 bombs(4550 MT fission yield)-165 million deaths.
500 bombs-180 million deaths.
assume august 1957(soviet first TN bomb that entered stockpile tested in oct.1957).

US have at least 522 MK36Y1.-so to cause 165 million deaths needed with 0.85 probability of delivery-412 bombs and 206 B-52.

remaining 110 bombs would be used on China and with same fallout density (assuming 700 million population) to cause 305 million deaths.

Anonymous said...

And some last remarks:

Report LA-643 have a several iterations,one of them have been for 1950,Hansen have a greatly sanitized 1950 version.




Hansen seen prior to edition of first Swords a second edited version of GAC 41 Minutes and there only GNOMON in content given and when Fisk asked on them they given.

GNOMON not given in Murray's 23 feb.1956 statement before AEC,he only gave as example -simply stating its yield to show that weapons much larger than 60MT are possible.

Anonymous said...

There some data existed on this Soviet 20-megaton warhead.

Its designation -A604G.Tsar Bomb designation -A620N.A-probably stands for Arzamas ,N-probably experimental,G-probably prime.
RDS-220 -there not existed such designation.-sites are wrong.


In 1956 Chelyabinsk-70 designed a 30-megaton bomb ( scaled -up in 10 times RDS-37 ) its have designation RDS-202.Special bomber was built Tu-95-202 (nicknamed Tu-95v,means a H-Bomb).RDS-202 weight was 40 tons with a ballistic case,in 1957-1958 this project was abandoned.At this time this bomb have been considered as weapon. But since 1960 Soviets not considered bombers as reliable weapons and arm them with a such yields-theirs main were directed on ICBMs.A620N was built as experimental device for a intimidation,but its scaled -down versions 40 and 50mt were considered as missile warheads.

A620N weight was around 20 tonnes.

its primary was a 860kt 2-stage device named 'device49' it was tested 23 feb.1958-it was ancestor of the first mass-produced Soviet tn weapons.

R-12/14/16/9A -warheads,R-13 and Kh-20 warhead +300kt tactical bomb.

"device 49" later was tested in a clan version at 440kt yield.-20 october 1958-so Soviets also considered clean devices.

So in the Tsar bomb primary gives only around 440kt from fission.

R-36 missile heavy RV(8f675) weight was 4 560 kg (payload was 5 825 kg-other part were penetration aids and etc. contrary to CIA estimates),so warhead weight was around 3600 kg,its boosted primary was no larger than 68kt.

Anonymous said...

Altough,Cia by around 30%overstimated Soviet megatons by ,in 1973 Soviets have around 12,000Mt,they greatlyunderstimated number of battlefield warheads-33,000 in 1985.But there 2 things that West never considerd,i'm previously not believed in this,but when i'm had seen actual Soviet documents i'm was scared to death:

1.Largest bioweapon program in the world ,this is after 1972.
...

2.Dead hand...

If USSR not evaporated in 1991 ,by 1995 they would arm a fraction of ICBMs with such things as super-plague ....

It seems for me that nukes not so bad things compared to this.

Anonymous said...

Please ask Hoower if you not believe me.Holloway may also help.


So,as you may seen in fact Commie planned conquest of Europe .

Anonymous said...

At the begining....

This is first comment to remove (censored) by histrorians .


Mk -41 warhead weight was 9300 pounds ,lenght-120 inches,diameter-45 inches.

Warhead have a 3 applications :

NAVAHO

Hustler's pod
NGB.

So,anecdote-this weapon was not a 3-stage,but 2-stage,tested in a clean version in Poplar. This why Taylor stated 6kt/kg ratio.

Actualy things much more complicated ,contrary to believs and Hansen 's Swords only very -very fragmental compilation .
Compare 15,000 and 7,000,000.

Source -Sandia's history of the MK 41-0.

P.S.Y2 for a Mk-41 was a Hansen's private contribution,fruit of his imagination,as well all things in his 1988 year falsebook and NRDC trash.

Anonymous said...

Are you insisting that a nuclear explosion will never be able to vaporize human bodies? So what kind of nuclear explosion that can instantly vaporize anything within the ground zero?

nige said...

Hiroshima's ground zero was 600 metres under explosion because it was an AIR BURST at 600 metres height, not a surface burst.

People in the open at ground zero received surface burns on the side facing ground zero: the thermal exposure at ground zero (600 metres) from a 16 kt Hiroshima detonation with 1/3rd thermal radiation yield (ignoring atmospheric attenuation) by the inverse square law is equal to {16 (1/3) x 10^12 calories}/(4*Pi*600^2) = 1.28 x 10^6 calories/m^2 or 118 cal/cm^2.

Now, 1 cal is the temperature needed to raise the temperature of 1 gram (1 cm^3) of water (humans are 70% water) by 1 degree centigrade or 1 K, from 15 to 16 C. For humans, to reach vaporization you need to go from 37 to 100 C. If 118 cal/cm^2 is distributed in the top 1 cm thickness of flesh (with no loss due to heat reflection, ablation of the top 1 mm layer, and other damage-limiting processes) then that top 1 cm layer could potentially gain about 118 C in temperature, reaching 155 C (37 C body temperature + 118 C = 115 C), IGNORING the change of state from water to steam when 100 C is passed.

However, you need a massive amount of energy (enthalpy of vaporization, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enthalpy_of_vaporization ) to drive water from 99 C to 100 C, because water molecules have strong bonds between them which need to be broken when water turns to steam.

"... the molecules in liquid water are held together by relatively strong hydrogen bonds, and its enthalpy of vaporization, 40.65 kJ/mol [note that 1 cal = 4.186 J, while 1 mole consists of 6.022 x 10^23 molecules of water per 18 grams of water], is more than five times the energy required to heat the same quantity of water from 0 °C to 100 °C."

- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enthalpy_of_vaporization

So the Hiroshima bomb did NOT deliver enough heat flash energy at GROUND ZERO to even vaporize a layer of water 1 cm thick. If you look at the data on the scorching depths of wood by the thermal flash at the 1955 Operation Teapot tests (Kyle P. Laughlin, Thermal Ignition and Response of Materials, Report to the Test Director, Operation TEAPOT, Nevada Test Site, February-May 1955, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, weapon test report WT-1198, December 1957, AD0611227), less than 1 mm of the surface of the wood was removed even by 50 cal/cm^2 or more: additional energy did not increase the depth of charring (the extra energy just went into ablating the top 1 mm more forcefully into a smoke cloud, which then absorbed the remainder of the heat flash and kept the heat absorbed well away from the underlying wood). The same applies at Hiroshima, where the moisture content of skin was 70% (much higher than wood, which was easier to heat, due to less water content; WATER HAS THE HIGHEST SPECIFIC HEAT CAPACITY OF ANY COMMON MATERIAL ON THE PLANET).

The only reason that the top 0.1 mm of roof tile surfaces bubbled at ground zero in Hiroshima was the failure of the 118 cal/cm^2 to penetrate more deeply than 0.1 mm. The tiny depth of the surface which absorbed the energy ensured that the temperature rise was massive, over 2000 C in that tiny 0.1 mm tile surface. Nobody was instantly killed by thermal radiation outside; the nuclear radiation was lethal.
Surface 1 mm

Anonymous said...

I see. Then what kind of atomic explosion that can instantly vaporize human bodies, including their bones teeth, until there will be nothing remains?

Anonymous said...

Okay one more question, what happen to human bodies if they are directly hit at the centre of the ground zero of Little Boy explosion? Can the bodies vaporize until there are not even single remains leave?

nige said...

As I said, even ignoring atmospheric attenuation you get just over 100 cal/cm^2, and even Dr Herman Pearse (Professor of Surgery, Rochester University) who wrote the original panic-mongering thermal burns disaster paper on Hiroshima in the New England Journal of Medicine, began to grasp that this was survivable and went to Eniwetok Atoll in 1951 to expose animals to the 47 kt boosted Easy test and the 225 kt thermonuclear George test:

"Finally, we wanted to know how we could protect against these burns. ... I didn't care what happened to the fabrics; I wanted to know what happened to the man under the fabric. So we conceived this idea, that the important factor in studying clothing was what happened under the clothing; how it shielded the animal with cloth of different composition, weight, texture, weave, and color. We have made a great many studies in tyhe laboratory and in the field on this problem of the protective effect of clothing. ... If you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers, you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed by some other thing. Under 6 layers we got about 50 percent first degree burns at 107 calories/cm^2."

- Dr Herman Elwyn Pearse, Professor of Surgery at the University of Rochester, "Biomedical Effects of Thermal Radiation", page 143 (published in the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration's book, "Cue for Survival, A.E.C. Nevada Test Site, May 3, 1955", pages 140-144).

This is for yields similar to Hiroshima (for modern larger nuclear weapons, even more heat is needed for a burn, because it is spread out longer in time and more heat is lost by diffusion, and of course people have longer to take evasive "duck and cover" countermeasures to get into a shadow). Therefore, if the bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima in cold weather, even at ground zero the skin under clothing would not be burned worse than 1st degree burns, mere sunburn. The outer clothing if dark in colour would be smoked to ignition on surfaces directly facing the fireball, but ignited clothing was easily rolled out or beaten out in Hiroshima. It is NOT the same as peacetime clothing burn accidents where people get their clothes soaked in gasoline before ignition!

Sure, if you ground burst a nuclear bomb on a packed beach where people are not wearing clothes, those VERY near the bomb will be quickly vaporized and pulverized by the great heat of the radiating shock wave near ground zero (a blast effect, not a thermal radiation effec), just as they would be in a CONVENTIONAL explosion. What people forget here is that in WWII conventional bombs of up to 10 tons were dropped, and the cube-root blast scaling law applies to this hot blast wave. Hence 10 kilotons blast yield in a Hiroshima or Nagasaki burst has just 10 times the radius of destruction from the WWII conventional bomb: (10,000/10)^{1/3} = 10. Big deal. All war is destructive, and nuclear bombs are a disproportionately expensive way of achieving results which could be had more cheaply from conventional weapons; which explains the LYING since Hiroshima in order to use nuclear weapons to deter WWIII instead of conscripting a massive army. On balance, the risk of WWIII is bigger with the massive arms and armies of conventional warfare, than nuclear weapons. This worked well in the Cold War for the West, but exaggerations are dangerous in encouraging terrorists and in making civil defence appear hopeless, when it is not hopeless unless you're near the crater.

Glasstone and Dolan, “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” 1977, paras 12.14, 12.17, 12.22, pp. 545-7:

“The high incidence of flash burns caused by thermal radiation among both fatalities and survivors in Japan was undoubtedly related to the light and scanty clothing being worn, because of the warm summer weather ... If there had been an appreciable cloud cover or haze below the burst point, the thermal radiation would have been attenuated somewhat and the frequency of flash burns would have been much less. Had the weather been cold, fewer people would have been outdoors and they would have been wearing more extensive clothing. Both the number of people and individual skin areas exposed to thermal radiation would then have been greatly reduced, and there would have been fewer casualties from flash burns. ... The death rate in Japan was greatest among individuals who were in the open at the time of the explosions; it was less for persons in residential (wood-frame and plaster) structures and least of all for those in concrete buildings. These facts emphasize the influence of circumstances of exposure on the casualties produced by a nuclear weapon and indicate that shielding of some type can be an important factor in survival. ... Had they been forewarned and knowledgeable about areas of relative hazard and safety, there would probably have been fewer casualties even in structures that were badly damaged.”








Above: the firestorm in Hiroshima merely blocked out sunshine for 25 minutes, hence disproving ‘Nuclear Winter’ polemical deceptions; furthermore, unlike Hiroshima modern cities that are nuclear targets simply do not contain thousands of charcoal braziers in bamboo and paper screen filled wooden houses with black colored air-raid black out curtains in their windows, and thermal shadowing prevents most modern city buildings from being ignited so there can be no firestorm now, let alone any climate change due to nuclear weapons! (Source: Figure 6 (3H) of the Report of the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan, Volume 1, Office of the Air Surgeon, report NP-3036, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.)



Above: eighteen people visiting Hiroshima survived and took trains home to Nagasaki and then survived the second explosion. Nine survivors of Hiroshima who travelled to Nagasaki avoided blasted glass and flying debris at the second nuclear explosion because they knew that the blast effect (breaking windows and blasting glass fragments and other debris horizontally) was slightly delayed after the flash (like thunder after lightning), so they had time to literally duck and cover from part of the heat flash and horizontally flying glass and debris. Robert Trumbull - the New York Times Pacific and Asia war correspondent, 1941-79 who had been in Iwo Jima - documented the facts in his 1957 book Nine Who Survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Personal Experiences of Nine Men who Lived Through Both Atomic Bombings. Here are their experiences and ages on 9 August 1945:

Kenshi Hirata, 26, accountant at Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company, Hiroshima (Trumbull pp. 25, 61, and 119): “‘through an open window what looked like a golden lightning flash ... had blown up out of the earth. The weird light was everywhere. I immediately thought of an air-raid, and hurled myself prostrate in the passage.’ Hirata’s quick action probably saved him serious injury, if not his life. ... Because it was the middle of summer, which is exceptionally hot in southern Japan, most of the people of Hiroshima were very thinly clad that morning, so they had less than ordinary protection against burns, Hirata observed. ... [Back in Nagasaki] ‘I shouted to my aged father ... ‘Lie face downward!’ In the immediate moment I was expecting that terrific explosion blast and roar.’ ... Kenshi and his father were unharmed. ‘But in two or three minutes ... I saw people running out of their houses, holding their hands over injuries on their heads, faces, and bodies. Most of these were wounds caused by flying pieces of glass.”

Tsutomu Yamaguchi, 29, Mitsubishi ship designer who died in 2010, aged 93 (Trumbull pp. 28 and 109): “‘Suddenly there was a flash like the lighting of a huge magnesium flare,’ Yamaguchi recalls. The young ship designer was so well drilled in air-raid precaution techniques that he reacted automatically. He flung his hands to his head, covering his eyes with his fingers and stopping his ears with his two thumbs. Simultaneously he dropped to the ground, face down. ... ‘As I prostrated myself, there came a terrific explosion’ ... [The left side of his face and arm facing the fireball were burned, and he returned to Nagasaki, experiencing the second nuclear explosion on the sixth-floor of the headquarters office of Mitsubishi.] Spelling out the danger of flying glass, he urged them to keep windows open during an air-raid alert, and at the instant of the flash to seize at once upon any shelter available ... the second A-bomb confirmed young Yamaguchi’s words, exploding in a huge ball of fire about a mile away. Yamaguchi’s lecture ... was not lost upon his colleagues. With the young designer’s words still fresh in their minds, they leaped for the cover of desks and tables. ‘As a result,’ said Yamaguchi, ‘my section staff suffered the least in that building. In other sections there was a heavy toll of serious injuries from flying glass’.”

Shigeyoshi Morimoto, 46, maker of kites for air defense of Japanese ships, used his Hiroshima experience to take cover in Nagasaki after seeing the flash, before the windows were blasted in. Tsuitaro Doi, 47, was on his Hiroshima hotel bed, a thin floor mattress called a “futon” when he saw the explosion flash (Trumbull pages 42 and 106-7): “I quickly rolled over and covered my head with the futon ... The floor of the room and my futon were covered with tiny bits of shattered glass. I noticed that I had a slight cut on one arm, and another on the leg, where I wasn’t covered. ... [He returned home to Nagasaki] “Doi was telling his wife in detail about the bomb. ‘If you ever see that flash,’ he said, ‘immediately prostrate yourself on the floor, or the ground if you are outside. ...’ As he was saying these words, the windows lighted as if giant searchlights had been turned directly into the house. ... Mrs Doi startled, jumped to her feet impulsively and turned to run out of the house. Doi grabbed her and pulled her and the baby down as the blast wave shattered all the glass in the little cottage and ripped off the wood and paper sliding doors. As the flimsy house steadied Doi opened his eyes, and saw that the interior of the room was a wreck. But neither he nor his wife nor the baby was hurt.”

