Happy 250th Birthday USA! Without you, we'd have nothing; no freedom, no liberty, no humanity, no life worth living. Yes, the USA saved the UK and the Free World in Two World Wars and Cold War 1.0 (you won't know this if you're a fascist or Marxist, or listen to such anti-freedom propaganda from the BBC, however).
ABOVE: US Marine Corps approach ground zero after a 19 kiloton air burst at 1040 feet altitude in preparation for ending the Korean War by training in tactical deployment of battlefield nuclear combat, Nevada Test Site, Exercise Desert Rock IV, May 1, 1952 (Operation Tumbler-Snapper, test Dog). The Korean War ended in 1953, after the election of President Eisenhower, who let it be known he would end the stalemate war by using tactical nuclear weapons if an armistice was not signed. It was. Tactical nuclear weapons openly publicised preparedness (films and photos of tactical nuclear tests, especially th 15 kiloton Grable nuclear cannon fired shell in 1953, helped end the Korean War) actually were a "USE" of nuclear weapons which deterred the invasions that could otherwise has escalated to WWIII. Strategic countervalue nuclear weapons did not prove a credible deterrent to prevent invasions. Conventional weapons did not deter either World War. We need credible deterrence to end statemate war, collateral damage by conventional weapons, genocide, and massive war expenditure for no useful purpose.
FURTHER READING:
1. Dr Adam Lowther, Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons, Global Security Review, 2024 (linked here):
"The United States’ and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) continued support for Ukraine’s valiant fight to repel a Russian invasion may, ultimately, depending on the state of the conflict, lead Russia to employ one or a small number of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. A conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan could also lead to a similar use of nuclear weapons. ... Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear missiles more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads. ... In short, Russia would seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of lowyield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response ... NATO’s dual-cable aircraft capability—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—is not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. ...
"Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. ... there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. ... Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. ... the “nuclear taboo” is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. ... the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. ... Putin found alternative outlets for Russia exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies. Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Iran together. ... Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history."
2. AD1210925 Expanding low yield battlefield nuclear weapon capabilities by Major Weinmeister, AD1210925 (linked here), 2023, stresses necessity for a return to credible tactical nuclear deterrence to reduce risk of megadeath WWIII threat:
3. Mark B. Schneider, Escalate to De-escalate, US Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2017 (linked here):
"U.S. and Russian views concerning nuclear weapons differ fundamentally. ... Russia today continues to put a large share of its national resources into nuclear weapons programs ... Declassified Soviet and former Warsaw Pact documents indicate that the Soviets planned to use nuclear weapons first in a general war against the West. Today, Russian military doctrine reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in a conventional war. ... Russian nuclear doctrine did “not rule out a nuclear strike targeting a potential aggressor, including a preemptive strike, in situations critical to national security.” ... In December 2009, then-Commander of the Strategic Missile Troops Lieutenant General Andrey Shvaychenko declared, “In a conventional war, [nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)] ensure that the opponent is forced to cease hostilities, on advantageous conditions for Russia, by means of single or multiple preventive strikes against the aggressors’ most important facilities. In a nuclear war, they ensure the destruction of facilities of the opponent’s military and economic potential by means of an initial massive nuclear missile strike and subsequent multiple and single nuclear missile strikes.” General Shvaychenko’s statement is what Russia calls “de-escalation of a conflict.” ... According to Vice Admiral Robert Monroe, U.S. Navy (Retired) and former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, “Russia has followed exactly the opposite course from the United States. It has focused on low-yield weapons research, design, testing, and production.” ...
"Deterring precision low-yield nuclear strikes is critical because small nuclear attacks could escalate into a large-scale war. The United States must make an in-kind retaliatory response more credible and do so at minimum cost. There are options for this. The United Kingdom has a sub-strategic Trident SLBM capability in which missiles intended for this role have just a single warhead, probably with a lower yield. The U.S. Navy could acquire a similar capability at minimal cost as part of the warhead life extension programs now under way, giving the nation a survivable low-yield deterrent. A guidance package similar to that proposed for conventional Trident could give such warheads precision strike capability at an affordable cost. ... In October 2016, President Putin declared that “brandishing nuclear weapons is the last thing to do.” Good advice, but he does not take it. ... Until President Putin starts taking his own advice, the United States and NATO need to maximize their nuclear deterrent capability as inexpensively as possible, sending a message that Russia will never gain an advantage by trying to “escalate to de-escalate.” ... Russia constantly is entertaining new concepts of nuclear war and nuclear weapons that should be a major concern for the West."
4. EM-1 version based on nuclear test data revised in 1960: TM23-200 Capabilities of Atomic Weapons BRIEF EXTRACT (linked here): emphasises military battlefield data on the use of nuclear weapons to stop or deter invasions and conventional warfare, i.e. the USE of nuclear weapons to end all war forever. (Subsequent versions are still in part classified secret and run to thousands of pages, employing computer models rather than emphasising the direct presentation of data actually measured in the 1950s nuclear tests.)
5. Mark Episkopos, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Is Jaw-Droppingly Large, The National Interest, December 2, 2021 (linked here):
"The Kremlin, with its relatively limited resources, is unlikely to win in a prolonged, conventional, continental war with NATO. Thus, Russian military doctrine sees tactical nuclear warheads as a hedge against NATO. ... Putin added that “It is important to keep the required pace of producing advanced strike systems for the purposes of their employment and testing in the course of intensive combat training.” ... Here is the extent of Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal, and how Moscow plans to use it in the event of a major armed conflict with the west. ... At around 3,000 to 6,000 units, the Russian Federation possesses the largest tactical nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. These include not only warheads inherited from the Soviet Union but new and potent weapons systems developed in recent years. ... Russian military doctrine sees tactical nuclear warheads as a hedge against NATO–not only a deterrent but one of Russia’s only means of leveling the playing field in the mutually undesired event of an all-out war. As costly as these stockpiles are to store and maintain, it would be exponentially more expensive– and ultimately futile, given the financial disparities between the two sides– for Russia to try to match NATO’s conventional strength. Tactical nuclear warheads are, and will likely continue to be, a cost-efficient way for Moscow to offset its disadvantage in this domain."