Shinji Kinoshita, 50, was hit by falling roof slabs in a Hiroshima warehouse but returned home to Nagasaki and was just outside the door of his family home when the bomb fell (Trumbull p105): “he was momentarily blinded by a flash that seemed to cover the sky. Like the other survivors of the Hiroshima attack, Kinoshita realized at once what the strange, blinding light meant, and reacted without a second’s hesitation. He threw himself face first on the ground, at the same time shouting into the house, ‘Cover yourself with futons!’”

Masao Komatsu, 40, was hit by falling beam in a Hiroshima warehouse and was on board a train in Nagasaki when the bomb fell (Trumbull, p101): “the interior of the coach was bathed in a stark, white light. Komatsu immediately dived for the floor. ‘Get down!’ he screamed at the other passengers. Some recovered sufficiently from the daze of the blinding light to react promptly to his warning. Seconds later came the deafening crack of the blast, and a shock wave that splintered all the windows on both sides of the train. The passengers who had not dived under the seats were slashed mercilessly from waist to head by glass flying at bullet speed.”

Takejiro Nishioka, 55, publisher of Nagasaki’s leading newspaper in 1945 who became Governor of the Nagasaki Prefecture in 1957. In Hiroshima on business on 6 August 1945, he survived the first nuclear explosion and noted the delay of the blast wave after the visible flash. When he returned to Nagasaki he was not allowed to publish the facts, and only survived by diving into an air raid shelter when he saw the flash after a single B-29 appeared over the city. He explained (Trumbull, p92):

“I had observed in Hiroshima that when the flash came, there would be a few seconds before it was followed by the blast wave ... I have often bitterly regretted the law that gagged me as a newspaperman, and forced me to confine my communications to the governor’s ear alone.”

Japan only permitted civil defense advice against nuclear attack to be published after the second nuclear attack on Nagasaki, which was too late. Even at ground zero, the blast wave was delayed after the first flash because of the height of burst, so quick reactions could limit exposure to flying glass. Proof of the efficiency of duck and cover advice against the blast wind and flying debris was given by Nagasaki’s police chief Mizuguchi, who had been told Nishioka’s advice by the Nagasaki governor and had passed it to his first-grade middle school student son, who was with three friends in Daikoku-Machi street, Nagasaki, when the flash occurred (Trumbull pp. 114-5):

“The police chief’s son remembered his father’s warning at once. Hauling his friend with him by the hand, he dashed for a shelter on the pavement ... The two boys in the shelter were saved; the other two, who stayed on the street, seemed to vanish ... Mizuguchi’s wife, at the same moment, happened to be standing just outside their house, under the eves, with a baby in her arms. The instant she saw the flash, she recalled her husband’s words of the night before and rushed back into the house. She opened a closet and, with the baby still in her arms, crowded inside and pulled shut the sliding door. ... The room, and the area outside the house, was covered with innumerable sharp, pointed slivers of shattered glass. Clearly, she had escaped serious injury by shutting herself in the closet. ...

“Nishioka was bitterly upbraided by Hiromasa Nakamura, chief of the foreign affairs sections of the Nagasaki Prefectural Office, for not briefing other government officials on the happenings at Hiroshima and the efficacy of bomb shelters. ... ‘I could only tell him that I was indeed anxious to tell everyone in Nagasaki what I had learned, but that if I had done so, I would have been liable for violation of the law against spreading ‘wild rumors’, and could have been arrested and convicted.”

Akira Iwanaga (25, engineer at Mitsubishi ship yard, a friend and colleague of Yamaguchi). After surviving at Hiroshima, he arrived in Nagasaki just as the bomb exploded, aboard the same train as another double-survivor, Masao Komatsu (Trumbull p101). Sakajiro Mishima, 36, dockside worker at Mitsubishi ship yard, also survived both nuclear explosions. Yamaguchi’s friend Kuniyoshi Sato, along with Masako Suga and her baby boy and Hiroshi Shibuta were all also double-survivors of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Another double-survivor is Mrs Kazuko Sadamaru (aged 20 in 1945), who was interviewed aged 80 in 2005 in The Observer (London, Sunday 24 July 2005). She was a nurse in a Nagasaki’s Ohmura Naval Hospital but on 5 August 1945 had to accompany a soldier to Hiroshima by train, where she survived and returned to Nagasaki before the second bomb:

‘“I never wanted to speak out about my experience. I haven’t published anything or talked to anyone because I didn’t want anyone to know. I only became a nurse because I wanted to devote myself to patients and the country. I never dreamt Japan would lose the war. I worked and worked believing Japan would win. I cannot forget the events on 6 and 9 August 1945. I saw the flashes and the mushroom clouds of both A-bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So many were exposed to the A-bomb but I am one of the few people who have experienced the two bombs, and still I am in good health. It was fate that I was there, but I had good luck in that I survived both bombs.” Despite being close to both bombs, she suffered only a temporary abnormal white blood cell count and loss of hair.”’


“No statistically significant increase in major birth defects or other untoward pregnancy outcomes was seen among children of survivors. ... The incidence of major birth defects (594 cases or 0.91%) among the 65,431 registered pregnancy terminations for which parents were not biologically related accords well with a large series of contemporary Japanese births at the Tokyo Red Cross Maternity Hospital, where radiation exposure was not involved and overall malformation frequency was 0.92%. No untoward outcome showed any relation to parental radiation dose or exposure. ... Since many birth defects, especially congenital heart disease, are not detected in the neonatal period, repeat examinations were conducted at age eight to ten months. Among the 18,876 children re-examined at that age, 378 had one or more major birth defect (2.00%), compared with 0.97% within two weeks of birth. Again, there was no evidence of relationships to radiation dose.”

– RERF, Birth defects among the children of atomic-bomb survivors (Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear weapons explosion irradiated survivors).


The Hiroshima-Nagasaki nuclear attacks RERF life-span study (LSS) from 1950 to 2000 for leukemia deaths and from 1958 to 1998 for solid cancer occurrence showed that for 49,204 survivors in the leukemia study group, there were an excess of 94 leukemia deaths attributed to radiation, risk of 94/49,204 or 0.191% (above the natural number of cancers in the unexposed control group), and an excess of 848 solid (tumour) cancer deaths in 44,635 survivors, a risk of 848/44,635 or 1.90%. In each case, the excess radiation cancer risk was smaller than the natural risk of 0.22% for leukemia and 15.69% for solid (tumour) cancer deaths. It is significant that the natural cancer death risk was higher than the radiation cancer death risk for both leukemia and solid tumours unless the dose exceeded about 1 Gray (100 R or 100 cGy). E.g., 48% of leukemia deaths from doses of 10-100 R were due to radiation and 52% were natural (a bigger risk than radiation). Likewise, only 16% of solid tumour cancer deaths for doses of 10-100 R were due to radiation (84% were natural):



“If all residents in the hazardous fallout region adopt a shelter-in-place strategy, the total number of acute radiation casualties is estimated to be ~ 3,600, as compared to ~ 100,000 casualties if all are outdoors and unsheltered. Some further reductions in casualties can be realized if those in the poorest shelters transit to better shelters soon after the detonation.”

– Larry D. Brandt and Ann S. Yoshimura, Analysis of Sheltering and Evacuation Strategies for a Chicago Nuclear Detonation Scenario, Sandia National Laboratories, Report SAND2011-6720, August 2011, page 5.
(PDF here.)

“We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a ‘radius’ for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.”

– R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, and B. Whitlock, Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Detonations in Urban Environments, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-TR-231593, June 2007, page 11.
(PDF here.)

“Reliance on The Effects of Nuclear Weapons for valid conclusions has its shortcomings. For example, in the 1954 test series in the Pacific, I was on the deck of the YAG-39 which was on station at about twenty miles from the shot point of a detonation with a yield near ten megatons. The thermal flash did not produce the predicted second degree burn on the back of my neck or indeed any discomfort at all.”

- Dr Carl F. Miller, Dialogue, Scientist and Citizen, vol. 8, combined issues 4-5 (February-March 1966), page 17.


“Models developed at Applied Research Associates (ARA) and Los Alamos National Laboratory have shown similar reductions in injuries from the initial radiation [J.T. Goorley, Nuclear Weapon Effects for Urban Consequences, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR 09-00703 and LA-UR-10-01029] ... Like the thermal analysis, these studies indicate that the ambient radiation levels from a low-yield, ground-level nuclear detonation in an urban environment could be significantly reduced.”

– Brooke Buddemeier, “Reducing the Consequences of a Nuclear Detonation: Recent Research”, The bridge (ISSN 0737-6278, National Academy of Engineering), Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer 2010, pp. 28–38 (quotation from page 30).


After studying hundreds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, Dr. Irving L. Janis reported that the bright flash arriving at light speed ahead of the blast wave allowed them to take evasive action in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a fact ignored in computer models of blast casualties (Psychological Effects of Atomic Bombing, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Publication No. L54-134, 14 May 1954, page 4):

“A substantial proportion of the survivors reacted automatically to the brilliant flash of the A-bomb as a danger signal, even though they knew nothing about the existence of atomic weapons at that time. Some who were not located near ground zero took prompt action – such as falling to a prone position – which minimized exposure to the blast and to the secondary heat waves. In many other cases, however, the opportunity to minimize the danger was missed because the individual remained fixed or because the action which was taken proved to be inappropriate.”


Dr G. Andrew Mickley explains how workers who returned to Nagasaki after surviving at Hiroshima were able to use their experience to survive the second nuclear explosion, and to help others to prepare, in his paper “Psychological Factors in Nuclear Warfare”, Chapter 8 in Textbook of Military Medicine; Part I, Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty; Volume 2: Medical Consequences of Nuclear Warfare, U.S. Army, 1989, pp. 184-5:

“The benefits of training are confirmed by the remarkable experiences of nine persons who survived the Hiroshima bombing and then fled to Nagasaki in time for the second atomic bomb. They remembered very well what they had done that allowed them to live, and they quickly instructed others in Nagasaki: “Yamaguchi's lecture on A-bomb precautions, he pointed out later, was not lost upon his colleagues. With the young designer's words still fresh in their minds [on 9 August 1945, in Nagasaki] they leaped for the cover of desks and tables. “As a result,” said Yamaguchi, “my section staff suffered the least in that building. In other sections there was a heavy toll of serious injuries from flying glass.” (Quoted from Robert Trumbull, Nine who survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki, New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1957.)”


Robert Trumbull’s Nine who survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki (E. P. Dutton and Co., N.Y., 1957) interviewed nine of the sixteen who survived both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear explosions (travelling to homes in Nagasaki immediately by train after surviving at Hiroshima). The double-survivor Takejira Nishioka (a newspaper publisher) observed in Hiroshima that the blast wave was delayed after the flash, and, being friends with the Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture, tried (but failed) to get permission to send out a warning prior to the Nagasaki nuclear attack that people can avoid being knocked down or hit by horizontally-blasted window glass and debris if they duck and cover on seeing the very bright visible flash. Duck and cover also provides shielding from thermal and nuclear radiation, because it increases the fraction of the free-field air radiation dose which is attenuated through obstructions before reaching a person, as was known in 1949 (HO 225/14, The advantage of lying prone in reducing the dose of gamma rays from an airburst atomic bomb).

The advice was experimentally verified in the 37 kt Plumbbob-Priscilla nuclear test of 1957, where a standing dummy and a lying dummy were actually filmed being hit by a 5.3 psi peak overpressure blast wave. The lying dummy was completely unmoved, but the standing dummy was accelerated to 21 ft/s in just 0.5 seconds, and blasted a distance of 22 feet. However, in humans the feet rotate forward (because the centre of the body mass is above mid-height) so head-first impacts at the maximum velocity are prevented by the laws of physics, and the only risk to the head is from the vertical fall, and even this is delayed for the blast duration, giving at least 0.5 second of extra time to use the arms to protect the head. Even in the 43.7 kt Plumbbob-Smoky nuclear test where the dummies were in a “blast precursor” desert sandstorm with a very much high dynamic pressure, the lying dummy was only blown half the distance of the standing one. In 1964, the 0.5 kt Snowball explosion confirmed the data and showed that goats are a proxy for humans in translation experiments (DASA-1859). Experiments prove that 77% (23/30) of goats survived a blast which gave them a velocity of 51-78 ft/sec and a decelerative tumbling displacement of 59-151 ft (I. G. Bowen, D. R. Richmond and C. S. White, Translational Effects of Blast Waves, “Minutes of the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program, Panel N-1, Sub-group N, 14-16 March 1963”, Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research, 11 March 1963, page 57). In a built-up area, most people will never even reach the peak velocity observed in desert tests, because they will be stopped by obstructions after typically 10 ft, before they have even been accelerated to the optimum velocity. Therefore, any injury will be less serious, due to the smaller velocity at the time of impact.

On 27 September 1956 dummy men were exposed to the 15 kt Buffalo-1 nuclear test at Maralinga (similar yield to Hiroshima). Dummies standing facing the burst were blown ~0.35ppsi2 feet (p = peak overpressure, psi). But the dummies lying facing radially towards or away from ground zero were only blown 10% of this distance, because of (1) the smaller area exposed to the blast wind and dust, and (2) the greater area in contact with the ground, providing frictional resistance against drag. References: W. J. H. Butterfield, E. G. Hardy and E. R. Drake Seager, The effects of blast on dummy men exposed in the open, Operation Buffalo, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, report AWRE-T2/59, 1959 National Archives documents DEFE 16/165, A. R. F. Martin, The effects of blast on dummies and scout cars, Operation Antler, report AWRE-T6/59, ES 5/270, 1959, and the research on the reduced blast displacement of lying dummies exposed to large conventional explosions: DASA 2710.

George Monbiot, The Guardian, Tuesday 5 April 2011: “The unpalatable truth is that the anti-nuclear lobby has misled us all: I’ve discovered that when the facts don’t suit them, the movement resorts to the follies of cover-up they usually denounce. ... Dr Caldicott is the world’s foremost anti-nuclear campaigner. ... Caldicott’s response ... a report by the US National Academy of Sciences, which she urged me to read. I have now done so – all 423 pages. It ... strongly contradicts her claims ... For the last 25 years anti-nuclear campaigners have been racking up the figures for deaths and diseases caused by the Chernobyl disaster, and parading deformed babies like a medieval circus. They now claim 985,000 people have been killed ... there have been 6,848 cases of [treatable] thyroid cancer among young children – arising ‘almost entirely’ from the Soviet Union’s failure to prevent people from drinking milk contaminated with iodine 131 [which has a half life of only 8 days, so cattle can be taken out of fields and given winter feed while it decays, or else the milk can be dry powdered or used to make cheese, or even frozen; if people must drink contaminated milk, they can block iodine-131 uptake by daily 130 mg potassium iodate tablets, which nuclear industries stock for emergency distribution].”

Weapons effects exaggerations against civil defense are escalated by successive journalists and editors, who increase circulation against ever increasing noise levels from rival journals by publishing lying scare mongering which is “justified” by the allegedly moralistic pseudo-ethical assumption that “the ends justify the means”. Environmentalists who worship subjective, fashionable groupthink like a religion scream and conflate natural cancers with the effects of radiation. Like a Gordian Knot, any attempt to pull apart this scam “orthodoxy” just hardens the dogma, because its proponents do not believe in it on the basis of hard objective science, but just as an emotional, ethical, moralistic piece of patronising high-horse politics. As Glasstone pointed out in the 1950 Effects of Atomic Weapons, it is like the gas effects fear-mongering exaggerations propaganda before WWII (which claimed that gas would destroy civilization and lied that there was no defense).

“The unsuspecting layman naturally swallows it whole ... but they do want to get their manuscript accepted for the feature page of the Daily Drivel or the Weekly Wail. In order to do that, they must pile on the horrors thick.” – James Kendall, Breathe Freely!, quoted by Fair (ADA488135, linked here).

The 1935 effectively pro-Nazi “pacifist” conspiracy between Labour and Conservatives to pander to popular British pro-disarmament pacifist media sentiments



“There is no security in armaments and we shall be no party to piling them up.”



– Labour Party Leader of the Opposition Clement Attlee, 1935 (two years after Hitler took power and began rearming Germany; quotation from Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers, 1967). Troubled by the failure of unilateral disarmament to save millions of lives in WWII, Attlee 12 years later as Prime Minister ordered the stockpiling of the first British nuclear weapons to deter WWIII from starting.



“Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm ... I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain.”



– Conservative Prime Minister Stanley “the bomber will always get through” Baldwin, who won the 1935 general election with a large majority by lying to get votes for popular pacifism, denying Winston Churchill’s unpopular “warmongering” claims that Hitler was rearming Germany and must be deterred effectively (speech in House of Commons, 12 November 1936). (Some pro-Baldwin historians – not Winston Churchill – claim Baldwin was referring to an earlier non-existing election than 1935, but this makes no difference to the lying.)



An early example of “ends justify the means” exaggeration of weapons effects is Will Irwin’s 1921 book, The Next War, exaggerating gas war into the end of civilization to “justify” 1920s disarmament. This was followed by a chorus of others, before appeasers like Chamberlain stepped in to “guarantee peace in our time” by shaking Hitler’s hand (while Britain only rearmed at a fraction of the rate of Germany, so as “not to risk another war”). Instead, this increased the danger of war:

“These weapons often appear mysterious and sinister to the general public. I think that much of the responsibility for this feeling falls on our government which, by placing great restriction on the public discussion of these weapons by military officers, has fostered this miasma of ignorance. ... the government perpetuates the mysteriousness of these weapons by its restrictions. Until I retired as Commanding General, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Research and Development Command, I was under such restrictions. ... An uninformed public will not support urgently needed research and development on these weapons, nor will it be prepared psychologically for their use against us. ... Only knowledge of these weapons will make them less terrifying.

“In 1959, after hearings on research in CBR (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare), the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the U.S. House of Representatives stated that. ‘There is an urgent need for greater public understanding of the dangers and uses of CBR if proper support is to be given to our defenses and countermeasures’. ... The attitude of our government not only prevents the public from learning of these weapons: it is also greatly responsible for the failure of our military personnel to learn about them. ... The military, in our country, are not a caste apart, but simply an extension of the civilian populace.”

- Brigadier General J.H. Rothschild, Tomorrow’s Weapons, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1964, pp. xi-xiii.

Rothschild explains on page 1 that his June 1959 Harper’s Magazine article arguing for greater defense against chemical and biological weapons was opposed by letters of protest “against war itself”. He then explains on page 2 that chemical and biological weapons are not uniquely invisible. Bullets are also invisible while flying through the air. On page 3 he adds that in WWI only 2% of gassed American Expeditionary Force casualties died, compared to 25.8% of non-gas casualties, adding: “Exposed to one of the nerve gases, available since World War II, the casualty will either die or recover completely. Though a person under the effects of the nerve gases looks as though he is suffering greatly, men who have been accidentally exposed to them, and have recovered, say that they do not remember suffering at all. This is at great variance with the experience of casualties resulting from bullets, shell fragments, flame throwers, and land mines.”

Matthew Meselson, reviewing Rothschild’s book using sophistry on page 35 of the October 1964 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, fell into a false argument, claiming that the use of chemical weapons in WWII would have caused them to be used in the Korean War with “additional casualties.” In fact, the use of chemical weapons in WWI did not cause them to be used in WWII, and the use of nuclear weapons in WWII did not cause them to be used during the Cold War. Furthermore, because America kept to “conventional” weapons during the Korean War, it had to drop 635,000 tons of explosives and napalm bombs on Korea, more than in the entire Pacific theatre during WWII, ruining Korea’s cities, with immense casualties and suffering. Escalating to demoralise the enemy, as in August 1945, may stop wars and so stop further physical use of the feared weapon.

Biologist J. B. S. Haldane summarised the psychology of denial and duplicity in claiming gas warfare “unthinkable” in his 1925 book Callinicus: “First are a number of out-and-out Pacifists, who object to all war, and apparently hope to make it more difficult ... With them are associated a group of sentimentalists who appear to me definitely to be the Scribes and Pharisees of our age. ... They salve their consciences for such behaviour by attacking, in the name of their God or their ideals, every novelty ... In particular they are distinguished by a ferocious opposition to, and contempt for, any attempt at the solution of human problems by honest and simple intellectual effort.”

Attacks on civil defense are akin to attacking home fire insurance, hospitals, ambulances, seatbelts, lifeboats, and other damage reducing precautions on the false allegation that they deflect attention from utopian accident prevention, or that they are “inefficient” and “the survivors would envy the dead”. The “false sense of security” and “recklessness” historically is shown to occur not with civil defense, but with a lack of civil defense, leading to either appeasement or a maximum amount of damage, escalating the problems.

“Is it really necessary for peace on this planet that an increasing number of governments have the power to destroy the lives of millions of Americans on short notice? Do the opponents of civil defense not see that such power also provides a temptation to use it, at least for blackmail? Mr Margolis points repeatedly and emphatically to the public apathy with regard to civil defense. ... But, in any case, if history is any guide, public apathy toward a measure would in no way prove the undesirability thereof.”

- Dr Eugene P. Wigner, “Civil Defense: Wigner on Project Harbor”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1966, pp. 21-22 (quotation on page 22).

Firestorm impossibility due to skyscraper thermal flash shadowing in modern cities (urban targets)

President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009:

“In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. ... Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.”



Dr Clayton S. White, M.D., “Biological Effects of Blast,” report DASA-1271, 1961, pp. 32-36:

“The area of complete destruction at Hiroshima [the area of the firestorm which developed to a maximum intensity 2-3 hours after the explosion was] about 1.2 mile radius (4 square miles), a range at which 4-5 psi existed. At this range there was an overall survival of near 90 percent. ... one must not confuse the area of complete destruction of houses ... with ‘complete destruction’ of people. ... The gloomy habit of confusing the two concepts is, I am afraid, as prevalent as it is unrealistic and, indeed, untrue. ... Think of the differences in casualties which might have occurred in Hiroshima had the population just been mostly indoors.”




Above: the overcrowding of wood-frame buildings in 1945 Hiroshima was such that 42 percent of the ground areas in the main firestorm areas was covered with wooden buildings containing charcoal braziers, paper screens, and bamboo furnishings. This compared to 45 percent ground coverage by buildings in the central wooden medieval part of Hamburg which suffered a firestorm in July 1943. (Source: secret USSBS report The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, May 1947, volume 2. This originally secret volume is not the misleading 1946 pamphlet, which omits all vital data.) U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, never-published full May 1947 report 92 on Hiroshima, volume 2, typeset edition pages 126-8 (quoted on pages 176 and 98 of Hiroshima: Ground Zero 1945):

Structural damage by blast to multistory, steel- and reinforced concrete-frame structures did not extend beyond 2,000 feet from GZ. The buildings within this radius sustained an average of 12 percent structural damage. The average for all the buildings of this type in Hiroshima was 8 percent.”


These are modern city buildings. The burned out areas in old photos are congested (a roof to ground area averaging 42% in firestorm areas) wood frame houses. On page 98, Hiroshima: Ground Zero 1945 quotes the secret 1947 USSBS Hiroshima report, vol 1, pp 13-14 (typeset edition):

“... six persons who had been in reinforced-concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton blackout curtains were ignited by radiant heat ... but a large proportion of over 1,000 persons questioned was in agreement that a great majority of the original fires was started by debris falling on kitchen charcoal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric short circuits.”


The electric power was rapidly cut off by the overload, so sustained heat came from charcoal fires in Hiroshima's houses (due to breakfast, i.e. 8:15 local time).



Above: overcrowded wood frame housing containing charcoal braziers on the edge of the damaged area in Hiroshima (U.S. National Archives photo). How many cities in the world which contain this type of overcrowded wooden housing with charcoal braziers are targets for nuclear terrorism today? Note also that formerly secret measurements of the specific activity of fallout show that only about 1% of the crater volume becomes lofted fallout dust, most of which falls back rapidly: nuclear tests in the 1950s thus confirmed that there is no significant nuclear winter (cooling) from the cratered dust lofted as fallout. This claim relies on the carbon soot from large-scale firestorms (not just fires) which are supposed to inject a stable, non-humid, layer of hydroscopic carbon soot to altitudes where it can be warmed and achieve stable stable buoyancy, blocking out sunlight from lower altitudes. This contravenes the facts concerning the black rain in Hiroshima, which rapidly precipitated the soot. Robock's poorly researched but politically correct (peer-reviewer passed) Climactic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts (Atmos. Chem. Phys., v7, pp. 2003–2012, 2007) maintains the nuclear disaster delusion by ignoring all factual data on firestorm dust from Hiroshima and Nagasaki:


The authors assume that all targeted cities will produce mass fires with efficient pyroconvective pumping, that these fires will consume basically all available flammable material in the target cities, and that rainout will only remove 20% of the soot before it reaches the upper atmosphere. These are not valid assumptions, and real-world experience with atmospheric nuclear weapons detonations does not bear them out. ... even Brode's relatively extreme views are incompatible with the bizarre assumptions made in the 2007 Toon et al. study, and consequently the many studies that now use its conclusions to model the effects of regional nuclear conflict. The extremely low 20% rainout value is particularly problematic- the authors have no real justification for it other than "because we used it in 1990, and it arguably happens this way in some forest fires." ... Indeed, neither Hiroshima or Nagasaki appears to fit the assumptions made in the study - rainout at Hiroshima seems to have been pretty pronounced (the famous black rain), and Nagasaki failed to develop into a full-blown firestorm due to the local topography. In any case, rainout after a nuclear explosion is not the same as rainout resulting from a forest fire, as is attested by this 1988 study and this 1979 study of rainout following the atomic bombings in Japan. In short, Toon et al. really didn't do their research - at all.


Before quoting the firestorm details from the secret Hiroshima report, it is worth pointing out that all nuclear weapons stockpiled today are much smaller yield MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) than the heavy fallout weapons tested in the 1950s. Most are relatively little more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons. Professor Freeman Dyson debunked the popular myths in his 1985 book Weapons and Hope (Harper and Row, New York, pp. 33-41):

“In 1957 ... Nevil Shute Norway published On the Beach, a description of mankind wiped out by radiological warfare [he had also previously published guesswork speculations about war in Britain in his April 1939 novel, What Happened to the Corbetts, which incorrectly speculated that bombing would cause a lack of clean water and cause that diseases like cholera to spread]. Norway's poignant translation of apocalyptic disaster into the everyday voices of real people caught the imagination of the world. His book became an international best-seller and was made into a successful film. The book and the film created an enduring myth, a myth which entered consciously or subconsciously into all subsequent thinking about nuclear war. ... Almost all the details are wrong: radioactive cobalt would not substantially increase the lethality of large hydrogen bombs; fallout would not descend uniformly over large areas but would fall sporadically in space and time; people could protect themselves from the radioactivity ...

“The first generation of hydrogen bombs which were tested in 1952 and 1954 had yields running from ten to fifteen megatons. They were, from a modern point of view, absurdly and inconveniently large. ... By the time I paid my first visit to Los Alamos, in the summer of 1956, hydrogen bombs of the twenty-megaton class were already considered technologically obsolete; all the experts I spoke to were working on smaller bombs with lower yields. ... The race toward smaller bombs has been driven by ... the cruise missile and the MIRV (Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle). ... As soon as cruise missiles and MIRVs are available, high-yield weapons rapidly become obsolete. ... The central paradox of the arms race is the discrepancy between public perception and reality. The public perceives the arms race as giving birth to an endless stream of weapons of ever-increasing destructiveness and ever-increasing danger. ... In the 1950s there was indeed a race to produce weapons of mass destruction ... Since then the arms race has been running strongly in other directions, away from weapons of mass destruction toward weapons of high precision. ... One consequence of the computer revolutions has been the replacement of big hydrogen bombs by the MIRV and the cruise missile.”

The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, secret, unpublished three-volume May 1947 report

The 14 October to 26 November 1945 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of Hiroshima is the key compendium of data, with much more data than any nuclear test report from the 1950s. A 1946 British Mission to Japan report includes photographs of air raid shelters which survived near ground zero in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but gives the survival data of 15,000 school children (in teams clearing firebreaks mainly outdoors), without stating the survival rates inside modern buildings. This is also done in Manhattan District report on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in the 1950-77 editions of The Effects of Atomic Weapons and The Effects of Nuclear Weapons where no breakdown of survival data in different kinds of buildings and in the open is provided. In particular, the cause of the Hiroshima firestorm was determined by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in its secret May 1947 report, but this was omitted from publications such as its unclassified report and the book, The Effects of Atomic Weapons.

Beginning with an incendiary raid on Tokyo on 9 March 1945 which Japanese records showed killed 83,793 and burned out 267,000 buildings (25% of Tokyo’s buildings), sixty-four Japanese cities were destroyed by non-nuclear air raids. The detailed and objective analysis of these incendiary air raids was classified “Restricted” in April 1947 by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in its unpublished limited distribution typeset and printed report Number 90, Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan, (108 MB PDF linked here). Part 3 (pages 65-118) documents the effects of the 9 March 1945 Tokyo incendiary raid, with photos on pages 104-109 very similar to the damage in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (combustible light frame buildings burned out with their steel distorted by the fires, and piles of charred bodies in streets). By omitting to publish this, an objective comparison of nuclear with conventional attacks was prevented.

The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, USSBS report 92, volume 2 (typeset May 1947 edition, secret)

Volume one, page 14: “the city lacked buildings with fire-protective features such as automatic fire doors and automatic sprinkler systems”, and pages 26-28 state the heat flash in Hiroshima was only “capable of starting primary fires in exposed, easily combustible materials such as dark cloth, thin paper, or dry rotted wood exposed to direct radiation at distances usually within 4,000 feet of the point of detonation (AZ).” Page 85 of volume one explains why so many people were outdoors in Hiroshima at 8:15 on 6 August 1945:

Conditions on Morning of Attack. The morning of 6 August 1945 was clear with a small amount of clouds at high altitude. Wind was from the south with a velocity of about 4.5 miles per hour. Visibility was 10 to 15 miles. An air-raid ‘alert’ was sounded throughout Hiroshima Prefecture at 0709 hours [the weather survey B-29 aircraft flying one hour ahead of the nuclear bomber]. ‘All-clear’ was sounded at 0731 hours. The following circumstances account in part for the high number of casualties resulting from the atomic bomb:

(1) Only a few persons remained in the air-raid shelters after the ‘all-clear’ sounded.

(2) No ‘alert’ was sounded to announce the approach of the planes involved in the atomic-bomb attack.

(3) The explosion occurred during the morning rush hours when people had just arrived at work or were hurrying to their places of business. This concentrated the population in the center of the city ...”


Volume two examines the ignition of clothing by the thermal radiation flash in Hiroshima:

Page 24: “Scores of persons throughout all sections of the city were questioned concerning the ignition of clothing by the flash from the bomb. ... Ten school boys were located during the study who had been in school yards about 6,200 feet east and 7,000 feet west, respectively, from AZ [air zero]. These boys had flash burns on the portions of their faces which had been directly exposed to rays of the bomb. The boys’ stories were consistent to the effect that their clothing, apparently of cotton materials, ‘smoked,’ but did not burst into flame. ... a boy’s coat ... started to smoulder from heat rays at 3,800 feet from AZ.”

Page 28: “Wood poles as far as 10,000 feet in a southerly direction from AZ [air zero] and 13,000 feet in a northerly direction were flash-burned but the burns, generally not much more than a discoloration of the wood, were in all cases only on the side of the pole facing AZ. ... it is logical to conclude that wood (ignition temperature approximately 450 F) was not raised to its ignition temperature, except possibly in its most easily ignitable condition, such as dry-rotted. Surface spalling or roughening of granite by heat was observed near GZ and as far as 2,400 feet from AZ. This condition was only noticeable where the granite was directly exposed to rays from the bomb (surfaces facing AZ but shielded from it were not spalled) indicating that extremely high temperatures lasted only a fraction of a second. Asphalt road surfaces and asphalt-painted surfaces also were flash-burned, distinct shadows of objects being cast upon them, which again indicated that the radiated heat from the bomb created a temperature which was high but of short duration. ... Blisters as much as one-sixteenth inch high were raised on exposed tile at GZ (2,000 feet from AZ), decreasing in size as the distance from AZ increased until they were barely visible at 4,400 feet from AZ (4,000 feet from GZ).”

Page 34: “The fire wind seems to have reached its maximum velocity about 2 to 3 hours after the bomb explosion, following which it began to diminish in intensity. ... the heavier rain began about 3,500 feet west of GZ and extended westward about 5,000 feet. Light rain was reported to have fallen near the center of the city. ... Rain fell almost exclusively in the northwest area of the city ... accounted for by the light natural wind from the southeast which blew particles of hot carbon northwestward to a cooler area where moisture condensed about them and fell as rain.”

Page 44: “A special effort was made to determine the probable cause of initial ignition in buildings in which there was fire and the reason for non-ignition in buildings in which there was no fire. By observation and by interrogation of persons who were in or near the buildings when the bomb detonated it was established that the probable causes of initial ignition in 40 of the 58 fire-resistive [not wood frame] buildings in which there was fire were as follows: 8 by heat radiation from the bomb (primary fire); 3 by blast disturbance of telephone or chemical laboratory equipment (secondary fire); and 29 by fire spread from exposing buildings.”

Page 45: “Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. ...

“(1) Each of the eight fire-resistive buildings in which primary fire was reported had unprotected windows facing AZ. Black cotton black-out curtains or light-weight paper, or both, were reported to have ignited initially in most of these buildings. All buildings in Hiroshima whose windows were not equipped with steel-roller shutters, which were considered light-proof, were required to have black-out curtains. Among the eight buildings which had primary fires, the farthest from AZ was Building 64 [Hiroshima Communications Hospital] at 5,300 feet [from AZ, or 4,900 feet from GZ].

“(2) A doctor who was in the first story of Building 64, a hospital 5,300 feet from AZ, stated that he discovered fire in the second story 10 minutes after the detonation, but was unable to identify the source. ... Cotton black-out curtains were drawn across the second-story windows only. ... Contents in the second story were totally damaged by fire, but in the first story only a few pieces of wooden furniture near the windows in the south wall facing AZ were scorched ...”

Page 70: “Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. None of the 8 non-combustible buildings which had [contents] fire in them was reported to have had its contents ignited by radiated heat from the bomb. All except 3 (Buildings 46, 78, and 81) of the 12 non-combustible buildings had at least some unprotected wall openings facing AZ at the time of detonation of the bomb. The contents of these 3 buildings were shielded from direct radiated heat from the bomb by a blank wall, closed fire shutters, or another building. ...

Pages 74-75: “Combustible Construction. a. General. ... combustible buildings were load-bearing, brick-wall structures with wooden floors or roof, or both; steel-frame structures with wooden purlins and studs ... It was established that the probable cause of initial ignition in 23 of the 41 buildings which had fire was as follows: 3 by secondary fire (electrical equipment, stoves and industrial furnaces), and 20 by fire spread from exposing buildings. ... No eyewitness testimony was obtained to the effect that any one of the 41 fire-damaged combustible buildings was ignited directly by flash heat from the bomb.

b. Direct Ignition by the Atomic Bomb. Although none of the 41 fire-damaged combustible buildings was reported to have been ignited by radiated heat from the bomb, it is considered probable that the contents of a few of the buildings which had unshielded wall openings facing AZ and which were within 4,000 feet of AZ were ignited in this manner. Since wooden poles and other exposed wood, even near GZ, were only flash burned by the bomb, it seems unlikely that exposed wood outside or inside buildings was ignited directly. ...

c. Ignition by Secondary Fire. It was established that the initial ignition in three combustible buildings (3 [Hiroshima Electric Company’s Yagurashita Substation 900 feet from GZ], 37 [Takano Bath House 4,200 feet from GZ], and 72 [Toyo Light Alloy Company 6,200 feet from GZ]) was probably by secondary fire. These comprise 13 percent of the cases in which the probable cause was determined in this class of building. Building 3, an electric substation, was ignited by short circuits in electric generating and transforming equipment after the blast had collapsed the combustible roof. ... Building 37, a public bath house, was ignited by a hot stove after the blast had collapsed the combustible roof so that it fell on the stove. The combustible debris and contents were completely consumed. Building 72, an aluminum foundry, was ignited by a hot stove ...”

Page 88: “Ignition of the City. ... Only directly exposed surfaces were flash burned. Measured from GZ, flash burns on wood poles were observed at 13,000 feet, granite was roughened or spalled by heat at 1,300 feet, and vitreous tiles on roofs were blistered at 4,000 feet. ... six persons who had been in reinforced-concrete buildings within 3,200 feet of air zero stated that black cotton blackout curtains were ignited by radiant heat ... dark clothing was scorched and, in some cases, reported to have burst into flame from flash heat [although as the 1946 USSBS report admits, most immediately beat the flames out with their hands without sustaining injury, because the clothing was not drenched in gasoline, unlike peacetime gasoline tanker road accident victims] ... but a large proportion of over 1,000 persons questioned was in agreement that a great majority of the original fires was started by debris falling on kitchen charcoal fires, by industrial process fires, or by electric short circuits. Hundreds of fires were reported to have started in the centre of the city within 10 minutes after the explosion. Of the total number of buildings investigated [135 buildings are listed] 107 caught fire, and in 69 instances, the probable cause of initial ignition of the buildings or their contents was as follows: (1) 8 by direct radiated heat from the bomb (primary fire), (2) 8 by secondary sources, and (3) 53 by fire spread from exposed [wooden] buildings.”

Page 110: “The most common failure of wood-frame buildings was buckling of the relatively slender columns ... This resulted usually either from a mass displacement of the building away from the blast, or from panel walls being blown in and carrying the columns along.”

Pages 126-8: “Structural damage by blast to multistory, steel- and reinforced concrete-frame structures did not extend beyond 2,000 feet from GZ. The buildings within this radius sustained an average of 12 percent structural damage. The average for all the buildings of this type in Hiroshima was 8 percent.”

Page 96 gives the mean destructive distance for multistory steel and reinforced concrete frame (both earthquake and non-earthquake resistant) buildings at 700 feet, compared to 9,200 feet for Japanese (wood-pole constructed) wooden houses. The damaged areas are proportional to the square of the radius, so although the Japanese wooden houses were only destroyed out to a radius about 13 times greater than modern city buildings, they were destroyed over an that was 173 times greater. Thus, for a similar bomb yield and altitude, the number of damaged buildings in a modern city would be 173 times less than in Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.

Page 126 states that the effects would have been stronger near ground zero for a lower burst height, but “lowering the height of detonation would have increased the amount of shielding of one structure by another”, thereby preventing the wide-area Mach stem enhanced blast and thermal effects like flash burns. Penney published extensive evidence of blast wave attenuation by the work energy done in causing damage (the force F due to a blast pushing a wall distance D in the direction of the blast uses energy E = FD, so energy is continually lost from the blast wave in a city, in doing damage).

Although fashionable books on Hiroshima tend to print pictures of the “blasted” twisted metal beams of the Odamasa Store (former Taiyo Theatre), USSBS building 52 at 2,800 feet from ground zero, page 322 explains it is an effect of fire: “Severe distortion caused by burning of combustible construction and contents.” Furthermore, similar twisting of metal frames in wooden buildings occurred in the Toyko incendiary attack, but those photos remained Restricted. It is not a special “nuclear” effect, nor are the burned bodies in the streets of Tokyo photographed after the main non-nuclear attack, despite all the polemic and inaccurate claims attacking civil defense.

Volume three states on page 29:

“The atomic bomb detonated at Hiroshima, although it was an extremely powerful blast weapon, caused relatively little structural damage to the 81 important bridges. Scattered throughout the entire city, the bridges, 260 to 15,600 feet from ground zero (GZ), connected islands to islands and islands to the mainland, forming an adequate and efficient bridge system. ... impressive evidence of the ability of the bridges to resist the forces of the Hiroshima atomic bomb (air-burst at 2,000 feet0 was found in the facts that (1) 10 of 19 timber bridges studied were undamaged, (2) 10 of 15 concrete bridges had no damage, and (3) 14 of 23 steel bridges were undamaged.”

This is illustrated by the survival of the nuclear target point, the distinctive T-shaped Aioi bridge at the intersection of the Ota and Motoyasu Rivers (located 1,000 feet from ground zero due to the Hiroshima bombing error). Volume three at page 40 explains: “This bridge of plate-girder design received physical damage of a spectacular and interesting nature but it continued to carry unrestricted highway, pedestrian, and street railway traffic. The longitudinal steel girders suffered no great structural damage although a slight lateral deformation indicated that they had been highly stressed.” Bridge 20 over the Motoyasu River at 2,900 feet from ground zero retained clear “shadows” of non-scorched asphalt cast by the hand railings, one of the pieces of evidence which allowed geometric determination of the burst location and altitude.

EMP effects in Hiroshima may have been masked by blast and fire damage, as indicated in volume three, pages 191-6: “Of the 7 substations of the Chugoku Electric Co., the Sendamachi substation and steam-electric plant at 7,700 feet from GZ were heavily damaged by fires which spread to the area. The Otemachi substation, 2,400 feet from GZ, was heavily damaged by blast and fires started by the short-circuited equipment. The Dambara, Misasa, and Eba substations were only slightly damaged at distances from GZ of 5,500 feet and beyond. ... Analysis of the Damage. The Hiroshima substation, 15,000 feet from GZ, was undamaged by blast as a direct effect, but the tremendous overload created by the short-circuited damaged electrical equipment in the city of Hiroshima tripped the circuit breakers in the substation and immediately interrupted all electrical services in the Hiroshima area.”






Above: the reason why there is statistically reliable data on high doses of radiation from Hiroshima and Nagasaki is simply the fact that many people - far from being instantly vaporized along with all buildings near ground zero - survived all of the nuclear explosion effects within the Hiroshima firestorm in the Bank of Japan and Geibi Bank Company, and extinguished fires 2-3 hours after the nuclear explosion when firebrands (burning cinders) were blown through broken windows from the wooden areas firestorm surrounding these modern concrete city buildings. The photos above are from the U.S. Department of Defense DCPA Attack Environment Manual 1973, chapters 3 and 8, which documents the successful firefighting in modern buildings within the Hiroshima firestorm. The diagram on the right shows substantial radiation protection factors in modern city buildings from fallout radiation. Amateur fire-fighting in the Hiroshima nuclear attack is more applicable to modern cities today which contain fire-sprinkler systems in vulnerable buildings and fewer wooden houses:

“The study involves the development of techniques to evaluate the effect of fire defenses on building fires caused by a nuclear burst and the incorporation of the fire-defense techniques in a fire-spread model. ... Preliminary computations indicate that within a few hours about 1/4 of the manpower available in a tract can suppress all fires created by the initial ignition of 1/2 or less of the buildings. Most of the manpower, particularly those in the self-help teams, can be diverted to other activities after several minutes of effort. The preliminary results show that ordinary citizens with minimal instruction and training can bring about very pronounced reductions in the total fire damage.”

- Arthur N. Takata, Mathematical Modelling of Fire Defenses, IIT Research Institute, report AD0688941, 1969
(See also part 2, AD0705388.)

The U.S. Department of Defense's 1973 DCPA Attack Environment Manual, chapter 3, panel 26 used the examples of successful amateur fire-fighting modern Western-type city buildings in Hiroshima as proof that people can survive in modern city buildings exposed near ground zero within the firestorm of a nuclear explosion (due to overcrowded wooden housing areas). The data came from reports which remained limited or secret in distribution, however. Panel 27 in chapter 3 of the 1973 DCPA Attack Environment Manual states:

"The evidence from Hiroshima indicates that blast survivors, both injured and uninjured, in buildings later comsumed by fire were generally able to move to safe areas following the explosion. Of 130 major buildings studied by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey ... 107 were ultimately burned out ... Of those suffering fire, about 20 percent were burning within the first half hour. The remainder were consumed by fire spread, some as late as 15 hours after the blast."

This proves that the rapid room flashover filmed Upshot-Knothole Encore test effect in a litter-filled wooden and imflammable materials-filled room with a large window facing the fireball with no obstructions or "shadowing", did not occur in the 80% humidity conditions of Hiroshima, far higher than in the drier Nevada test site desert (the humidity in Hiroshima was 80% and in Nagasaki it was 71%, see table VI of William E. Loewe, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report UCRL-90258, 1983). Although humidity has relatively little effect on the ignition energy for thin fine kindling materials, the proportionate effect is far greater for thicker fuels with the same equilibrium moisture content. The thermal flash can dry out damp paper; but it cannot dry out damp wood (a maximum of 0.85 mm of the surface of wood was charred by 50 cal/cm2 from a 30 kt test in 1955 as proved by Kyle Laughlin in nuclear weapon test report WT-1198, 1957). Therefore, rapid flashover does not occur in realistic city humidity (most cities are beside rivers, lakes or the ocean). It did not occur from thermal radiation in Hiroshima.

Panel 3 of chapter 3 of the 1973 DCPA Attack Environment Manual also points out that the predictions of thermal burns in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons omit protection due to shadows by tall buildings in modern cities, and duck and cover evasive action: "Persons caught in the open or near windows can also take advantage of the relative slow pace of the thermal pulse from large-yield weapons. ... Further out, even more time would be available. In the light damage area (1 to 2 psi), evasive action within the first four seconds would avoid significant burn injury."




Above: buildings protect against thermal burns and fire ignition by the simple shadowing effect. The badly injured people in Hiroshima in many documented survivor accounts of serious burn and flying glass injuries had moved into a position (behind windows or outdoors) with a direct radial line to the fireball, to watch the B-29 bomb carrying aircraft.

In The Number of Atomic Bombs Equivalent to the Last War Air Attacks on Great Britain and Germany (National Archives piece HO 225/16, 1950, Top Secret for 8 years then Restricted until 1980), the British Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch points out nuclear war damage and casualties tends to be exaggerated by the media’s incorrect use of Hiroshima. For example, it found that actual WWII damage on Britain was found to be equivalent to 52 Hiroshima bomb’s “for the night raiding conditions on London in the last war, where something like 60% of the population were in houses, 35% in shelter and 5% in the open ...”



Above: conventional warfare dropped 240 kilotons of bombs on Germany in the month of March 1945 alone, equivalent to 15 times the 16 kt Hiroshima nuclear bomb, i.e., one Hiroshima every 2 days during March 1945.

Note that in both WWI and WWII the vast majority of the weapons and explosives used were manufactured during the war itself, so prior disarmamant would not have assured that no weapons were used. One assumption in most disarmament propaganda is that a war is an instant all-out blitz; this assumption was made prior to WWI and was proved false, and again before WWII and was proved false again. The whole of the second-strike capability of hardened silos and hidden submarines designed by RAND Corporation strategists in the late 1950s was specifically aimed at removing any temptation for such a short knock-out war. This second-strike system remains and takes away any rational incentive to launch a surprise all-out attack. This is why, as President Obama stated, the major risk from nuclear weapons is a limited nuclear attack due to terrorism and rogue states. A nuclear attack will have a similar effect to large WWII air raids, but the effects will be easier to mitigate than V2 warheads, if people are informed about the reality of nuclear weapons effects phenomenology, and duck before the blast wave arrives, stamp out fires, and take cover from fallout. EMP will often rapidly disconnect the electrical fire risk by activating circuit breakers in substations, as at the Nevada test site after EMP pick up in long cables which carried thousands of amps from close-in locations out to the control point 30 miles away (not only to the 2 psi overpressure range gives in Glasstone and Dolan, which confuses the range to which cables pick up EMP with the range to which currents can be carried by cables). This is made clear in B. J. Stralser's secret 30 April 1961 E.G. and G. report Electromagnetic effects from nuclear tests.

Distributing the same explosive energy over many small bombs (rather than a single large bomb) in conventional is actually more damaging, since people have no time to respond near a small bomb that explodes. Additionally, the overpressure-damaged area from a bomb scales up only as the two-thirds power of the explosive energy, and is equivalent to megatons of nuclear weapons per month. The Manhattan Project in 1945 at best could produce only two bombs per month. There is a tendency among many politicians, historians, disarmers, and others to down-play conventional warfare and to exaggerate the effects of nuclear weapons, by misleadingly selective use of statistics. (Source: Overall Report, European War, USSBS, 1945, charts 3 and 4. Chart 1 in this document shows that 2,697,473 tons of bombs were dropped on the occupied countries in Europe by the US Army Air Force and the RAF, including 50.3% on Germany, 21.8% on France and 13.7% on Italy. In 1945, essentially all of the bombing was on Germany. The fact that civilian damage can be accomplished by conventional warfare led the British Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (William Waldegrave) to explain in the 28 July 1988 House of Commons debate on Disarmament (Hansard HC Deb 28 July 1988 vol 138 c778): "Britain and Europe have suffered dreadfully from conventional wars during this century, and modern conventional weapons are many times more destructive than those of 40 years ago. ... That is why we must insist that nuclear arms control must not make Europe safe for conventional war ..." Nuclear weapons were clearly not responsible for WWI or WWII, despite false and misleading anti-civil defense propaganda spread by Noel Baker, Joseph Rotblat and others who found it immoral to use nuclear weapons for ending WWII but were happy to work on them when it happened to suit their personal pet politics. When a terrorist uses a weapon and thousands of people don't duck and cover against blast, glass and radiation, what does the great "free" media of fashionable groupthink prejuduce do then? Laugh at the needless suffering? Pretend that they followed the consensus of politically dogmatic consensus that was justified by the long term ambition to end nuclear deterrence and go back to conventional war, and to do this by telling lies about civil defense? Or do what it usually does, and learn the lessons when it is too late to prevent needless suffering? here.)

London received 71 major raids (over 100 tons/raid) in the Blitz from 7 Sept 1940 to 16 May 1941, consisting of 18,291 tons or 18.291 kilotons of high explosive, over twice the blast yield (8 kt) of the 16 kt Hiroshima nuclear bomb (O’Brien, Civil Defence, 1955, Appendix IV, p681). These explosives were mainly 50 kg and 250 kg (B’Brien, p505), an average of about 0.1 ton of explosive per bomb. The scaled area equivalent megatonnage for overpressure damage areas and casualties from the London Blitz is therefore 4 thermonuclear weapons, each with a total yield of 2 megatons (1 megaton of which is blast):

(4 bombs) x (1 megaton TNT blast yield)2/3 = (182,910 bombs of 0.1 ton each) x (10-7 megatons blast yield)2/3.

Home Office experts had experience from the WWII Blitz, visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 after the nuclear air bursts (as part of the British Mission to Japan), and set up Anderson shelters at Monte Bello to assess their protection against nuclear war at the first British nuclear bomb test. The first manual they issued on nuclear attack was the excellent 1950 “Atomic Warfare” (PDF file, 6 MB, linked here) with 24 photos of damage from blast, heat and fire from Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the protection from heat flash by shadows, a discussion of shelters in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a blast pressure graph and discussion, and a Foreword by Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee. Then, under Prime Minister Churchill, in 1953 the British Government published its excellent civil defence training notes “The atom bomb, its effects and how to meet them: Heat” (0.6 MB PDF) and “The atom bomb, its effects and how to meet them: Effects on personnel” (0.8 MB PDF).

Most later British manuals appeared to be mindless drivel, despite being based on more solid evidence from nuclear testing, because all the evidence was secret and had to be omitted, leaving patronising advice that looked pathetic to readers. Even the Hiroshima and Nagasaki shelter photos and discussions were omitted from future Home Office Nuclear Weapons and Protect and Survive handbooks, instead of adding more photos and data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to inform the readers about the possibilities for survival. However, the 1960 Civil Defence Handbook no. 7 Rescue, a 25 MB PDF file, linked here does reprint key Hiroshima and Nagasaki building damage photos, showing building response to blast from the standpoint of improvised rescue techniques, comparing it to the London Blitz. Also in 1960, concise Civil Defence Instructors’ General Notes (78 pages, PDF linked here) were published which provide an excellent brief overview of civil defence against conventional high explosive bombs, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

What went wrong with civil defense during the Cold War era was the move towards hubris, arrogance, patronising, dependence upon authority, and increasing secrecy over the basis of the evidence for widely mocked and attacked civil defense countermeasures against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Instead of focussing on making the lessons of Hiroshima clear for all to understand, these lessons went unpublished or were actually classified secret. The failure of the government to effectively and scientifically answer and demolish false propaganda attacks in the media against civil defense undermines national security when the chips are down:

“The only way to win a war is to escalate it one way or another above what the enemy can endure. If we feel that we cannot win without unacceptable risk we have no business fighting in the first place.

“There are just two checks on escalation. One is the waning of motivation for fighting the war in the first place. A long grinding war of attrition on the ground might achieve this ... The second check on escalation is to so overwhelm your enemy with such heavy and rapid destruction that he loses all hope of winning. Then surrender is an attractive choice when compared to inevitable defeat or certain death. This, of course, is the way we brought Japan to terms in 1945. It was unnecessary to invade with infantry and fight a ground war. We seem to have forgotten this fact. Even though Japan had four million troops under arms with two million guarding her shores, not a shot was fired. We invaded with fourteen hundred military administrators, by air. Not a life was lost in this invasion.

“The Japanese had been highly motivated to wage war against us. Kamikaze tactics and no-surrender policies were typical. Yet a realization that Japan simply could not win and the certainty that continued resistance meant mounting devastation caused her to toss in the sponge. ... In the final analysis, hundreds of thousands of lives were saved and dozens of cities spared ... In Korea ... there were three and a half million military casualties on both sides during three years of drawn-out war. Over a million civilians were killed ...”

- General Curtis E. LeMay, America is in Danger, pages 307-9.


In a surprise attack, conventional weapons give practically no time for defensive countermeasures, unlike the bright flash prior to the blast arrival over most of the damaged area in a nuclear explosion, which acts as a warning. With nuclear weapons, there is an automatic warning prior blast and fallout arrival over the wide areas of destruction, which gives time for most people to take effective countermeasures and was used by people who experienced the Hiroshima nuclear explosion before travelling to Nagasaki and surviving the second nuclear explosion. As explained by Professor Joseph O. Hirschfelder, “The Effects of Atomic Weapons”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August-September 1950, vol. VI, no. 8-9, pp. 236-40 and 285-6 (quotation from page 238):

“Because of the comparatively long duration of the thermal radiation, exposed personnel can greatly reduce their exposure by ducking behind an obstacle or dropping prone. Ducking behind an obstacle would also considerably reduce the exposure to gamma rays and place the person in a more sheltered position to withstand the flying debris which will shower the area a few seconds later when the blast wave passes. It takes the blast wave one second to reach one-half mile, three seconds to reach one mile, and seven seconds to reach two miles.”


Dr Samuel Glasstone in 1950 compared psychological fears of radiation to ignorance of gas warfare in Effects of Atomic Weapons, 1950, page 289, paragraph 8.116: “perhaps the most important application of radiological warfare would be its psychological effect as a mystery weapon, analogous to the initial use of poison gas ... The obvious method to combat radiological warfare in this case is to understand and be prepared for it.” By educating people in simple effective fallout countermeasures, the use of fallout in warfare by ground bursting nuclear weapons may be discouraged, like gas in WWII. In the event of a disaster, panic can be replaced by actions that will reduce the danger. The gas illusion:

“In the next war, with its overwhelming air raids, its gases blotting out life over square miles, its bacilli, possibly its rays, munitions works and the services of the rear will be special objects of attack.”

- Irwin Will, The Next War: An Appeal to Common Sense, E. P. Dutton, New York, 1921, p77 (best-seller first published by Dutton in April 1921, 23rd printing, October 1921).

“The chemical Warfare Research Department [prior to 1927] had been making experiments to determine how long persons could remain under certain conditions in a ‘gas-proof’ room ... a broadcast in February [1927] by Professor Noel Baker, on ‘Foreign Affairs and How They Affect Us’ ... claimed, ‘all gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise means to protect the civil population from this form of attack’. The Chemical Warfare Research Department emphatically disputed the accuracy both of the details of the picture and of this general statement. They considered it unfortunate that statements of this nature should have been broadcast to the public, particularly after the Cabinet’s decision that the time was not ripe for education of the public in defensive measures.”

- T. H. O’Brien, Civil Defence (official U.K. history), 1955, p31.


Like civil defense attacking polemics today, Noel-Baker had made a completely false claim about "all experts" agreeing that gas masks and civil defense are useless in that influential and dangerous February 1927 BBC radio broadcast, Foreign Affairs and How they Affect Us. As British official civil defence historial Terrence H. O'Brien states, the British committee on civil defence chickened out of censoring or even bothering to correct Noel-Baker, despite disputing his assertion in secret meetings. They agreed that he was wrong, but then agreed to do nothing, because they didn't want to risk the work of censoring all BBC broadcasts on gas war. In the true spirit of British officialdom, they only considered censorship, not democratic argument by exposing the falsehood and demolishing it with facts. The Cabinet had decided gas defenses were a classified secret, so their hands were tied as they were bound by the Official Secrets Act. However, Noel-Baker was not telling the truth and the original 1915 British gas mask inventor Professor J. B. S. Haldane (who one of the experts on the gas civil defence committee advising the Cabinet) had published a very different view of gas warfare in his 1925 book Callinicus: A Defence of Chemical Warfare. It is a fact therefore that was a lie for Noel-Baker to two years later make his claim about a complete consensus of experts denying defense against was warfare. Here are Noel-Baker's lying February 1927 BBC broadcast words of political Correctness and groupthink ideology:

“‘In the first phase of the next war,’ says a high authority, ‘there is little doubt that the belligerents will resort to gas bomb attack on a vast scale. This form of attack upon great cities, such as London or Paris, might entail the loss of millions of lives in the course of a few hours. Gas clouds so formed would be heavier than air and would flow into the cellars and tubes in which the population had taken refuge. As the bombardment continued, the gas would thicken up until it flowed through the streets of the city in rivers. All gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise means to protect the civil population from this form of attack’."

(Source: Peter Adey, Aerial Life, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p189.)

Noel-Baker, athlete and Quaker disarmer typical of the ideologues exaggerating weapons effects and denying facts about the efficiency of civil defence countermeasures today, later won a Nobel Peace prize and become a Lord, but his fear-mongering and scare-mongering lies about civil defence actually helped to enable Hitler to murder millions by cultivating appeasement. I have yet to find any historian who addresses the ideology whereby lies about civil defence for utopian dreams of disarmament are compared to Adolf Hitler's or Joseph Stalin's ideological lies of eugenics or Marxism; all are ideologies where "the ends justify the means" and since the ends are not achieveable in the real world, all of these ideologies which rely on lying fear-mongering about the alleged evils of weapons, minority races, or genuine democracy. He failed to achieve peace and his lying ideology against civil defense actually made the war risks and the war dangers of the world worse, by removing support for Churchill and allowing public empathy to side with Hitler, even to the point of the British football team being forced to give the Nazi salute at a game in Germany. Support for appeasement was due in large part to the anti-civil defense groupthink polemics which played up WWI effects, but Noel-Baker did not do this by accident or genuine error, because he was still continuing the same inaccurate anti-civil defense polemics in 1980 to deny any possibility of civil defense being of value under any circumstances, again by examining only the worst and least probable possibility, despite this being proved in WWII to be a contrived, unbalanced piece of sophistry. This is like denying the value of hospitals, seat-belts or life-boats by the trick of only considering worst-case eventualities where they are of minimal utility. House of Lords Home and Civil Defence Debate on 5 March 1980 (Hansard, vol 406 cc260-386):
“... I want to argue that no measure of civil defence, in any war which we can realistically expect to have, will save a single life, and that to nurse a hope of safety from civil defence is to indulge a self-deceiving, futile and dangerous illusion—self-deceiving and futile because, as I said, civil defence will not save our lives; dangerous because it diverts attention from the only policy that gives us any genuine hope. It makes the public think that there will be safety where no safety is. It obscures the fact that the only way to avert disaster is to avert the war, and to abolish those offensive weapons without which aggressions cannot be begun. ... My Lords, the first atom bomb weighed two kilogrammes—less than 5 lbs [sic]. ... Against such a danger civil defence offers us no help ...”

But this is another falsehood of the same type as his 1927 BBC broadcast on gas: as WWII indicated (where gas was not used against Britain or Germany), by reducing the scale of the disaster if a terrorist or accidental nuclear explosion should occur, civil defense could help avoid escalation to a massive war by minimizing the effects even within war itself, stabilizing the political situation.

Denying civil defense facts, apart from maximising casualties, is a constraining act which forces only military responses in a crisis. Noel-Baker was never openly criticised for his propaganda and also dismissed civil defence against biological warfare in a letter to the New Scientist (14 Dec 1961, no 265, p700), after they published an article called “Biological agents in warfare and defence” by Dr LeRoy D. Fothergill of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps:
“May I express my gratitude to you for publishing the article ... Dr Fothergill writes with admirable restraint ... very little progress has been made in ... defending the citizen ... there is at present no defence against them, and none likely in the measurable future.”

Fothergill’s article (aimed at raising concern to encourage more research and defences) gave outdoor data for wind dispersion of spores released by a ship off the Californian coast in 1950. Being inside with the windows closed gives good protection while the cloud is blown past (even anthrax has a half life of only 25 minutes outdoors in bright sunlight in dry air and less in humid air; see Field Manual FM 3-3, 1992, Fig. B-1). Noel-Baker deceptively seized on an omission as if proof that countermeasures do not exist, exactly what he had done in 1927 when the government kept civil defence experiments and weapons effects facts secret.
“In May 1929, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom sponsored a conference in Frankfurt on ‘modern methods of warfare and the protection of civil populations’. ... While the overall objective of the proceedings was to enhance pleas for disarmament, individual participants did so by calling attention to the stakes of future wars ... conference speakers emphasized that ‘the worst of the past gives little idea of what would be the horrible reality of a future war,’ one where ‘the civil population ... will be massacred by gas bombs from thousands of aeroplanes ...’”

– Professor Susan R. Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp149-50 (citing Getrud Woker, “The Effects of Chemical Warfare,” in Les methodes modernes de guerre et la protection des populations civiles / Chemical Warfare: An Abridged Report of Papers Read at an International Conference at Frankfurt, London, 1930, p45).

“Most of the books and pamphlets on the subject seem to me to be of the nature of propaganda ... a great many opponents of the Government state that such things as gas-masks and gas-proof rooms are completely useless, that London could be wiped out in a single air raid ... a frightful responsibility rests on those who expose British children to such a death in order to score a point ... In 1915 ... I was at that time a captain in a British infantry battalion and was brought out of the trenches to St. Omer, where I assisted my father in the design of some of the first gas masks. ... one would be safe in a phosgene concentration of one part per thousand, of which a single breath would probably kill an unprotected man. Hence in practice such a mask is a very nearly complete protection. ... These gases can penetrate into houses, but very slowly. So even in a badly-constructed house one is enormously safer than in the open air. ... even if a new gas is produced, it is very unlikely that it will get through our respirators. ... Now all the poisonous gases and vapours used in war are heavier than air, so it is thought that they would inevitably flood cellars ... But within a short time it would be mixed with many times its volume of air. Now air containing one part in 10,000 of phosgene is extremely poisonous. But its density exceeds that of air by only one part in 4,000.”

- Professor J. B. S. Haldane, A.R.P., 1938.
“Ever since the Armistice, three classes of writers have been deluding the long-suffering British public with lurid descriptions of their approaching extermination in the next war ... pure sensationalists, ultra-pacifists, and military experts. ... they do want to get their manuscript accepted for the feature page of the Daily Drivel or the Weekly Wail. In order to do that, they must pile on the horrors thick ... The amount of damage done by such alarmists cannot be calculated, but is undoubtedly very great. ... It is significant that they concentrate almost unanimously on poison gas, and that the dangers of high explosive and incendiary bombs are seldom stressed. The reason, of course, is obvious – poison gas has a much greater news value. It is still a new and mysterious form of warfare, it is something which people do not understand, and what they do not understand they can readily be made to fear. ... Millions of people, perhaps, have been impressed by the authority and reputation of Mr H. G. Wells into believing that this picture represents the plain truth.”

- Professor James Kendall (a 1917 Chemical Warfare Liaison Officer), Breathe Freely! The Truth About Poison Gas, G. Bell & Sons, London, 1938, pp. 11-13.

“... in spite of the tremendous scale of the violations it still took the Germans five years, from January 1933 when Hitler came in to around January 1938, before they had an army capable of standing up against the French and the British. At any time during that five-year period if the British and the French had had the will, they probably could have stopped the German rearmament program ... one of the most important aspects of the interwar period [was] the enormous and almost uncontrollable impulse toward disarmament ... As late as 1934, after Hitler had been in power for almost a year and a half, [British Prime Minister] Ramsey McDonald still continued to urge the French that they should disarm themselves by reducing their army by 50 per cent, and their air force by 75 per cent. In effect, MacDonald and his supporters urged one of the least aggressive nations in Europe to disarm itself to a level equal with their potential attackers, the Germans. ... Probably as much as any other single group I think that these men of good will can be charged with causing World War II. [Emphasis by Kahn.]. ... At no time did Hitler threaten to initiate war against France and England. He simply threatened to ‘retaliate’ if they attacked him. ... an obvious prototype for a future aggressor armed with H-bombs ”

- H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 1960, pp. 390-1 and 403.

Future President John F. Kennedy's college thesis, Why England Slept, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1962 (first published 1940), pages 7, 169, 170 and 179:
Page 7: “What had England been doing while Hitler was building up this tremendous German Army?... To say that all the blame must rest on the shoulders of Neville Chamberlain or of Stanley Baldwin is to overlook the obvious. As the leaders, they are, of course, gravely and seriously responsible. But, given the conditions of democratic government, a free press, public elections, and a cabinet responsible to Parliament and thus to the people, given rule by the majority, it is unreasonable to blame the entire situation on one man or group.”

Page 169: “... I believe, as I have stated frequently, that leaders are responsible for their failures only in the governing sector and cannot be held responsible for the failure of a nation as a whole ... I believe it is one of democracy’s failings that it seeks to make scapegoats for its own weaknesses.”

Page 170: “Herbert Morrison, the able British Labour Leader ... was being criticised in 1939 for co-operating with the Government ... ‘At the beginning I got plenty of abuse from the irresponsibles because I said that Labour administrators must play their full part in A.R.P. [Air Raid Precautions, i.e. civil defense], which was denounced as a fraud and a plot... to create war psychology. For Labour local authorities to co-operate with state departments in this task was treachery ... no A.R.P. could possibly be effective’.”

Page 179: “... the dictator is able to know exactly how much the democracy is bluffing, because of the free Press, radio, and so forth, and so can plan his moves accordingly.”

Kennedy stuck to his guns with civil defense. After the first Russian nuclear weapon test, he wrote a public letter to President Truman warning of the risk of an "atomic Pearl Harbor", published in the New York Times of 10 October 1949. Kennedy also attended the 22-26 June 1959 nuclear war congressional hearings which featured Herman Kahn on civil defense, and Kennedy used the supposed missile gap as the basis for his Presidential election campaign (which in the even only appeared in about 1975 when the USSR achieved parity and went on bankrupting itself by churning out more missiles). Kennedy set up the public fallout shelter allocation in 1961. All of this goes back to his time in the American Embassy in 1939 and the research he did into the connection between British civil defense apathy in the 1930s and appeasement (even encouragement) of fear exploiting Nazi thugs. He could see that aggressors are all alike: they are all self-deluded, they all have an ideology, and they all use fear-mongering lies.

Professor Susan R. Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz (Cambridge University Press, 2012) finds that (p176): “a variety of voices reflected on the enormous destructive potential of air power in interwar Britain, and many determined to prevent the imagined horrors of the next war from coming true. Several important constituent bodies of the nation – including key segments of women, trades unionists, and members of the state itself – worked fervently for disarmament and to challenge efforts to accept aerial and perhaps even chemical attacks as somehow inevitable in a future war.”

Pro-disarmament propaganda which was based entirely on exaggeration of weapons and war effects (ignoring the real dangers of ideologies like racist eugenics and ethnic cleansing) and denials of civil defense efficiency went largely unopposed until 1938, partly due to official secrecy to keep both the enemy and the public ignorant (while they were being sold exaggerations by the media). To be heard, disarmament activists had the temerity to falsely dismiss all countermeasures, to exaggerate the scale of potential attacks, and to ignore the fact that countermeasures were a tried and tested solution (unlike disarmament without civil defense, i.e. complete vulnerability). Public apathy allowed doom exaggerations to be mainly supported or allowed to circulate without correction. How many newspapers, popular historians, or TV stations stand up and publish the facts on nuclear weapons and Hiroshima today? None. Civil defense has never had any backing and has always been violently opposed by ideologies which prefer war. When Noel-Baker claimed to have an "authority" which proved a consensus of gas war experts who knew gas had no countermeasure, he was simply lying to the nation. In any case, his claim that science is determined by a religious type consensus, was again lying to the nation, because science is distinguished from political agreements by its factual evidence rather than its fashionable popularity and the number of votes its adverts gain. Never mind how "unpopular" or "unfashionable" it is for a gas mask or duck and cover evasive action to protect the public, it is fact:











For a full analysis of the small amount of fallout measured in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see W. McRaney and J. McRaney, Radiation dose reconstruction U.S. occupation forces in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, 1945-1946, DNA 5512F, 1980, and for a comparison of the fallout pattern to self-induced rainout computer predictions see Charles R. Molenkamp, An Introduction to Self-Induced Rainout, URCL-52669, 1979, and Numerical Simulation of Self-Induced Rainout Using a Dynamic Convective Cloud Model, UCRL-83583, 1980. Neutron-induced activity dose rate and decay rate data from the 2002 Japanese dosimetry project (DS02) is linked here and is verified by neutron induced activity in debris from both cities. The only fully scientific (quantitative) discussion of the relative contributions of initial flash radiation, neutron induced activity, and fallout as a function of burst altitude is given in Chapter 5 (Nuclear Radiation Phenomena) of Dolan’s effects manual EM-1.

White shows that Hiroshima’s Post Office, 0.12 mile from ground zero, was gutted by fire hours later well in the firestorm, but over 50% of its 400 occupants had already survived the explosion and escaped. Photos of the final burned out areas show firestorm effects which occurred after survivors had time to escape, not unsurvivable, instant Encore-type thermal radiation-induced newspaper-filled inflammable room flashover in a dry desert. The firestorm in Hiroshima took 2-3 hours to reach a maximum intensity. The secret (full) U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey May 1947 report on Hiroshima interviewed over 1,000 survivors, and their evidence was that the fires were started by the blast wave overturning the obsolete charcoal braziers in obsolete city-centre wooden housing slums, which were full of inflammable paper screens and bamboo furnishings. The report shows that no building in Hiroshima had any fire-sprinkler system, and that the only fires started inside modern buildings by thermal radiation were in black coloured (heat absorbing) blackout air-raid curtains within 2,500 feet of air zero (close to ground zero). These and firebrands entering the Bank of Hiroshima through broken windows were easily extinguished by survivors with water buckets, in the centre of the "firestorm".

This obsolete mechanism caused the firestorm, not thermal flash ignition, which cannot directly ignite sound wood.
The danger from exaggerations of weapons effects in order to underplay civil defense and leave yourself vulnerable to an enemy was clearly demonstrated in the 1930s, when British Government scientists exaggerated war effects. They exaggerated the effects by using the July 1917 surprise attack bombing data, when people stood outdoors during the air raid, or watched the explosions ignorantly from behind glass windows: exactly the situation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were again surprise attacks. This exaggeration by using 1917 data led to Nazi appeasement in the 1930s, when they could have been stopped with minimal casualties if civil defense effectiveness was understood earlier. Civil defense did work to prevent a poison gas attack by the Nazis, despite gas masks never being 100% effective: the efficiency of the countermeasure was sufficient that the Nazis never tried to use their 12,000 tons stockpile of tabun nerve gas in WWII.

Civil defense did not need to be 100% effective in order to remove the attractiveness of "weapons of mass destruction" to coercive thugs wishing to threaten civilian targets.
Exaggerations of weapons effects, by downplaying or ignoring simple countermeasure effectiveness prior to World War I, actually encouraged the warmongers to plan for WWI prior to 1914 in the belief of achieving a quick victory using big guns and other offensive weapons. By ignoring the efficiency of simple improvised blast and flying missile defenses like trenches against explosive blast, shelling, mortar fire, shrapnel and machine guns in the American Civil War, European planners exaggerated weapons effects predictions.

This exaggeration led to WWI by falsely predicting a quick and easy outcome from the use of offensive bombardment and machine guns against completely exposed and unprotected opponents. Simple trenches and gas masks in WWI proved highly effective at reducing casualties, thereby turning the war into a protracted affair that Germany had not prepared for. Thus, two world wars have proven conclusively that deceptive exaggerations and attacks on defensive countermeasures against explosive and contaminating weapons effects like blast and persistent mustard and nerve gas did not guarantee peace. Instead, weapons effects exaggerations for "peace" actually encouraged thugs to acquire precisely the most scare-mongered weapons for coercive intimidation, and to use them to threaten the unprepared into appeasement, causing wars.


Some myths debunked: 1. nobody was "vaporized": people are 70% water which has far too high a specific heat capacity and latent heat of vaporization even at ground zero, 2. fallout and neutron induced activity were insignificant compared to the initial nuclear radiation doses, because of the height of burst, 3. the long term effects of radiation were trivial compared to the natural cancer rate in an unexposed control group, and genetic effects were insignificant, 4. conventional weapons killed more people and resulted in more deaths and suffering because conventional wars lasted for years: the "blunt knife" is more dangerous overall, because it is likely to slip and cause injuries, because you need to use more force on a blunt knife to achieve any given result, 5. shallow underground bursts avert collateral damage around bunkers, while retaining credible deterrence. Downwind fallout can be washed or brushed off, and nuclear radiation is attenuated by buildings, 6. nuclear weapons with individually larger areas of effects are actually easier to protect against than an immense number of conventional weapons, because the blast wave is delayed for a longer period of time after the bright visible flash over most of the damaged area: fashionable lying "films" falsely superimpose the sound on the flash to "discredit" civil defense, one of the most sinister deceptions. The same applies to fallout: the further an effect has to travel, the longer it takes to arrive, so there is time to evacuate or to take cover in a safe building. Conventional weapons failed to deter two world wars, which explains why Cold War nuclear weapons were relied upon for deterrence. Anti-civil defense propaganda for nuclear disarmament politics is reducing not only deterrence but public safeguards against nuclear terrorism. Nuclear disarmament will put the clock back to the pre-nuclear era of conventional world wars. Nuclear safeguards and inspections will simply drive proliferation further underground, or risk war in themselves (just as 1930s efforts to oppose proliferation risked starting a war).

“If individuals feel they can do little about possible dangers, they have to flee from such threats by the use of denial. ... such individuals are not prepared to deal with the danger situation when it appears. ... In the early days of training for nuclear disaster, we stressed the number of casualties that even a nominal bomb could produce. Our listeners were alarmed, thinking, ‘How could we care for a thousand burn cases when only four or five such cases demoralize our hospital?’ The result of this approach was to lose our audiences.”

– Albert J. Glass, MD, “Mass Psychology: the Determinants of Behavior under Emergency Conditions,” Mass Burns: Proceedings of a Workshop, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. (linked here), pp. 11-20 (quotations from pages 13-14).

Exposed burned skin evaporates water at the rate of 10 litres/m2/day, which dries out and cools the body temperature, and this water evaporation rate is the actual physical mechanism behind the well-known dehydration, hypothermia, and shock in serious burns victims. The exposed burned skin also offers direct entry to the body tissues for bacterial infections (sepsis) which overwhelm the immune system and in combination with lowered temperature due to evaporation, escalate to pulmonary complications, and also allow direct contamination with radioactive fallout particles after a nuclear attack. Because severely burned victims reject food, they soon lose the energy needed to recover due to the cooling from water evaporation from the burned areas. At Hiroshima nothing was done to address the causal mechanism for burns mortality, instead efforts were made to treat dehydration by providing more fluids and antibiotics for infection. Reversing this whole approach, in order to actually prevent the underlying causes of these secondary effects in an emergency situation (nuclear attack), it has been found that simply covering exposed severe burns wounds with plastic film has been proved to avoid or reduce the immense evaporation of water which actually causes all of these immediate dehydration, shock, and hypothermia effects, and also much of the infection and contamination danger in the first place.

See Carl Jelenko, III, MD, “The Burn Surface as a Parasite: Water Loss, Caloric Demands, and Therapeutic Implications” and E. J. L. Lowbury, “The Prevention of Sepsis in Burns” (which shows in table 2 that 70% mortality from infected burns is reduced to 5% mortality if the burns are not infected) in Mass Burns: Proceedings of a Workshop, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. (linked here).


Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for Thermal Burns

ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News

August 2008

By Patrice Wendling

Elsevier Global Medical News

CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit. The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on burn wounds for almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician, explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Burn Association. “Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back,” Mr. Clopton said in an interview. “We just wanted to get the word out about the success we’ve had using plastic wrap for burn wounds,” he said. Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it’s inexpensive, widely available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing removal. “I can’t recall a single incident of it causing trouble for the patients,” Dr. Kealey said.


Professor Eugene P. Wigner, “Why Civil Defense: A consideration of its effects if war comes, if not, and on the likelihood of nuclear war”, The Technology Review, v66 (1964), no. 8, pp. 21-23:

“No one, least of all the soldier, thought it ill-fitting or cowardly to seek protection ... rather than to meet enemy shells fatally in the open. ... Let us assume, for example, that the United States and the Soviet Union reach some accord on gradual disarmament, and that many weapons and missiles are destroyed. ... If some small country, ruled by a dictator, built or otherwise acquired a few megaton-size weapons, its ruler might be tempted to threaten the U.S. with a few bombs with primitive delivery systems, such as mined merchant ships or concealed bombs in cities, to gain a free hand in his part of the world. ... It often has been said that the protection of our population might make our leaders more aggressive ... The absence of civil defense also could generate aggressiveness in leaders aware of the advantages of striking the first blow.”


'Restricted' classified U.K. Home Office Scientific Adviser's Branch journal Fission Fragments, W. F. Greenhalgh, Editor, London, Issue Number 3, August 1962, pages 22-26:

'The fire hazard from nuclear weapons

'by G. R. Stanbury, BSc, ARCS, F.Inst.P.

'We have often been accused of underestimating the fire situation from nuclear attack. We hope to show that there is good scientific justification for the assessments we have made, and we are unrepentant in spite of the television utterances of renowned academic scientists who know little about fire. ...

'Firstly ... the collapse of buildings would snuff out any incipient fires. Air cannot get into a pile of rubble, 80% of which is incombustible anyway. This is not just guess work; it is the result of a very complete study of some 1,600 flying bomb [V1 cruise missile] incidents in London supported by a wealth of experience gained generally in the last war.

'Secondly, there is a considerable degree of shielding of one building by another in general.

'Thirdly, even when the windows of a building can "see" the fireball, and something inside is ignited, it by no means follows that a continuing and destructive fire will develop.

'The effect of shielding in a built-up area was strikingly demonstrated by the firemen of Birmingham about 10 years ago with a 144:1 scale model of a sector of their city which they built themselves; when they put a powerful lamp in the appropriate position for an air burst they found that over 50% of the buildings were completely shielded. More recently a similar study was made in Liverpool over a much larger area, not with a model, but using the very detailed information provided by fire insurance maps. The result was similar.

'It is not so easy to assess the chance of a continuing fire. A window of two square metres would let in about 105 calories at the 5 cal/cm2 range. The heat liberated by one magnesium incendiary bomb is 30 times this and even with the incendiary bomb [which burns for 15 minutes, not the few seconds or less for a nuclear flash] the chance of a continuing fire developing in a small room is only 1 in 5; in a large room it is very much less.

'Thus even if thermal radiation does fall on easily inflammable material which ignites, the chance of a continuing fire developing is still quite small. In the Birmingham and Liverpool studies, where the most generous values of fire-starting chances were used, the fraction of buildings set on fire was rarely higher than 1 in 20.

'And this is the basis of the assertion [in Nuclear Weapons] that we do not think that fire storms are likely to be started in British cities by nuclear explosions, because in each of the five raids in which fire storms occurred (four on Germany - Hamburg, Darmstadt, Kassel, Wuppertal and a "possible" in Dresden, plus Hiroshima in Japan - it may be significant that all these towns had a period of hot dry weather before the raid) the initial fire density was much nearer 1 in 2. Take Hamburg for example:

'On the night of 27/28th July 1943, by some extraordinary chance, 190 tons of bombs were dropped into one square mile of Hamburg. This square mile contained 6,000 buildings, many of which were [multistorey wooden] medieval.

'A density of greater than 70 tons/sq. mile had not been achieved before even in some of the major fire raids, and was only exceeded on a few occasions subsequently. The effect of these bombs is best shown in the following diagram, each step of which is based on sound trials and operational experience of the weapons concerned.

'102 tons of high explosive bombs dropped -> 100 fires

'88 tons of incendiary bombs dropped, of which:

'48 tons of 4 pound magnesium bombs = 27,000 bombs -> 8,000 hit buildings -> 1,600 fires

'40 tons of 30 pound gel bombs = 3,000 bombs -> 900 hit buildings -> 800 fires

'Total = 2,500 fires

'Thus almost every other building [1 in 2 buildings] was set on fire during the raid itself, and when this happens it seems that nothing can prevent the fires from joining together, engulfing the whole area and producing a fire storm (over Hamburg the column of smoke, observed from aircraft, was 1.5 miles in diameter at its base and 13,000 feet high; eyewitnesses on the ground reported that trees were uprooted by the inrushing air).

'When the density was 70 tons/square mile or less the proportion of buildings fired during the raid was about 1 in 8 or less and under these circumstances, although extensive areas were burned out, the situation was controlled, escape routes were kept open and there was no fire storm.'


Modern buildings in modern cities do not suffer firestorms.

“The only way to win a war is to escalate it one way or another above what the enemy can endure. If we feel that we cannot win without unacceptable risk we have no business fighting in the first place.

“There are just two checks on escalation. One is the waning of motivation for fighting the war in the first place. A long grinding war of attrition on the ground might achieve this … The second check on escalation is to so overwhelm your enemy with such heavy and rapid destruction that he loses all hope of winning. Then surrender is an attractive choice when compared to inevitable defeat or certain death. This, of course, is the way we brought Japan to terms in 1945. It was unnecessary to invade with infantry and fight a ground war. We seem to have forgotten this fact. Even though Japan had four million troops under arms with two million guarding her shores, not a shot was fired. We invaded with fourteen hundred military administrators, by air. Not a life was lost in this invasion.

“The Japanese had been highly motivated to wage war against us. Kamikaze tactics and no-surrender policies were typical. Yet a realization that Japan simply could not win and the certainty that continued resistance meant mounting devastation caused her to toss in the sponge. … In the final analysis, hundreds of thousands of lives were saved and dozens of cities spared … In Korea … there were three and a half million military casualties on both sides during three years of drawn-out war. Over a million civilians were killed ...”

- General Curtis E. LeMay, America is in Danger, pages 307-9.


General Curtis Emerson LeMay (1906-90) developed and led the B-17 and B-24 incendiary bombing missions first in Europe and then B-29 missions in the Pacific during World War II, including control of incendiary raids and the two nuclear attacks. In the Cold War he headed the Berlin airlift of 1948, was the founder of SAC (the Strategic Air Command), and from 1961-5 was Chief of Staff of the USAF, retiring after arguments with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara over the Vietnam War. LeMay advised declaring war on North Vietnam (which McNamara refused to do) and the escalatory winning tactics that had proved successful against Japan without requiring a ground invasion of Japan in 1945. McNamara instead initially used the failing flexible response efforts to try to encourage negotiation with the least possible force, and later a gradual rather than overwhelming vertical escalation which simply resulted in media criticism for the killing of civilians with no positive result. While LeMay requested the bombing of North Vietnam harbors, but McNamara preferred to leave them untouched and bomb insurgent camps and supply routes within Vietnam, claiming that LeMay’s scheme would kill Soviet Union advisers in supply ships in the harbors of North Vietnam, escalating the war horizontally, destabilizing Europe.

General Curtis E. LeMay’s 5 June 1968 book America is in Danger (Funk and Wagnalls, New York) is still valid today, and it predicted on page 307 that America was going to lose in Vietnam, if McNamara’s graduated response war policy continued. The book jacket clearly summarizes LeMay’s case: “America is in danger. … We find ourselves in a purely defensive role, unable to make our will felt even in a conflict with a backward jungle country. … Our strategic nuclear superiority has given us much diplomatic strength in the past. Do we still have that strength? … I think not. That is why America is in grave danger. … Assessing the strategic situation, General LeMay argues that our former policy of overwhelming nuclear superiority proved itself during the crises in Berlin, Taiwan, and Cuba, and produced twenty years of relative peace. Yet the current Administration has opted for a new and untested posture that permits, even encourages parity with Russia.”

On pages viii-ix LeMay explains that the worst wars are caused by dogmatic censorship in democracy:

“The equivocal manner in which we are waging the war in Southeast Asia [Vietnam] is a direct result of the bankrupt nature of a deterrent policy. … ‘defense intellectuals’ go unchallenged simply because the experienced professional active duty officers are officially prohibited from entering into public debate. … In 1916 while war in Europe was raging, President Woodrow Wilson banished from Washington a few officers at the Army War College who had the temerity to plan for war. … I. S. Block, ‘proved’ statistically in a popular book The Future of War, and in numerous speeches, that war was an economic impossibility [Norman Angell’s Great Illusion in 1908 deluded Britain into viewing war as economically absurd, but was still awarded a Knighthood and a Nobel Peace Prize after WWI, since facts are always distorted to fit in to a hardened ideology]. His disciples (among whom was David Starr Jordan) were still plugging this doctrine in America in the face of the Battles of the Marne and the Somme.

“Just a few months before Sarajevo in 1914, David Starr Jordan, President of Stanford University and a renowned naturalist, said, ‘It is apparently not possible for another real war among the nations of Europe to take place.’ … Before World War II the military profession was again pre-empted by the ‘defense intellectuals.’ … The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 had outlawed law in principle. The Washington Disarmament conferences of the 1930s, if not arriving at a treaty had at least condemned ‘offensive’ weapons. … There was no one who could tell America that wars cannot be won with defensive weapons. … In the Army Air Corps we developed the B-17 Flying Fortress almost clandestinely. … Thirteen were ordered in 1937 and with them we worked out the tactics and strategies which carried the war to Germany and Japan …”

On pages xiii-xiv, LeMay points out that in any war, be it Japan or Vietnam, there is no certain quantitative prediction possible of the effect of weapons on the will of the enemy to resist or surrender, and this factor must be either omitted or faked in all computer “predictions”:

“We computerized every activity susceptible to machine analysis long before most businesses or other government agencies … What we did not do was to force non-quantifiable data into a quantified mold in order to feed it to the machines. … when defense intellectuals attempt, in deadpan seriousness, to quantify the effect that x number of casualties will have on the government or the will to resist, they are entering the Land of Oz. Some countries have succumbed, as France did in 1940, with minor casualties. Carthage and Paraguay (in 1870) show that other countries never give up, no matter what the casualties. … Such unknowns in the strategic equation are anathema to the quantifier.”

LeMay elaborates this on page 77:

“An enraged country may go to war against impossible odds, with no logical change of victory. This is another example of weakness in the concept of deterrence – the possibility of the illogical reaction. Thus did Paraguay fight against an overwhelming alliance of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay in 1864. So did little Serbia stand up to the great Austria-Hungarian Empire in 1914. And thus did England and France declare war on Germany in 1939 … Almost any country can be pushed too far, as was Hungary in 1956. It then feels compelled to fight regardless of the consequences. Patrick Henry’s remark ‘give me liberty or give me death’ is not an isolated human decision.”

LeMay’s points out that Defense Secretary McNamara’s failure in the Vietnam War was due to the abuse of science, in fiddling computer model assumptions about the political response to the enemy to military coercion. LeMay on page 89 shows that this failure of analysis in Vietnam also applies to general nuclear war deterrence planning, e.g. McNamara’s 1967 Posture Statement: “To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States … ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage …” Here the word “unacceptable” is a subjective function of the emotional state of mind of the enemy.

Anti-nuclear war propaganda like Kubrick’s pseudoscience film Dr Strangelove is attributed by LeMay on pages 8-12 to ideologues (the pseudo-pacifists, the pseudo-moralistic crusaders, and the well-meaning media whose lying “anti-war” propaganda lay behind previous wars):

“This large peace-time military establishment has allowed many scaremongers to capitalize on the traditional anti-military American attitudes and thus sell books and movies. … It is like yelling fire in a crowded theatre. Some … is encouraged by our enemies to weaken faith in our military leadership and thus to undermine our resolve or capability for self-defense. Some of it, of course, is a perfectly legitimate concern over how a large, perpetual military establishment will change our system of values, society, and government. … One must keep in mind the communist technique of ‘boring from within.’ … History illustrates that the first act of a dictator is to distort and suppress the news. Free speech and press permit the truth to be aired and opposing opinions to be expressed. … The world is moving too fast today, particularly in technology, for us to be tied to a monolithic organization which stifles all thought outside its own party line of hackneyed solutions. … One of the greatest dangers in a military estimate of any situation is to believe, through party-line strategic concepts, that you know what the enemy will or will not do. We knew that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor, our best-defended outpost. … We knew that the Soviet Union would not put nuclear intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. … We must – but do not – have a defense organization which permits controversy, which permits the ‘unthinkable’ condition to be debated freely, which permits the screwball idea to come forth, and which tolerates the maverick officer. The Andrew Jacksons, the Zachary Taylors, the Ulysses S. Grants, the George Deweys, the Alfred Thayer Mahans, the Billy Mitchells, are not nurtured in orthodoxy. They are not products of a party line.”

In a chapter on the “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” LeMay explains on page 204 that although “Every large war, of course, is sparked by some relatively minor event, as the murder at Saravejo in 1914 or the Nazi march into Poland in 1939”, ignition sparks are not the fuel. The straw that breaks the camel’s back is not the sole or even the major problem:

“The small countries of Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Poland most certainly cannot be accused of ‘catalytic’ behavior during these tense times. Should Poland have succumbed for the sake of world peace? The small country argument is sometimes related to the ‘statistical’ theory. As more countries get the bomb, goes the reasoning, something is likely to happen that will cause a bomb to go off. … This fear should be laid to rest. The number of nuclear bombs and warheads have already proliferated to the thousands and the first accidental nuclear explosion has yet to occur. … For example, on December 8, 1964, a B-58 Hustler bomber with a ‘nuclear device’ in its bomb bay caught fire at Bunker Hill Air Force Base, Indiana … no radioactive contamination occurred. Of the four bombs dropped from a B-52 off Palomares, Spain, as a result of a refueling collision in 1966 … there was some relatively harmless contamination caused by two which broke up. A nuclear bomb is a highly complicated device and many sequential steps must be taken to light it off. … At worse, the chemical high explosive components of a bomb might detonate from fire and scatter some nuclear material which could cause a small area to become mildly and harmlessly radioactive, as in Spain. Nothing of this sort is liable to lead to a nuclear war.”

On pages 242-260, in his chapter on “Counterinsurgency and the War in Vietnam”, LeMay points out:

“It is a war waged simultaneously on many fronts and in many forms. It is a cold war and a hot war, and economic war and a political war, a propaganda war and an ideological war. It is waged by the communists according to their own timetable and on battlefields of their choosing. … By 1965 we were bombing North Vietnam and landing combat troops to engage with the Viet Cong. Yet the South Vietnamese army was shot with desertions and down to one-third strength. Equipment worth millions of dollars from the United States was finding its way into Viet Cong hands. … It is a war of flexible response not designed to win but rather to punish, and to punish only enough to bring the Hanoi government to the conference table. … It is a war where our powerful Navy allows foreign ships to supply the enemy with war materials. … It is a war where we allow the one principal harbor – the harbor through which the large majority of enemy supplies must flow – to remain undamaged. … This is the war of flexible response and graduated deterrence applied for the first time. This is the war concocted by the arms controllers of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations to prevent, they believed, the feared nuclear holocaust. The consequences of such a cruel non-war will be heartache, frustration, and death, rather than a reasonable political settlement. We must change our strategy. …

“The long, drawn-out conflict has created dissension, disillusion, and dispute in America. It has seemed to foster a greater sense of determination and purpose in North Vietnam. … Oriental stoicism and patience make North Vietnam willing to extend the struggle from generation to generation, or so they say, to have a ‘protracted war’. … we are fighting with the commodity most precious to us … the lives of men. And what is our objective? To negotiate. … Our continued pleas for peace and talks can only leave an impression of irresolution, which encourages North Vietnamese resistance. … we dribbled in reinforcements, taking one half-measure after another in the ‘graduated’ manner of flexible response, pursuing a peculiar strategy which said, in effect, ‘Fight the enemy on his own terms.’ … we must fight the war from our position of strength, not theirs. We must fight it at the lowest cost to ourselves and at the greatest cost to the enemy. … Probably the weirdest aspect of this Alice-in-Wonderland war is that we have dropped more explosive on Vietnam than we did on Germany in World War II. … It is not air power that is wanting. It is the wrong employment of air power. … The sanctuary we have granted to the port of Haiphong is one of the strangest anomalies in the history of warfare. During the past two years 827 ships have brought munitions and supplies to North Vietnam. Of these ships, 267 were Russian, 258 were Red Chinese, 94 were from Eastern European countries, and 210 were ships of our alleged allies and foreign air recipients. … There are so many ways we could close that port! We could blockade it. We could bomb it to rubble. We could mine it. We could sink a ship in the entrance channel.”

The American gradual response doctrine in Vietnam backfired and built up resistance and hardness in North Vietnam. When finally the bombing intensity was increased, the people were by then well accustomed to bombing and inured to bombing. Vietnam is the textbook example of what happens when you try to fight a politically correct war: not only do you lose militarily, but you also cause more destruction and suffering in the process of losing and then suffer more savage propaganda from the “peace” movement for having done so. In his chapter on “Limited War”, LeMay explains how Einstein’s equation can be used to intimidate an enemy thus actually preventing the usual massacre:

“Modern delivery systems make it possible to achieve great accuracy in placing weapons on target, and technology has made it possible to tailor the size of the nuclear yield to fit the situation [dial a yield]. The basic target system for nuclear weapons, as in all conflict, is the enemy’s military capability … The introduction of appropriate-sized nuclear weapons should insure an early termination of hostilities, reduce casualties among American and friendly forces, and limit, not expand, the amount of economic disruption and destruction … As to the question of escalation to general nuclear war, it would seem that this is a matter which should concern the Communists more than it does the United States … With United States superiority, the crossing of any threshold of escalation presents an outcome progressively worse for the Communists. Lacking a capability to fight and win a full-fledged war with the United States, they are obliged, in their own interests, to keep any war at a low level of intensity. …

“The idea of controlled escalation is not valid when we are confronted by an irrational enemy. A country bent on suicide cannot be stopped short of that. …

“1. Success in limited war is contingent upon maintaining a superior general war capability.

“2. Escalation must be feared most by the power with the weaker general war capability. …

“Unless we start to win the wars we get into, we may find ourselves overextended around the world on several frontiers, fighting equivocal wars. To maintain such vast military forces America would become an armed camp with all our sons being drafted for these endless foreign wars. God forbid! The 1984 of George Orwell would be here. America could then offer little more to its citizens than communism does to its comrades.”

In a chapter on “Military Superiority” at pages 273-309, LeMay explains that fashionable arms control and weapons parity is a dangerous policy because it encourages aggression and coercion by the enemy:

“The desire to reduce the huge expenditure for armed forces and armaments is universal. Measures to reduce the risk of war or its destructive nature are crucial matters to all. … Why have physical scientists taken up arms control with such consummate zeal? Some scientists have suggested that there is a guilt complex at work. The physical scientists unleashed the horrible genie of nuclear energy and now they feel morally responsible for putting the genie back into the bottle. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [which responded with a damning review of LeMay’s book, written by Dr Ralph Lapp, ignoring the military lessons about war and quibbled about the yields of some Russian missiles] has beat this drum for almost two decades. Activists … set out to change the national ethos by making nuclear war so horrible to contemplate that national defense with nuclear weapons would be considered immoral and unthinkable. … This anti-nuclear movement is a highly charged, emotional ‘cause’ which has attracted many other groups. The peace organizations have joined with vim. Yet so have many able and well-intentioned politicians, diplomats, and businessmen. … These are all people with a crusading zeal to do away with nuclear weapons and save the world from nuclear war. … They conceive of nuclear weapons to be the greatest evil in the world, and this thought seems to becloud all judgement, knowledge, and sometimes even loyalties. …

“The accidental war concept was popularly launched by the novel Red Alert [by Peter George in 1958, which was made into Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film Dr Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb using cobalt bomb propaganda against LeMay, Kahn and Teller], a horror story describing a war started by a crazed SAC commander. … Soon after the story was published in 1958, it was ordered that tactical pilots would be medically examined for possible mental abnormalities. The connection seems obvious. Fail-Safe by Burdick and Wheeler was a later thriller of similar plot. This impossible yarn related how a condenser blew in communications equipment, causing a bomber force to fly past its fail-safe point and attack Moscow. Such a ridiculously inaccurate story, deliberately twisting the whole concept of fail-safe which simply meant that if any part of the system failed the system was safe, was passed off by the authors as an authentic possibility, even a probability. Said the authors, ‘it represents a competent estimate of the technical and scientific factors involved in the ‘fail-safe’ system. …

“War is never ‘cost-effective’ in terms of dollars and blood. People are killed. To them the war is total. You cannot tell bereaved wives, children, and parents that today’s war in Vietnam, for example, is a counter-insurgency exercise into which the United States is putting only a limited effort. Death is final, and drafted boys should not be asked to make this ultimate sacrifice unless the Government is behind them 100 percent. If we pull our punches how can we explain it to their loved ones? … Our losses so far in Vietnam exceed those of the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War combined. Are we paying this price simply to help a friendly country stop outside aggression, or are we actually fighting expanding communism? … we should never engage in a small war unless we are prepared to fight and win a large war. This is fundamental. … The only way to win a war is to escalate it one way or another above what the enemy can endure. If we feel that we cannot win without unacceptable risk we have no business fighting in the first place.

“There are just two checks on escalation. One is the waning of motivation for fighting the war in the first place. A long grinding war of attrition on the ground might achieve this … The second check on escalation is to so overwhelm your enemy with such heavy and rapid destruction that he loses all hope of winning. Then surrender is an attractive choice when compared to inevitable defeat or certain death. This, of course, is the way we brought Japan to terms in 1945. It was unnecessary to invade with infantry and fight a ground war. We seem to have forgotten this fact. Even though Japan had four million troops under arms with two million guarding her shores, not a shot was fired. We invaded with fourteen hundred military administrators, by air. Not a life was lost in this invasion.

“The Japanese had been highly motivated to wage war against us. Kamikaze tactics and no-surrender policies were typical. Yet a realization that Japan simply could not win and the certainty that continued resistance meant mounting devastation caused her to toss in the sponge. … In the final analysis, hundreds of thousands of lives were saved and dozens of cities spared … In Korea … there were three and a half million military casualties on both sides during three years of drawn-out war. Over a million civilians were killed ...”

On pages 104-5, LeMay recommends ABM, pointing out that enemy nuclear missile warheads are vulnerable to initial nuclear radiation and X-ray ablation extending over immense distances in the vacuum of space by a defensive nuclear explosion, so they are shot down without having to “hit a bullet with a bullet”. On page 106, LeMay points out that on 10 November 1966 Defense Secretary McNamara publicly admitted that Russia was employing these ABM systems around Moscow and Leningrad. The three 300 kt Russian Operation K nuclear tests at altitudes of 290, 150 and 59 km on 22 and 28 October and 1 November 1962, respectively, were ABM system proof tests. Unlike American high altitude nuclear tests (where EMP damage on Hawaii was discovered purely by accident), Russia specifically instrumented burned power transmission lines and telephone lines for EMP damage research before setting off these nuclear tests. Russian unveiled its Griffon ABM in 1963 and “The Galosh ABM was displayed in a Moscow parade in November, 1964.”

Despite this proof-tested Russian ABM accomplishment which would have shot down rogue nuclear missiles falling on Moscow, America never protected its cities by ABM systems. Civil defense is also derided in democracies by utopian ideologies who are rewarded Nobel Peace Prizes for censoring out the facts.

“Appeasement seldom works in the long term ... appeasement will not prevent every possible attack.”

- Robert C. Harney, “Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness”, Homeland Security Affairs, volume V, No. 3, September 2009, pp. 1-19 (quotation from page 18). (PDF here.)

“... before World War II, for example, many of the staffs engaged in estimating the effects of bombing overestimated by large amounts. This was one of the main reasons that at the Munich Conference, and earlier occasions, the British and the French chose appeasement ... Many people object to air and civil defense, not because they underestimate the problem, but because they overestimate it. They think there is nothing significant that can be done ...”

- Herman Kahn, testimony to the Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Congress, 22-26 June 1959, Part 1, at pages 883 and 943. (139 MB PDF.)


“No folly is more costly than the folly of intolerant idealism.” - Winston Churchill

“U.S. leaders will be compelled to temper their objectives visà-vis nuclear-armed regional adversaries ...”

- David Ochmanek and Lowell H. Schwartz, The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries, RAND Corporation, 2008, Monograph MG-671-AF, pages xi-xii.


“... We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal. ... We learned that the institutions charged with protecting ... did not adjust their policies, plans and practices to deter or defeat it.” - Thomas H. Kean (Chair) and Lee H. Hamilton (Vice Chair), Preface to The 9/11 Commission Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004.

Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1972

Janis, civil defense research psychologist and author of Psychological Stress (Wiley, N.Y., 1958), Stress and Frustration (Harcourt Brace, N.Y., 1971), and Air War and Emotional Stress (RAND Corporation/McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1951), begins Victims of Groupthink with a study of classic errors by “groupthink” advisers to four American presidents (page iv):

“Franklin D. Roosevelt (failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor), Harry S. Truman (the invasion of North Korea), John F. Kennedy (the Bay of Pigs invasion), and Lyndon B. Johnson (escalation of the Vietnam War) ... in each instance, the members of the policy-making group made incredibly gross miscalculations about both the practical and moral consequences of their decisions.”

Joseph de Rivera's The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy showed how a critic of Korean War tactics was excluded from the advisory group, to maintain a complete consensus for President Truman. Schlesinger's A Thousand Days shows how President Kennedy was misled by a group of advisers on the decision to land 1,400 Cuban exiles in the Bay of Pigs to try to overthrow Castro's 200,000 troops, a 1:143 ratio. Janis writes in Victims of Groupthink:

“I use the term “groupthink” ... when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”(p. 9)

“... the group's discussions are limited ... without a survey of the full range of alternatives.”(p. 10)

“The objective assessment of relevant information and the rethinking necessary for developing more differentiated concepts can emerge only out of the crucible of heated debate [to overcome inert prejudice/status quo], which is anathema to the members of a concurrence-seeking group.”(p.61)

“One rationalization, accepted by the Navy right up to December 7 [1941], was that the Japanese would never dare attempt a full-scale assault against Hawaii because they would realize that it would precipitate an all-out war, which the United States would surely win. It was utterly inconceivable ... But ... the United States had imposed a strangling blockade ... Japan was getting ready to take some drastic military counteraction to nullify the blockade.”(p.87)

“... in 1914 the French military high command ignored repeated warnings that Germany had adopted the Schlieffen Plan, which called for a rapid assault through Belgium ... their illusions were shattered when the Germans broke through France's weakly fortified Belgian frontier in the first few weeks of the war and approached the gates of Paris. ... the origins of World War II ... Neville Chamberlain's ... inner circle of close associates ... urged him to give in to Hitler's demands ... in exchange for nothing more than promises that he would make no further demands.”(pp.185-6)

“Eight main symptoms run through the case studies of historic fiascoes ... an illusion of invulnerability ... collective efforts to ... discount warnings ... an unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality ... stereotyped views of enemy leaders ... dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members ... self-censorship of ... doubts and counterarguments ... a shared illusion of unanimity ... (partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations, augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent)... the emergence of ... members who protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.”(pp.197-8)

“... other members are not exposed to information that might challenge their self-confidence.”(p.206)

William J. Broad, U.S. Rethinks Strategy for the Unthinkable, New York Times, December 15, 2010:

“But a problem for the Obama administration is how to spread the word without seeming alarmist about a subject that few politicians care to consider, let alone discuss. So officials are proceeding gingerly in a campaign to educate the public. “We have to get past the mental block that says it’s too terrible to think about,” W. Craig Fugate, administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, said in an interview. “We have to be ready to deal with it” and help people learn how to “best protect themselves.” ... Administration officials argue that the cold war created an unrealistic sense of fatalism about a terrorist nuclear attack. “It’s more survivable than most people think,” said an official deeply involved in the planning, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “The key is avoiding nuclear fallout.” ... “There’s no penetration of the message coming out of the federal government,” said Irwin Redlener, a doctor and director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University. “It’s deeply frustrating that we seem unable to bridge the gap between the new insights and using them to inform public policy.” ... “Public education is key,” Daniel J. Kaniewski, a security expert at George Washington University, said in an interview. “But it’s easier for communities to buy equipment — and look for tech solutions — because there’s Homeland Security money and no shortage of contractors to supply the silver bullet.” ... Some noted conflicting federal advice on whether survivors should seek shelter or try to evacuate. ...

“In 2007, Congress appropriated $5.5 million for studies on atomic disaster planning, noting that “cities have little guidance available to them.” The Department of Homeland Security financed a multiagency modeling effort led by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The scientists looked at Washington, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and other big cities, using computers to simulate details of the urban landscape and terrorist bombs. ... The big surprise was how taking shelter for as little as several hours made a huge difference in survival rates. “This has been a game changer,” Brooke Buddemeier, a Livermore health physicist, told a Los Angeles conference. He showed a slide labeled “How Many Lives Can Sheltering Save?” ... Soon after Mr. Obama arrived at the White House, he embarked a global campaign to fight atomic terrorism and sped up domestic planning for disaster response. ... The agenda hit a speed bump. Las Vegas was to star in the nation’s first live exercise meant to simulate a terrorist attack with an atom bomb, the test involving about 10,000 emergency responders. But casinos and businesses protested, as did Senator Harry Reid of Nevada. He told the federal authorities that it would scare away tourists. Late last year, the administration backed down. “Politics overtook preparedness,” said Mr. Kaniewski of George Washington University.”

Blast wave survivability - the secret facts

Blast wave survivability - the secret facts
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Survival at high overpressures from nuclear bombs in Japan, by easy shielding of outdoor radiations

Survival at high overpressures from nuclear bombs in Japan, by easy shielding of outdoor radiations
Source: L. Wayne Davis, “Prediction of Urban Casualties and the Medical Load from a High-Yield Nuclear Burst” (based on over 35,000 Hiroshima and Nagasaki case histories), Dirkwood Corporation paper DC-P-1060. By contrast, the widely circulated 1979 U. S. Office of Technology Assessment report, “The Effects of Nuclear War”, assumes that just 5-6 psi produces 50% mortality (the computer model this estimate is from ignores floor resistance, like an ice-skating rink in multistory buildings, thus assuming that the blast blows people out of high-rise buildings to be killed by gravity in the fall to the ground), compared to over 15 psi for people indoors at Nagasaki (people indoors were largely protected from blast-duration dependent wind drag effects, and longer duration blast reduces the vertically falling debris load on survivors by blowing debris horizontally, often reducing rather than increasing the overall hazard). Table 5 in the 1979 report “arbitrarily” assumes that 6.7 cal/sq. cm is lethal to people outdoors, whereas the Dirkwood report shows that 16 cal/sq. cm was lethal to 50% of personnel exposed outdoors in thin summer clothing in Hiroshima, and larger amounts are required for higher weapon yields. Clothing and shadows from buildings, trees, fences, and vehicles offered substantial protection. The U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey reports on Hiroshima and Nagasaki document how people were able to roll and beat out ignited dark colored clothing at very high thermal exposures, usually without sustaining serious burns. Once people are protected against the radiation, flying debris and wind drag by taking cover, Glasstone and Dolan’s 1977 “Effects of Nuclear Weapons” shows in Table 12.38 that an effective peak overpressure of 62 psi is required for 50% lethality from blast effects. Their Table 12.43 shows that the average mass of flying glass fragments decreases with increasing overpressure, from 1.45 grams at 1.9 psi to 0.13 grams at 5.0 psi, making protection against high velocity flying glass splinters and other debris possible. M. K. Drake, et al., “Collateral Damage”, Science Applications, Inc., Defense Nuclear Agency report DNA 4734Z, ADA071371, 1978, page 5-86: “For personnel inside structures, the probability of being hit by glass fragments decreases rapidly as a person moves laterally from behind a window. At 25 degrees from the edge of a window pane, the density of glass fragments is approximately one-tenth the density of fragments measured directly behind the window. ... This was extremely evident in injuries of British civilians during World War II. As the people learned to quit looking out of their windows during bomb raids, the number of glass casualties decreased dramatically.” (Like lightning before thunder, the painfully bright first flash of a nuclear explosion arrives ahead of the slower blast wave, proving a useful warning to duck and cover over large areas of destruction. Fallout consists of small particles which take time to arrive, allowing evacuation or improvised radiation shielding. Fallout predictions only failed during early 1950s tests due to inadequate knowledge of the fallout mechanism and inadequate weather predictions. Modern city buildings with modern fire-resistant furnishings are even less prone to ignition than black air-raid blackout curtains in wartime Hiroshima, which generally failed to start sustained fires. The Hiroshima firestorm was caused by thousands of overturned charcoal stoves in paper screen filled congested wooden housing areas, so overcrowded they were a peacetime fire risk, according to the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey report. With no firestorms, there can be no nuclear winter. In Hiroshima, where there was a firestorm, sunshine was blocked out for 25 minutes as proved by the Hiroshima meteorological sunshine recorder data.)

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